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List of abbreviations 
ADC = Area development committee  
ADMADE = The Administrative Management Design (first called Lupande development 
project) 
CAMPFIRE = Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources 
(Zimbabwe) 
CBD = the Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBNRM = Community-based Natural Resource Management  
CITES = the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna 
CRB = Community Resource Board 
FAO = Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN) 
GRZ = Government of the Republic of Zambia 
IUCN = International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources/The 
World Conservation Union  
LGMA = Lupande Game Management Area 
LIRDP = Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project 
MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NORAD = Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation 
SD = Sustainable Development 
SEDC = Strategy for Environment in Development co-operation (my abbreviation) 
SLAMU = South Luangwa Area Management Unit 
SLNP = South Luangwa National Park 
UNCED = United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNDP = United Nations Development Programme  
UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme 
UNGASS = United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
VAG = Village Action Group 
WCED = World Commission on Environment and Development (also called the 
Brundtland Report) 
WCS = World Conservation Strategy  
WWF = World Wildlife Fund  
ZAWA = Zambia Wildlife Authority (semi-autonomous) 
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1. General introduction. 
I have chosen a theme that involves both international and national goals for 
development. This is a study of Norwegian Aid1 and Sustainable Development in 
Underdeveloped Countries with focus on sustainable use of natural resources in rural 
development. I will be looking at the importance and understanding of the concept of 
Sustainable Development in Norwegian Development Co-operation. I have also 
chosen two international conventions to see what kind of impact they have on the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD), and the possible 
impact on a specific development project in Zambia – the South Luangwa Area 
management Unit (SLAMU)2. The two conventions are the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Flora and Fauna (CITES). Norwegian authorities signed and ratified CITES in 1976 
and CBD in 1993.  
Norwegian authorities constantly use "sustainable" in their descriptions of what 
development should be. In doing this, they have committed themselves to certain 
criteria for how the development co-operation should be executed. How do they 
handle the duality of the concept, since it is both highly symbolic in strategies but 
also a concrete objective to work for in projects? Will short-term economic and social 
improvement be prioritised even if it leads to serious degradation of natural 
resources, or will people be able to see that sometimes, the prioritisation of natural 
resource conservation will lead to economic and social improvement in the long run? 
To what extent are impacts of SD, CBD and CITES evident in practical development 
projects? How important are environmental considerations seen to be by NORAD 
personnel? How are natural resources used and conserved in development projects?  
                                              
1 Aid and Development co-operation is considered to be the same, and will therefore be used interchangeably. 
However, development co-operation will be used as far as possible, except where it is not well suited for 
pedagogical reasons. This is in line with the way it is used by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-
operation (NORAD) and my view is the same as theirs; development co-operation is a better, more neutral 
conception which should be used instead of aid as far as possible. 
2 Throughout the thesis ‘the project’, LIRDP, and SLAMU will be used interchangeably. The project was 
originally called LIRDP= Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, until the name was changed 
01.01.1999 to SLAMU. Further explanations about this will follow in chapter 2. 
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1.1 Norwegian Development Co-operation. 
The management of Norwegian public aid is divided between The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the directorate underneath it, NORAD. The MFA has the 
responsibility for the multilateral3 part and disaster relief, while NORAD administers 
the long-term and bilateral4 part. In addition the Ministry of the Environment has 
responsibility for environmental assistance in Norwegian development co-operation. I 
will only look at the bilateral development co-operation.  
NORAD has a lot of strategies, but the ones which are the most important in this 
study are the Report (White Paper) no.19 (1995-1996) to the Storting, “A changing 
world - Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries”, and the 
“Strategy for environment in development co-operation”(SEDC)1997-2005 (Ås: 
2002 [interview]). In addition, the main strategy “NORAD invests in the future, 
NORAD’s strategy for 2000-2005” will be elaborated on further in chapters 2 and 4 
to, among other things,  show the symbolic value of its contents5. The first mentioned 
strategy explains the background for changes in the Norwegian policy towards 
developing countries and lists the most important aspects of this policy. More than 
earlier development co-operation is used to support peace and democratisation 
processes, human rights work has increased and the environment has become a 
central area of support. Consideration of ecological sustainability is sought to be 
integrated in all development co-operation6. The principle of recipient responsibility 
is also highlighted7. The second aspect is more specific as a follow up of one of the 
main points in Report no 19, namely contribution to a responsible management of the 
environment on earth and biological diversity– as the superior goal of SEDC.  
                                              
3 Multilateral aid = the kind that is distributed through international organisations like the United Nations (UN), 
the World Bank and The International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
4 Bilateral development co-operation= means the co-operation between Norway and single developing 
countries, based on an agreement between the two countries. NORAD is the responsible executing institution. 
5 The other strategies are; "HIV/AIDS and development - Norway’s views", "NORAD's Good Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Action Plan", report no. 21 to the Storting "Action plan for human rights", NORAD's 
"Handbook in Human Rights Assessment", and "Strategy for female- and equal rights oriented development 
co-operation".  
6 http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/publ/stmeld/032005-040003/index-dok000-b-f-a.html 
7 For a further description of the white paper; see 2.3.1 
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In addition there are strategic guidelines from the Foreign Ministry in the yearly 
allocation letters. These are the important overarching strategies for NORAD when 
considering environmental issues. 
 
1.2 Research goals and objectives 
Biological diversity is not spread evenly around the globe, nor are the means or the 
knowledge on how to use it in a sustainable manner. Most notably, the greatest 
variety of flora and fauna and the greatest losses of this diversity are in developing 
countries (Rosendal: 1999, Stenseth: 1999). Biodiversity is important because it 
offers choice, and choice helps people to manage change, whether instigated by 
economic, social or environmental factors, or a combination (Koziell & Saunders 
2000:2). The consequences of not addressing biodiversity as a part of development 
decision-making processes are likely to be most serious for the financially poor and 
marginalised (ibid: 7, Paavola: 2001).  
However, in the long run this will affect us all as the environmental services 
supported by biodiversity will be impaired8 (Koziell & Saunders: 2000). Biodiversity 
gives a good basis for reaching sustainable development. As the WCED (1987: 147) 
stated, the challenge facing nations today is no longer deciding if conservation is a 
good idea, but rather how it can be implemented in the national interest and within 
the means available in each country. Since the developing countries don’t have the 
necessary means, developed countries have to contribute through development co-
operation, so that the biological diversity within the borders of developing countries 
is sustained. Developed nations are well placed to undertake remedial efforts given 
their productive, technological, and financial capacity (Lafferty & Meadowcroft 
2000: 2-3.)  It is  
                                              
8 Biodiversity is the medium through which air, water, gases and chemicals are moderated and exchanged to 
create environmental services (which are categorised as indirect use as opposed to direct use like subsistence). 
It takes place over a wide scale with watershed protection, carbon storage and on a smaller scale via nutrient 
cycling. Pest and disease control. It ensures the continued functioning, resilience and productivity of 
ecosystems which provide the ‘direct use’ goods. ( from  Koziell & Sauders 2000:3 (table 1).  
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..important to recognise that the international consensus around SD is based 
upon a principle of ‘differentiated responsibility’, with the rich countries 
having publicly acknowledged an obligation to take action, particularly with 
respect to- among other areas- the provision of development assistance and 
environmental technology transfer to developing countries. (ibid: 3). 
According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft it is unlikely that developing countries will 
take SD seriously, if the affluent societies of the North do not demonstrably do so. 
Thus the attitude of developed countries becomes crucial to the viability of the entire 
international process of engagement with sustainable development9 (ibid., CBD 
1992). 
I think it is important that the differentiated responsibility that Lafferty & 
Meadowcroft mention, and which is also recognised by CBD, is followed by 
developed countries. Even when the transfer of expensive technological means is not 
needed, like it can be with development based on natural resources, the developing 
countries still need support in different forms10. One of my informants mentioned that 
the most successful projects he knew about were not expensive (Eid 2003: 
[interview]). Biological diversity is a very important resource for further 
advancement in developing countries, which can bring better livelihoods for local 
people as well as secure food and medicine for the whole world through maintaining 
the genetic diversity.  
There is much too little knowledge about the ecosystems on the planet, and 
because of this it is important to act with caution and always seek out sustainable or 
beneficial ways to bring development to poor people. In this way, biological diversity 
can also be secured for future generations. The realisation that biological diversity 
has a great value, not the least in creating development for poor people through 
conservation and sustainable use, is not new to NORAD. It is an important part of the 
environmental considerations in NORAD’s work and is emphasised in many present 
strategies and reports11. If the written strategies were the same as the practical work, 
                                              
9 This is connected to the notion that developing countries are afraid of having their development reduced by 
developed nations’ arguments for environmental considerations. Developed nations have to show that they also 
put restraints on how their own continued development can evolve. 
10 Besides transfer of technological means, other forms of support can be information, education, institutional 
co-operation and so on, which need not be so expensive. 
11 E.g. Report no. 19 (1995-96), Strategy for Environment in Development cooperation (SEDC), NORAD’s 
strategy to the year 2005, and the Norwegian national report on implementation of the CBD. 
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sustainable development including poverty reduction, conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, would have been realised to a higher degree a long time 
ago. Unfortunately, it seems very difficult to implement the strategies; therefore I 
wish to find out why it seems so problematic for NORAD to include environmental 
considerations in the development work. Maybe they haven’t had the right 
competence or will to integrate environmental issues in the development work? Or 
maybe the new stronger focus12 on the connection between poverty reduction and 
sustainable development will make it easier to fulfil both? 
My goals in this thesis are: 
 First, to look at the importance of the mentioned concept for NORAD, by using 
Lafferty & Meadowcroft’s definition of Sustainable Development to see how 
Sustainable Development is used and if the three dimensions13 within the 
concept are equally emphasised in NORAD.  
Second, the importance of the conventions for NORAD will be looked at through 
how they are mentioned in strategies, and how they are used by NORAD employees, 
which I intend to find out through reading the strategies and guidelines and through 
interviewing NORAD employees. The main question in relation to the conventions 
will be; To what extent and in which ways have CBD and CITES influenced 
NORAD’s strategies and how are they used in the daily work?  
Third, the importance of the concept and conventions will be considered at project 
level in a developing country, through looking at a concrete NORAD-financed 
project in Zambia, SLAMU, which has sustainable development and poverty 
reduction as its main objectives (LIRDP project documents, Larsen 2002 [interview], 
Lomøy 2002 [interview]), Grøva 2002 [interview]). To what extent and in which 
ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU 
project? How do they promote or hamper the project?  
                                              
12 According to Knut Opsal in NORAD, the new minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson (election, fall 2001) has 
especially pointed out that the connection between poverty reduction and sustainable development is very 
important, and has to be focused on more thoroughly.  
13 The three dimensions are social development, economic development and environmental protection, and they 
are seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of SD.  See 2.1 for elaboration. 
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Fourth, I will examine the institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU 
in light of institutional theory and how these two institutions work together to 
promote development with implementation theory as an analytical tool. I wish to see 
how the institutional relationship and their co-operation affect SLAMU’s community-
programme. Since Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is 
promoted through the programme, and this is considered by NORAD as one of two 
areas within SLAMU where their main goals can be reached, namely empowerment 
and poverty reduction, it will be interesting to see how NORAD affects the 
community-programme, or more specifically how NORAD's involvement in 
SLAMU promotes or hampers the work of the community-programme. 
 
Figure 1 Analytical model  
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The model shows that the role of the concept and conventions for NORAD and 
SLAMU will be examined, since Zambia and Norway are parties to the conventions 
and both countries state that they work to reach sustainable development. The 
institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU is also important to examine, 
to see in what positive and negative ways they have affected each other. Since my 
main focus is on the community-programme, it is especially interesting to see how 
NORAD affects that. My original plan was also to examine the relationship between 
SLAMU and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and SLAMU and the Government 
of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), but since the ministry have not answered my 
questions, and I was only able to interview one person in ZAWA, there is not much I 
can say about their points of view. Whenever appropriate there will be some 
reflections in the analysis as far as my data allows it.  
The case study can contribute to the debate on centralisation versus 
decentralisation of management responsibility. By studying the empirical results in 
light of different theories, we can hopefully contribute to a better understanding of 
why some things function and others don’t – which again will give grounds for better 
projects and investments in sustainable development. This means that my goal is to 
contribute with an outsiders view on how NORAD works, and maybe some 
suggestions about what can be done differently, or to get further results. Secondly, I 
will try to share the results of this study as openly as possible, so that people wanting 
to develop similar projects, or already working on some, can avoid the mistakes made 
in LIRDP/SLAMU and maybe implement measures resembling the successful parts 
of the project. By revealing the problems and prospects for this kind of project, we 
can hopefully learn something on how to succeed with “win-win” project, and show 
that it is possible to combine development with environment like the WCED stated in 
1987. In March 2002 there was a conference in Norway on Poverty, Development 
and Environment, which resulted in a report with advice14. It highlights the fact that 
                                              
14 http://www.forskningsradet.no/bibliotek/publikasjonsdatabase/detalj.html?id=96351 The director at the 
Christian Michelsen Institute, Gunnar Sørbø, says that a more holistic environment and development research 
can reduce the conflicts between rich and poor countries, because the focus from rich countries has been more 
on environment and the poor countries have focused on development. In combining the two, conflicts can be 
avoided (http://www.forskningsradet.no/nyheter/notiser/melding.html/12850). I participated in the conference 
and highly agree with the resulting advice. 
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the agendas for environment and development have drifted apart both politically and 
in research, since the UN meeting in Rio ten years ago. Therefore this thesis will be a 
follow up of both WCED and the mentioned conference, in being a contribution to 
connecting the two research fields. I hope to show that it is possible, interesting and 
necessary to connect them.  
Being situated in Norway, I have a special advantage since NORAD has been 
partly financing the project almost from the beginning. I have had access to the files 
on the project at NORAD headquarters and at the embassy in Lusaka. I have been 
able to interview people who have been involved with SLAMU at different times and 
in different positions, both in Norway and in Zambia. It is also suited for a case study 
because it has been well documented over a long period of time, which makes it 
possible to look at which efforts have been made and which of them have been 
successful or unsuccessful. This provides a good possibility for learning from prior 
mistakes, in adopting a learning process which embraces problems and barriers as a 
means of discussion and a catalyst for active, appropriate change (Robinson 1996: 5). 
 The former phases of the project will serve as background information to make 
sure that we have a clear understanding of the goals and the efforts that have been 
made. The analysis will mainly be based on phase IV, which lasted from 1999 to 
2002. The fact that I am an ‘outsider’ might also bring some new perspectives on the 
project. As far as I know, nobody has done this kind of study of the project before, at 
least not without being connected to the project somehow. There are two MSc. 
theses15 on the project, but only considering wildlife in different aspects, and both at 
the beginning of the 1990s, that is, ten and twelve years ago. The project has evolved 
and changed very much since then, and none of them considered NORAD's role and 
the relationship between the central authorities and SLAMU explicitly. There has 
been a massive study touching upon most angles (Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001/2003) 
but it hasn’t been printed in its final version yet, which means that I won’t have time 
                                              
15 Dora Ernest Ndhlovu (1990) ”Management and utilization of wildlife in Upper Lupande Game Management 
Area, Luangwa Valley” and Poul Wisborg  (1992) “Social and cultural aspects of  Wildlife management in 
Africa” both from the Agricultural University of Norway, Ås. C. Butler (1996)  “The development of 
ecotourism in South Luangwa National Park, Zambia” and  C. Wainwright (1996) “Evaluating community 
based natural resource management: a case study of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project, 
Zambia” both from the University of Kent, UK. 
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to look at it before this study is finished. From what I have understood, they don’t 
focus on NORAD's work in general and not on CBD's role.  
The project will be presented further below in part 1.3 and also in chapter 2. The 
theories and research methods will be presented more thoroughly in chapter 3. 
 
1.3 Suitability of the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development 
Project/South Luangwa Area Management Unit as a Case Study 
 
As stated before, I’m going to look at the SLAMU project and particularly at the 
community-programme, to illustrate the investments in sustainable development by 
Norway through NORAD in co-operation with Zambia. Since it is supposed to be a 
successful project combining environment and development, it should be well suited 
for this study. The project is based on the concept of Community Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM) and it is a kind of continuance of the 
CAMPFIRE16 project in Zimbabwe. According to Inger Næss, Adviser for Southern 
Africa at NORAD, SLAMU is even more successful than CAMPFIRE (Næss 2001: 
[interview]). The SLAMU project was one of the first programmes to recognise the 
linkages between poverty and wildlife conservation (Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001: 2). 
 The underlying assumption was that the local economy could be built around the 
wildlife sector (ibid.) SLAMU is hopefully a so called “win-win” project, which 
means that it is supposed to lead to a better life for the poor people in the Luangwa 
Valley and better living conditions for the wildlife in the area – in other words, 
considering both development and environment. To be able to make the research 
questions fruitful, I have to concentrate on some issues within SLAMU and ask some 
concrete and relatively narrow questions. Since Norwegian assistance has two basic 
concerns, as noted earlier – poverty alleviation and empowerment – and these are 
main goals of SLAMU, we have to look at how these goals can be reached. 
According to Grøva they can be reached through two sections of SLAMU; the 
                                              
16 CAMPFIRE = Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources. 
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community-programme and through job creation within tourism (Grøva, statement at 
annual review meeting, 04.07.02). I will choose one and concentrate my questions on 
the goals and effects of the community programme17. By answering the following 
questions, I will be able to say something about the effects in poverty alleviation and 
empowerment: 
• How has the community-programme affected local people? 
Or more specifically, 
• Which means are being used to empower18 people through the community 
programme? 
The social goals mentioned above are to be reached through the sustainable use of 
wildlife resources to make sure that these resources are not decreased or endangered 
for the aim of securing this part of people’s livelihood and future. 
The study will be organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 Empirical theme  
Chapter 3 Theory and research methods 
Chapter 4 Analysis 
Chapter 5 Conclusions and tentative recommendations 
                                              
17 The community programme, CBNRM programme and – section will be used interchangeably throughout the study.  
18 Normally empowerment refers only to social and/or economical aspects in giving people better possibilities 
to earn what they need and to influence decision-making both locally and nationally. In this case however, 
empowerment includes the environmental aspect in that people are empowered to take better care of the natural 
resources in their area. That way it is an empowerment especially in accordance with Sustainable Development 
(See 2.1). 
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2. Empirical theme; the sustainable use of natural 
resources in rural development through Aid, 




The empirical theme involves efforts on three levels, international through 
conventions and bilateral development co-operation, national through the government 
and Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), and local through ZAWA/SLAMU with the 
CBNRM component. First, some background information on Zambia in general will 
be given. The next part will be background information on the international process 
focusing on the connection between environment and development and the two 
chosen conventions. In the third part, Norwegian national strategies and follow ups of 
the conventions in the development co-operation by NORAD will be presented. 
Finally, in the last part of the chapter, a more thorough presentation of the case study 
project will be given. 
 
2.1.1  Zambia’s political, economic and social development situation  
To be able to understand the circumstances that SLAMU is set within, a short 
introduction to the political, economical, and social development situation in Zambia 
is important. From being one of Africa’s most prosperous countries thirty years ago, 
Zambia has turned into one of the poorest (NORAD 2001: 7). A reason for this is the 
decline in the international copper market since the end of the 1970s, on which the 
one-sided economic policy of Zambia was focused (Sele 2002). The reforms which 
were initiated after the first multi-party election in 1991, have been inconsistently 
implemented and have lacked the wanted effects. Gradually, political and economic 
development has stagnated, and the provision of public services like education, health 
services, and clean water have also deteriorated (NORAD 2001:6-7). One of the main 
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reasons for this is that the dual governance system on local level is dysfunctional 
(Crook & Manor 2001:2). Urban and District Councils have major financial 
problems, due to the fact that they only receive an average of between one and three 
per cent of their total funds from central government (ibid.). They have also been 
deprived of former powers to mobilise resources, which lead to inability in service 
delivery to local people. The implications for popular confidence in government are 
severe, and something needs to be done to change this negative trend. This will be 
discussed in chapter 4. 
The country’s ranking on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) is now 
down to153rd place, and eighty-five per cent of the people live on less than a dollar a 
day19. Most indicators reveal a more precarious situation in rural than in urban areas 
(NORAD 2001: 7). According to the national newspaper The Post, (June 2002), fifty 
per cent of the National Budget is donor-funded, something which shows how 
dependent the country is on development co-operation. Norway provides about five 
per cent of the total donor funding to Zambia (NORAD 2001: 10). 
 
2.2 Historical background, development and understanding of the 
concept Sustainable Development (SD). 
“Around the globe political leaders and public administrators routinely 
justify policies, projects, and initiatives in terms of the contribution they 
make to realising sustainable development”. (Lafferty & Meadowcroft 2000: 
1). 
The first time the Sustainable Development concept was used was in the World 
Conservation Strategy (WCS) in 1980. The WCS also provided the first 
comprehensive, integrated strategy to conserve wild species and habitats. It was 
commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
formulated by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources/The World Conservation Union (IUCN) in collaboration with the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF). The WCS was launched in 30 countries, and it explains the 
contribution of living resource conservation to human survival and to sustainable 
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development. It identifies the priority conservation issues and the main requirements 
for dealing with them20.  
Sustainable development as a concept achieved new status with the publication of 
Our Common Future (OCF), the report of The World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED)21 in 1987. The UN General Assembly appointed the 
WCED as an independent body in 1983. It was composed of 21 commissioners with 
representation equally divided between developed and developing countries. In the 
enabling resolution, the general assembly called on the Commission to propose long-
term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development to the year 2000 
and beyond (Lafferty and Meadowcroft: 2000). It has gained more and more 
attention, especially because of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, and many countries are now adopting conservation 
strategies formulated within the guidelines suggested in all these documents on 
Sustainable Development (Reid 1997: xiii, http://www.batcon.org/batsmag/v1n1-
10.html). 
The idea Sustainable Development (SD) was central to the whole UNCED process 
and is explicitly mentioned among other places in the text of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), but the concept was never formally defined in any of the 
UNCED documents, its meaning was taken for granted from Our Common Future 
(Lafferty & Meadowcroft: 2000). My understanding of Sustainable Development is 
mainly taken from Lafferty and Meadowcroft (2000), with supplements from Lafferty 
& Langhelle (Eds: 1999), their presentation of other authors’ views, and the 
understanding of the concept from Our Common Future. Many prefer to restrict the 
concept to environmental sustainability (Meadowcroft in Lafferty & Langhelle 1999: 
13), especially in the Western world. It is important to emphasise that the concept is 
here understood as more than environmental sustainability – even  though that will be 
a main part of this study. The reason why the environment is emphasised here, is its 
                                                                                                                                           
19 Human Development Report (HDR) (1999), UNDP. 
20 http://www.nssd.net/References/KeyDocs/IIEDa24.htm . Nssd = national strategies for SD. The website is 
developed and managed by the National Resources Institute (NRI), University of Greenwich and funded by the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
 19
minor role in Norwegian aid compared to the two other aspects within Sustainable 
Development. This understanding involves seeing economic development, social 
development, and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing components (of SD) as it was described in the ‘Programme for the Further 
Implementation of Agenda 21’ adopted at UNGASS22 in 1997. 
“[A] chieving Sustainable Development involves the pursuit of economic, 
social and environmental goods to enhance the welfare of current and future 
generations. In particular, this implies reconciling economic advance, social 
equity, and environmental protection – and neglect of any one of these 
strands means a drift away from the line of SD” (Lafferty & Meadowcroft  
2000: 18). 
Alternatively, one can emphasise two sorts of constraints on developmental 
activity embedded within the notion of Sustainable Development (Lafferty & 
Meadowcroft: 2000).  
First, there are physical environmental constraints: beyond a certain point, the 
erosion of environmental assets will threaten development progress. Thus the 
maintenance of an adequate environmental base becomes a precondition for making 
continuing development possible.  
Second, there are ethical constraints rooted in the imperatives of social justice. It 
is morally right to have regard for the needs of future persons (inter-generational 
justice), and to address the pressing needs of the world’s poor (intra-generational 
justice). These requirements in turn establish limits to the forms of development 
activity that legitimately can be pursued today (ibid.). 
Lafferty (1996) has referred to four normative principles embodied in UNCED’s 
usage of SD, which is another way of clarifying the concept; change which is to be 
considered sustainable development aims: 1) to satisfy basic human needs and 
reasonable standards of welfare for all living beings and 2) to achieve more equitable 
standards of living both within and among global populations. To be sustainable, 
change should: 3) be pursued with great caution so as to avoid disruption of 
biodiversity and the regenerative capacity of nature, both locally and globally, and 4) 
                                                                                                                                           
21 Also called the Brundtland Commission, after its leader Gro Harlem Brundtland. The shortenings OCF and 
WCED will be used interchangeably throughout this study. 
22 UNGASS = United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
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be achieved without undermining the possibility for future generations to attain 
similar standards of living and similar or improved standards of equity’ (ibid: 18-19). 
These principles are not supposed to be (part of) a definition of Sustainable 
Development, but rather function as a specification of the normative dimensions 
included in the concept (Lafferty 1996: 19). According to Lafferty & Meadowcroft 
(2000: 19) all successful and indicative concepts invoked in political life are subject 
to contrasting interpretations and are loaded with different meanings. They continue: 
Divergence of understanding and usage is especially likely with highly 
charged normative concepts, such as ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ or ‘equality’. 
The range of understandings hardly prevents, however, the application of 
such contestable concepts in specific policies and programmes for social and 
economic change” (ibid.).  
For this study, it is sufficient to take notice of the fact that Sustainable 
Development indicates an interdependent concern with: promoting human welfare; 
satisfying basic needs; protecting the environment; considering the fate of future 
generations; achieving equity between rich and poor; and participating on a broad 
basis in development decision-making. 
 
2.2.1  Basis from ‘Our Common Future’ by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED). 
 The WCED (1987: 21) recommended putting the problem of endangered species 
and ecosystems on the political agenda as an important issue in the debate on 
economy and resources. There are many good reasons for this; the diversity of 
species is necessary for the normal functioning of ecosystems and the biosphere as a 
whole, the genetic material contributes billions of dollars yearly in the form of 
improved crop species, new drugs and medicines and raw material for industry. 
Besides utility issues, there are also moral, ethical, cultural, aesthetic and purely 
scientific reasons for conserving biodiversity (ibid, Swanson 1997). Although the cost 
of conservation will rise - both directly and in terms of opportunities for development 
foregone - long-term the development possibilities will increase, which is a very 
important point to clarify. For these reasons, international development agencies 
should give comprehensive and systematic attention to the problems and 
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opportunities of species conservation (1987: 13,147).  The WCED-report maintains 
that managing species and ecosystems together is clearly the most rational way to 
approach the problem. At the heart of the issue lies the fact that there is often a 
conflict between the short-term economic interest of individual nations and the long-
term interest of Sustainable Development and potential economic gains of the world 
community at large. A major thrust in action to conserve genetic diversity must 
therefore be directed at making it more economically attractive both in the short term 
and in the longer perspective to protect wild species and their ecosystems. 
 Developing countries must be ensured an equitable share of the economic profit 
from the use of genes for commercial purposes. I will maintain that it might be most 
important to show that there is much to be gained in implementing sustainable 
development (policies) also for a single country, not just the world community at 
large, instead of going after short-term economic profit, which can ruin or decrease 
the basis for further development (Paavola: 2002). If the authorities and citizens in a 
developing country realises that they can secure their own development basis by 
going for sustainable development, I think there is a greater chance that it will be put 
on the political agenda rather than if one just focuses on the world community as a 
whole.  
A lot of people who live in developing countries have expressed concern and fear 
that the industrialised countries will limit or stop their development by claiming that 
they have to take the environment into consideration. It is entirely understandable that 
they are afraid that we will try to limit their development possibilities so that we can 
go on living in our luxury. It is therefore very important to express that it is to secure 
their own development that environmental considerations have to be taken, and that 
they must not do the same mistakes that we have done in our industrialisation, or so 
called grey growth. The knowledge the industrial countries have gained must be 
transferred, to secure that it doesn’t take as long for the developing countries to go 
from a grey to a green development (Berntsen: 2001). This is in accordance with 
WCED, which states that industrial nations should support the efforts of Third World 
nations to conserve species, which would be part of a green growth. Industrial nations 
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should also seek ways to help developing nations realise some of the economic 
benefits of these resources (1987: 157). 
A new approach is of anticipation and prevention is needed. With the development 
politics which is lead these days, species will go extinct (ibid.). There have been 
some improvements since the WCED-report came out, one example is the 
development of national conservation strategies (NCS), which is supposed to bring 
the processes of conservation and development together. In connecting with the CSD 
in Johannesburg, several countries have developed NCSs. Hence, it seems logical that 
the development of national conservation strategies should be supported through 
Norwegian development co-operation, but according to Ås (2001: [interview]) 
NORAD is currently not supporting any developing countries in this respect. He says 
that it is the developing countries themselves who decide what they want to seek 
support for and that NORAD has not received any requests for support to 
development of NCS. However, The Ministry of the Environment follows up the 
special environmental agreements with a few developing countries where the 
financial means come from the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
NORAD, and support is given to increase the recipient country’s competence on 
environmental issues (Nåvik: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). 
 
2.2.2 The development of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
There is a growing recognition that biological diversity is of tremendous value for 
present and future generations, at the same time as the extinction rate of species and 
ecosystems has never been greater. These recognitions lead UNEP to convene an ad 
hoc working group of experts on biological diversity in 1988 
(http://www.biodiv.org/conv/background.html). It was to evaluate the need for an 
international convention on biological diversity. In 1989, an ad hoc working group of 
technical and legal experts (later called ’Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee’) 
prepared an international legal instrument for conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity – the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). It was opened 
for signature at UNCED, in Rio de Janeiro on the 5th of June 1992, and remained 
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open until the 29th of December 1993 when it entered into force as a legally binding 
agreement after 168 states had signed and 30 had ratified it. 182 states are now parties 
to the CBD23.  
The objectives of the Convention as they are stated in article 1 are: 
” … the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilisation of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to 
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking 
into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by 
appropriate funding”. 
The convention also encourages all governments in the world to make national action 
plans for sustainable use and conservation of biological diversity and for all 
developed countries to take (specific) measures to help developing nations in 
fulfilling their obligations to the Convention. Several of the articles are related to the 
special needs of developing countries.24 Article 20 (4) is especially relevant to this 
study, it says:  
“4. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively 
implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the 
effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments 
under this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of 
technology and will take fully into account the fact that economic and social 
development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding 
priorities of the developing country Parties” (my italicization). 
 
2.2.3 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species Of Wild Fauna 
And Flora (CITES.) 
The aim of CITES is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild 
animals and plants does not threaten their survival. In the 1960s, at the time when the 
ideas of CITES were first formed, international discussion of the regulation of 
wildlife trade for conservation purposes was something relatively new 
(http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml).  
International wildlife trade is estimated to be worth billions of dollars annually, 
and to include hundreds of millions of plant and animal specimens. The trade is 
                                              
23 By January 2002, including Norway and Zambia. 
24 Article 16 (2), 17 (1), 18 (2), 19 (1) and (2), 20 (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), (1) and 21. See appendix 1 for 
relevant parts of the Convention text. 
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diverse, ranging from live animals and plants to a vast array of wildlife products 
derived from them. Levels of exploitation of some animal and plant species are high 
and the trade in them, together with other factors, such as habitat loss, is capable of 
heavily depleting their populations, even bringing some species close to extinction 
(ibid.). Many wildlife species in trade are not endangered, but the existence of an 
agreement to ensure the sustainability of the trade is considered important in order to 
safeguard these resources for the future.  
Because the trade in wild animals and plants crosses borders between countries, 
the effort to regulate it requires international co-operation to safeguard certain species 
from over-exploitation. CITES was drafted as a result of a resolution adopted in 1963 
at a meeting of members of IUCN (The World Conservation Union). The text of the 
Convention25 was finally agreed at a meeting of representatives of 80 countries in 
Washington DC, USA, on the 3rd of March 1973. On the 1st of July 1975 CITES 
entered into force. CITES is an international agreement to which States adhere 
voluntarily. Although the convention is legally binding on the Parties - in other words 
they have to implement the Convention - it does not take the place of national laws. 
Rather it provides a framework to be respected by each Party, which has to adopt its 
own domestic legislation to make sure that CITES is implemented at the national 
level.  
According to the CITES official website, not one species protected by the 
convention has become extinct as a result of trade since it entered into force and it is 
among the largest conservation agreements in existence, with now over 150 Parties 
(http://www.cites.org). 
 
2.3 Norwegian national strategies 
NORAD employees relate to many strategies, some overarching and others as 
follow up on more specific issues, but they all touch upon Sustainable Development 
and environmental factors. As noted in chapter 1, the most overarching for the whole 
                                              
25 http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.shtml 
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organisation is “NORAD invests in the future - NORAD's strategy for 2000 - 
2005”26, which gives an overall presentation of NORAD's work and indicates the 
kind of development it wants to support. The whole strategy and the parts27 which are 
most relevant for the approach to the problem of integrating environment will be 
elaborated on in chapter 4. There is also report no. 19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A 
changing world – Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries”, 
“The Strategy for environmental development co-operation (1997-2005), "HIV/AIDS 
and development - Norway’s views", "NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-
Corruption Action Plan", report no. 21 to the Storting (1999-2000) "Action plan for 
human rights", NORAD's "Handbook in Human Rights Assessment", and "Strategy 
for female- and equal rights oriented development co-operation".  In addition there 
are strategic guidelines from the foreign Ministry in the yearly allocation letters.  
As also mentioned in chapter 1, in addition to the main strategy, I have chosen to 
take a closer look at the two strategies which are most relevant for environmental 
development co-operation, according to employees in the Unit for Environment and 
Energy (Ås: 2002 [interview and e-mail], Opsal: 2002 [interview]). These are Report 
no.19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A changing world– Main elements of Norwegian 
policy towards developing countries” and “The Strategy for Environmental 
Development Co-operation” (SEDC). 
 
2.3.1 Report no.19 to the Storting (1995-96) “A changing world –Main elements of 
Norwegian policy towards developing countries”.  
There are often trend changes in all areas of society, so also in politics. Right after 
the publication of the Brundtland-report in 1987, sustainable development was a 
‘new’ and exciting concept, which was considered very important as a goal for 
development, globally as well as locally. This can also be seen in the Report no. 19 to 
the Storting from 1995-96, where it is said that the superior goal for Norwegian south 
politics is to contribute to the improvement of economic, social and political 
                                              
26 This strategy will be called ‘the main strategy’ in the following. 
27 The relevant parts for environmental development work are a description of sustainability and a description 
of the work on environment and natural resources (pp11 and 21) 
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circumstances in the developing countries within the framework of sustainable 
development (Report no. 19 (1995-96): 6 and 11).  
There are 5 main points under this superior goal; 1. Contribute to promotion of 
peace, human rights and democracy, 2. Contribute to promotion of economic and 
social development for poor countries and peoples, 3. Contribute to a responsible 
management of the environment on earth and its biological diversity, 4. Contribute to 
promotion of equal rights and possibilities for women and men on all areas in society 
and 5. Contribute to prevention and alleviation of suffering in connection with 
conflict situations and natural catastrophes (ibid: 6-7). Point 3 is the most relevant for 
this case study, but the other points are also pertinent, which will be shown in the 
analysis. It also says in the strategy that the government wants to strengthen the work 
on integration of environmental issues in the development co-operation in general. 
The integration of environment and development on all levels of decision making has 
been a goal of NORAD for about 20 years (Opsal, Ås 2002 [interviews], Skjønsberg: 
2000). Additionally, it is mentioned that a strategy for environmental development 
co-operation should be worked out. The strategy was finished in 1997 after 10 years 
of planning and discussions (Andersen: 2001 [personal comment]).  
 
2.3.2 The Strategy for Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC) 
Point number 3 under the main goal of Report no. 19 mentioned above – 
Contribution to a responsible management of the environment on earth and the 
biological diversity – is the superior goal of the Strategy for Environmental 
Development Co-operation. This point is made more concrete with four prioritised 
areas; 1. Development of sustainable production systems, 2. Conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, 3. Reduced pollution of earth, air and water, 
and 4. Cultural heritage protection and management of the natural environment’s 
cultural values. The goal for environmental development co-operation is further to 
integrate environmental considerations in all development co-operation supported by 
Norway (SEDC: 1).  
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To be able to integrate environmental considerations in all development co-
operation it is important to; secure that environmental considerations are incorporated 
in strategies for individual aid areas, secure that environmental considerations are 
sufficiently regarded in decisions on separate projects, secure sufficient 
environmental competence and capacity in NORAD, training of personnel (NORAD 
and Foreign Ministry) and lastly, strengthen contact with and use of the 
environmental expertise network in Norway.  
Another aspect in SEDC is the role of global conventions on environmental issues, 
which also encompass developmental aspects, making it imperative to secure the best 
possible conformity between obligations in the conventions, and regulations in 
development co-operation politics (ibid: 4). Other aspects that are relevant for this 
study is the emphasis on participation (ibid: 5), that poverty orientation shall be the 
basis for the environmental development co-operation, and that the biological 
diversity’s national and local importance for livelihood and future development 
possibilities will be of the greatest influence. In the last aspect, it is argued that aid 
capital funds can play a significant role. Under implementation of the strategic 
regulations it says that ventures which are not directly environmentally oriented 
should be not contribute unnecessarily to environmental problems (ibid: 11). Lastly, 
on preparation of country strategies in bilateral development co-operation, SEDC 
says that environmental circumstances shall be given more weight. The strategy 
refers to the connections with other areas within development work: social and 
economic development, health, water supply and sanitation, civil society and (local) 
participation, institutional capacity, education and competence building, business, 
industry, the role of women, gender equality, infrastructure development, migration, 
agriculture and fisheries.  
To conclude, my impressions are that people on the outside, either former NORAD 
employees or people who co-operate with or evaluate NORAD’s performance, and 
the NORAD employees working especially with environmental issues, find that the 
above mentioned goals largely have not been reached. Employees in the regional 
offices on the other hand, find that sustainable development as such has been 
integrated in their work, and that it therefore doesn’t need political follow up 
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anymore. There are several things that could have been done to get closer to these 
goals but, as long as the apprehensions and interpretations are so essentially different, 
they are difficult to implement. I will have a closer look at this in chapter 4. 
 
2.4 Decentralised management of natural resources as a means in 
rural development – specifically community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM). 
2.4.1 Historical background; Colonial history 
Many of Africa’s national parks date back to colonial times. The first international 
conservation treaty28, which was signed in London in 1900 by all the continent’s 
colonial powers29, laid the foundation for the top-down preservationist style of 
management that came to characterise African conservation policies (Honey, 1999: 
223). However, very few species were completely protected and big game hunting 
was permitted and even encouraged for some species30 that were considered threats to 
settler farming (ibid.). But hunting required a licence, which Africans could not 
obtain or afford, neither were they allowed to own rifles. Pre-colonial management of 
wildlife resources was under the control of local chiefs, but with the colonisation 
local communities were disenfranchised (Mynyenyembe et. al. 2000: 61); hunting in 
Africa became solely a sport of the European aristocracy. Africans’ traditional 
practices of killing animals only for food, ritual use or self-protection were banned, 
forcing them to become poachers (Honey 1999: 23). The reason was that the 
colonialists feared that the Africans would wipe out the continent’s wildlife. But, 
already by 1900, it was conclusively shown that it was the white intruders, not the 
indigenous people, who were most swiftly and systematically killing off Africa’s 
wildlife (ibid.)  
With the transition into postcolonial time, independent states had other more 
pressing priorities than wildlife, and the ideology was almost unaltered (ibid: 225, 
Munyenyembe et. al 2000: 61). The conservation organisations, like WWF and 
                                              
28 The Convention for the Preservation of Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa. 
29 Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Belgium. 
30 Like lion, leopard and wild dogs.  
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IUCN, replicated the top-down, repressive practices of colonial rule together with 
elites, which mostly ignored the needs of local communities and often denied them 
access to ancestral homelands (Honey 1999: 226). Indeed, protected areas have been 
the source of many conflicts due to the associated loss of rights, or access, to the 
range of biological resources necessary for local livelihoods (Koziell & Saunders 
2000: 6). In the 1950s with the realisation that there was a potential for tourism in 
many areas, it was also realised that change was needed (Munyenyembe et. al 2000). 
In addition, the protected areas approach has its limitations, not only because of 
potential conflicts and pressures as the demands for material development have 
grown, but also because the viability of species populations held within such areas 
declines as they become isolated (ibid.). Therefore, protected areas alone cannot be 
used to maintain a representative sample of biodiversity, because most of the 
diversity will always be in areas also populated by people.  
All of these realisations eventually led to the Community-based Natural Resource 
Management initiatives in many of the Southern African countries31(Child:2002 
[interview]). Child emphasised that it was a Southern African idea; it did not come 
from donors (ibid.). The development of CBNRM was partly a reaction to the 
centralised systems from colonial times and represented a new, very different way of 
managing natural resources. It also contains the realisation that the conservation of 
natural resources is by extension the conservation of human life, and that the 
conservation of culture rests on conservation of nature (Stenseth 1999: 97). In 
addition, this approach is connected to Sustainable Development in that one main 
condition for reaching SD is to make sure that the Earth’s biological diversity is not 
emaciated (ibid: 98). 
 
2.4.2 Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). 
The principles of CBRNM were the background for LIRDP and later on, a 
CBRNM component – a community programme32 – was established within the 
                                              
31 Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. Just to mention it, CBNRM projects are also being used in other 
parts of the world, among other places in Asia and Latin America. 
32 Community programme and CBNRM section will be used interchangeably throughout the study. 
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project to strengthen the local participation. As mentioned above, the fact that 
CBNRM was ‘invented’ can be seen as a response to dysfunctional centralised 
management, which was a legacy of the colonial time. Until the 1970’s wildlife 
conservation was solely the state’s responsibility (Hutton: 1996). However, policies 
imposed by government agencies often don’t succeed, because they cannot control all 
users of living natural resources, as is the case with many rural populations who 
depend on natural resources for their survival (IUCN 2002: 183).  
In projects based on community-based natural resource management, the 
responsibility is devolved to the local level. The local level is defined differently in 
different projects and programmes. In the CAMPFIRE project in Zimbabwe, it is 
generally the local governments that get the responsibility, whilst in Zambia it goes 
all the way down to villagers through Village Action Groups (VAGs). It has been 
organised in this way in Zambia partly because the district councils and line 
ministries are very weak (Chimba 2002 [interview], Larsen 2002 [interview], Crook 
& Manor 2002). The idea is that people will be given incentives to live with and 
conserve wildlife when they get direct benefits from it, by receiving revenues from 
hunting and photo safaris and from entrance fees to the National Park (IUCN:2000, 
Boje:2000). This means that the community programme in SLAMU and other similar 
projects, all based on CBNRM, attempt to both enhance development and conserve 
biodiversity at the same time. The different projects have been rooted in different 
problems – ADMADE33 and LIRDP/SLAMU in serious poaching and with a heavy 
focus on wildlife, whilst CAMPFIRE was rooted in land pressure, and the LIFE 
project in Namibia had social empowerment of marginalized groupings as the initial 
impetus (Munyenyembe et. al: 2000) There are, however some who are opposed to 
this kind of decentralisation. The arguments for and against decentralisation of 
responsibility for natural resources, will be further discussed and analysed in chapter 
4. 
                                              
33 The Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) first called Lupande development project, is the other 
CBRNM pilot project next to LIRDP which became SLAMU. Both grew out of the Lupande Development 
Workshop which was held in 1983. 
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2.5 Specific empirical case: the LIRDP/SLAMU in Zambia. 
2.5.1 The project area in the Luangwa Valley 
 
Figure 2.1 The project area  
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As can be seen in the map above, the LIRDP/SLAMU area covers the South 
Luangwa National Park (SLNP) and the Lupande Game Management Area (LGMA) 
which totals 14.000 square kilometres34. There were 28.000 people living in the area 
in 1987, and the last number is estimated at 50.000 people (WWF Land Use planning 
team 2002 [workshop]).  
The Luangwa Valley was and still is a relatively poor area35. It is situated outside 
the Copper belt/’line-of-rail’ provinces, where economic activity was concentrated 
from colonial time. This created vast regional inequality after independence, and 
education and other social infrastructure were also largely neglected (Andersson et. 
al.11: 2000). The eastern province still suffers from this lack of equal treatment 
especially concerning poorly developed infrastructure, health care and schools. There 
has nevertheless been substantial migration to the area since the project became 
known because people hope there will be jobs for them on the project (Mwamba 2002 
[interview], Lubilo 2002 [interview]). The villages have grown and there are more 
and more individual initiatives in setting up small shops which sell groceries and 
local curios (land use planning facility WWF, presentation at Workshop: 2002).  
The SLNP was created in 1972 when all game reserves were converted to national 
parks. It had been a game reserve since the early part of the century and has become 
internationally known for its exceptional wildlife. Tourism potential was realised in 
the 1950s when pontoon crossings were established across the Luangwa river and the 
first camps and lodges opened (ibid: 3). After independence in 1964, conservation 
issues in the area became a major concern, it lead to the establishment of the 
Luangwa Valley Conservation and development Project (1968-1973) funded by 
UNDP/FAO36, which undertook surveys and concluded that there were too many 
                                              
34 The SLNP covers about 9050 km2, and the LGMA 4800 km2. 
35 There are different ways of defining poverty. Earlier it was often considered as notions of inadequate private 
income or consumption, but in the so-called ‘new poverty agenda’ it has been broadened towards a more 
comprehensive perspective where poverty is defined as absence of a secure and sustainable livelihood 
(Mikkelsen 1995:149). The broadened definition is easier to connect with defining a poor area, since it stresses 
the importance of access to goods and services. It is important for people to have access, since it will be 
difficult for them to improve their standard of living without it. In this case a poor area means that there is a 
lack of infrastructure, like (all-weather) roads and health care, and also low quality on the existing services 
(health care and schools). Housing is also low standard, with even people working for SLAMU(who are 
considered fortunate) living in tiny tin huts.  
36 United Nations Development Program and Food and Agriculture Organisation 
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elephants37 who were destroying forests and degrading habitat (ibid.) This project 
also foresaw the need for a tourism industry and they began constructing the 
infrastructure that would be needed. It included 40 km of all weather roads in the 
park, a bridge across the Luangwa River at Mfuwe, several smaller bridges which 
allowed access to Chipata all year round and last but not least, a new airport (ibid.). 
2.5.2  The different phases of the Project38. 
The preparatory phase of the project was initiated with a workshop in 1983 and 
ended with the formal establishment of LIRDP in May 1986 (LIRDP project 
document no. 4, Oct. 1987). NORAD financed some of the preparatory work and 
decided to formally co-operate with the Zambian government on the project in 1988, 
after four years of considerations and numerous letters of application from the 
Zambian President (Larsen: 2002 [interview]). The financial agreement between the 
Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Zambia was finally signed in 1989 for a 4-
year second phase (ibid., LIRDP project documents(NORAD archive)). Since then 
there has been two years of transition (1993-94) before the third phase started in 
1995. It was extended with one year and thus ended in 1998, and phase 4 started in 
1999 and ends this year. This was supposed to be the last phase, as phase III was 
meant to be from the beginning, but the SLAMU management is currently working 
on the application for another five year phase.  
The most important events in the history of the project will be described in the next 
section below. 
2.5.3 Former and new organisation 
The first model was based on the ideas from a workshop in 1983, which was 
further developed by the Norwegian biologist Thor S. Larsen in collaboration with 
the Zambian Fidelis B. Lungu. The most important part of their ideas was the use of 
the full range of natural resources to improve the standard of living for the people of 
the Luangwa Valley. They considered the local government as being too weak and 
                                              
37 About 90’000 elephants in the entire Luangwa basin. 
38 For a full description of the different phases, See Child & Dalal-Clayton (2001/2003) final draft and forthcoming study of 
LIRDP/SLAMU from IIED.  
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not innovative enough to handle the assignment, and therefore based it outside all 
official government as a project on its own (Larsen: 2002 [interview]). The idea was 
although from the beginning that the administration of the different activities would 
be gradually transferred into the regular administrative system of Zambia (Agreement 
between Norway and Zambia: 1989).  
Initially, the chiefs were seen as representative agents/distributors for the local 
people and collaboration was started with them. The chiefs appointed the highest 
level of Community-based organisations (CBOs) in the beginning; the Area 
Development Committees (ADCs). These had the responsibility to travel to the 
different areas and appoint people to form the next level of CBOs; Village Action 
Groups (VAGs), in the different areas in the Southern part of the Luangwa Valley. 
The chiefs made themselves heads of the ADCs, but this was changed after a while 
due to the necessity of auditing the ADCs. The traditional role of the chiefs makes it 
impossible to audit them, and therefore they could not continue as heads of ADCs. 
The chiefs’ participation was further reduced when elections were introduced instead 
of chiefs appointing people, which made the CBOs much more democratic and better 
founded in the villages. This was done to make the system more transparent and to 
hinder corruption, which was a problem in the beginning.  
Another weakness in the system was the lack of transparency regarding the use of 
money. There was no proper budgeting and things got out of hand, which ultimately 
lead to reorganisation. The exceptional component in the CBNRM programme after 
the reorganisation is the radical bottom-up approach (Boje: 2000:10). The differences 






Figure 2.2 Old and new policy and organisation. 
 
At the lowest level in the triangle, villages are represented by Village Action 
Groups (VAGs). The VAGs are small democratic institutions which have a much 
larger role after the reorganisation, because they receive the major part of the wildlife 
revenue, and here all decisions lie entirely with the community members (Chimba 
2002: [interview], Boje: 2000). There are 43 VAGs in the project area and there are 
about 500 members in each. At chiefdom level there is an Area Development 
Committee (ADC) responsible for co-ordinating, monitoring and reporting (ibid.). 
Some of their work involves maintaining a bank account and financial records, 
monitoring the VAG performance and financial records, and co-ordinating 
development plans for their area (Boje:2000:7). As can be seen from figure 2.2, in the 
old policy the chiefs were in control of the wildlife money and from the beginning 
they appointed themselves heads of the ADCs, whilst within the new policy they have 
a non-administrative and non-executive role, being patrons and overall advisors.  
Lastly, SLAMU was focused on providing infrastructure in the old model, 
functioning as a mini-government. When it was realised that this became too 
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expensive and financial self-sustainability was impossible to reach, the policy was 
changed. In the new policy, SLAMU is to monitor the performance of finances and 
institutional development of VAGs and ADCs. They also must develop a managerial 
capacity of community institutions, e.g., provide training and design systems 
(CBNRM section: 1999, Chimba: 2002 [interview]). This means that SLAMU has 
changed from a provider of services and infrastructure, to a facilitator of training and 
technical support, although the goals and the CBNRM policy remained unchanged 
(ibid.). The money generated by the National Park goes to SLAMU to cover 
administration costs and salaries while the revenues from safari hunting goes to the 
communities. Figure 2.3 in appendix 1 shows how the money is shared.  
2.5.4 Analysis of the case study project 
As most can probably understand from the presentation above, it is very difficult to 
limit the themes in this study because, as many scientists have come to realise, one 
species cannot be studied in isolation, but must be analysed within its ecosystem. The 
same goes for the local project, SLAMU, which should be seen in relation to 
Zambia’s decentralisation strategy as well as be considered in relation to the national 
political situation and international conventions and agreements, which have 
influence on the project. In addition, the financing and influence from NORAD 
should be considered. There are so many societal and cultural aspects that are 
interdependent, and analysing everything is impossible in a master’s degree thesis. To 
consider some aspects, namely the project’s contribution towards Sustainable 
Development, the institutional influences from contributing institutions/organisations, 
and some international conventions’ effects on the project, is although possible to do 
without having to consider all other aspects surrounding the project to the same 
degree. I will look at how the international conventions, CBD and CITES, are known 
to the employees in SLAMU, and how these affect the project.  
Where it is natural and necessary other aspects will be touched upon in explaining 
the performance of SLAMU’s community-programme, but they will have a smaller 
role than the main aspects mentioned above. I have made some choices after having 
spoken to a lot of people on different levels, who are or have been working in 
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NORAD, or are or have been involved in the project. Considering also that despite 
my broad and interdisciplinary background from different countries, this is a political 
science thesis.  
I have therefore decided to focus mainly on the institutional and 
decentralisation aspects of and around the project and the connection to 
sustainable development and the international conventions. It will be interesting to 
see how well management responsibility and resources have actually been devolved 
to the local level in this case represented by SLAMU, and if this is making the 
management of the wildlife better and sustainable, since that is the theory behind 
CBNRM and Local Agenda 21 from Rio. The main goal of the project has always 
been to give the people of the valley a better livelihood through sustainable use of the 
natural resources. I will look at how the institutional characters of the involved 
institutions have contributed to or hindered the project in its work for poverty 
reduction and sustainable use of wildlife. I have chosen to look specifically at these 
two aspects, poverty reduction and sustainable use of natural resources, which can be 
seen as components/goals within Sustainable Development, because they are the most 
relevant in this particular project. Secondly, I have chosen them because they are 
important goals for NORAD.  
It is important to look at the reasons for why the project was organised the way it 
was, and later how the integration of the project into official authorities is proceeding. 
The integration process did not start until in phase III, in 1995, and it can be 
questioned why it didn’t start earlier. This happened in conjunction with the scaling 
down of the project from a mini-government to something that was supposed to be 
more manageable for both NORAD and the project employees, and to make it easier 
for the project to become financially self-sustainable. The way LIRDP was 
functioning made it impossible to become financially self-sustainable because it 
sponsored too many activities, had high expenses and received too little income 
(Child, Larsen and Lomøy: 2002 [interviews]). The more specific questions I will try 
to answer in relation to the case study are; 
First, on NORAD and institutional features; 
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• Which institutional features in NORAD play a positive role in making it 
possible to see the project through?  
• And which function as barriers? 
Second, on the local case; 
• Is the decentralisation to SLAMU/the Community-programme having any 
effect on local government? 
• How is the placement of the project under ZAWA instead of NPWS affecting 
the decentralisation/the autonomy of SLAMU/the Community-programme? 
 
With the data I collected in the project area, I should be able to answer the 
questions above with a high degree of certainty, since I have the strategies of 
SLAMU in general and the community-programme specifically, the interviews of 
many employees who have been there for a long time, which makes them able to say 
something about the differences from LIRDP to SLAMU and the degree of 
decentralisation over time. I have also interviewed the former head of the 
community-programme who has been working with CBNRM questions both within 
and outside SLAMU, and a ZAWA employee who has been working in SLAMU 




3. Theory and research methods 
 
3.1 Theory - introduction 
The concept Sustainable Development will be used to shed light on NORAD’s 
strategies and the integration of environmental considerations in development co-
operation. This will be done to see how well the strategies and practical work are in 
accordance with Sustainable Development, since that is seen to be the main goal of 
the development work. The integration of environment is seen as an implementation 
problem, because in most strategies for the last 20 years it has been a goal, but there 
are different opinions as to whether this goal has been reached or not, or to what 
degree it has been reached (Skjønsberg: 2000, Opsal: 2002 [interview], Ås: 2002 
[interview],, Lomøy: 2002 [interview], Andersen: 2001 [personal communication]). 
The theory on decentralisation and the concept community-based natural resource 
management will be used to analyse the project SLAMU and its relations to NORAD. 
Institutional aspects will be touched upon within the main theoretical approaches – 
Sustainable development, implementation theory and decentralisation theory – 
supported by institutional approaches taken from Peters. The theories are 
supplementing and there is no clear border between them in real life. The discussions 
on degree of decentralisation and how to implement measures to reach goals are 
universal and relevant to all institutions. Within NORAD there is also a focus on 
centralisation versus decentralisation when it comes to decision authority and 
responsibility, and within SLAMU implementation problems are discussed. 
Therefore, an eclectic approach will be used, which means that the most relevant 
parts of the different theories will be used in the analysis. 
 The recommendations from Our common future and Lafferty & Meadowcrofts’39 
contributions on Sustainable Development have influenced my research questions 
and function as a basis for the entire analysis. 
                                              
39 See 2.1. 
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3.1.1 Decentralisation Theory/ Community-based Development Theory40 
For more than four decades, optimistic colonial powers, newly independent 
countries, and Western aid agencies have sought to assist the governments of 
late developing countries to formulate, adopt, and implement 
decentralisation reforms and programmes – these have mainly failed (Cohen 
& Peterson 1999: 1) 
SLAMU is seen as a decentralisation project by many, including Child (2002 
[interview]) who thinks it is a fantastic decentralisation experiment which can have 
far-reaching effects. For this reason, I will analyse the project using decentralisation 
theory from theorists who have developed their contributions especially considering 
developing countries, mainly Ribot (& Agrawal) (1999 & 2002), but with 
contributions from Braathen (2002), Cohen & Peterson (1999) and Rondinelli (1999). 
Ribot’s contributions are especially relevant since he considers the decentralisation of 
natural resource management. One thing that can be seen as a problem, is that the 
theories mainly focus on formal government and administration units, whereas the 
project at least as long as it was called LIRDP, was an autonomous unit outside the 
formal governance system (Larsen: 2002 [interview], ZAM 044 archive documents, 
NORAD). In addition, Community-based Organisations (CBOs) have been 
established as autonomous bodies outside the formal governance system. However, 
theories developed to explain formal government can, in some cases, be extended so 
that they are applicable to other types of governance. In fact, some have wide 
definitions of democracy, development of democratic principles and decentralisation, 
and refer to traditional structures and CBOs in their writings on district democracy 
(Siame: 2000, Braathen: 2000, FODEP: 99-00).  
Decentralisation is defined as the transfer of power and resources from the central 
to a lower level of an organisation, or as ceding of powers to actors and institutions at 
lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Braathen 2002:22, 
Ribot 2002: v). Rondinelli (1999:2) on the other hand, has a wider definition of 
decentralisation; “[..] the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions 
from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government 
                                              
40 The reason why these two approaches have been placed together is because decentralisation theory in general 
is the ideological basis for the more specific community-based development theory. The latter is very important 
for the case study project in Zambia, because it is the basis for the community programme’s CBNRM-policy. 
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organisations or the private sector”. The problem with this and other definitions by 
Rondinelli is that he fails to define what he means by quasi-independent, quasi-
autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, if they are the same, overlapping, or 
entirely different types. This makes it difficult for others to use his definitions – for 
research to be widely applicable; it needs to be thoroughly defined.  
It is also important to distinguish between administrative and political 
decentralisation: According to Braathen (2002) and Eriksen et. al. (1999) the 
administrative type of decentralisation is deconcentration, with decision-making 
power and resources transferred to local civil servants, although consultation with 
local stakeholders or user groups might be part of the routines. Devolution is defined 
as the political type of decentralisation, with more power and resources transferred to 
local elected entities, e.g. the territorially defined local councils (Eriksen et. al: 1999 
in Braathen: 2002). Ribot’s definition of devolution is much wider; “any transfer 
from central government to any non-central-government body – including local 
elected governments, NGOs, customary authorities, private bodies etc”. (2002: v). 
His definition of political or democratic decentralisation is basically the same as the 
one given by Braathen and Eriksen et. al, although it is explained in further detail 
(ibid.). Ribot also has a separate category for delegation, and it is defined as “the 
transfer of public functions to lower levels of government, public corporations or any 
other authorities outside the regular political-administrative structure to implement 
programs on behalf of a government agency” (ibid.).  
Rondinelli has yet another categorisation, political decentralisation is not really 
defined, but he says something about its aims and what its advocates assume (see 
1999:2), which is not very different from any of the other scholars’ definitions. 
Administrative decentralisation however, is divided into three sub-types; 
Deconcentration, devolution and delegation (ibid: 2-3). Cohen & Peterson (1999:22) 
have the same categorisation of administrative decentralisation, whilst their definition 
of political decentralisation includes transfer of decision-making power to citizens or 
their elected representatives.  
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 Many frameworks have been used to analyse African decentralisations41. One of 
them which is especially relevant for this study, because it is used to analyse  
decentralisation of natural resources, is the one developed by Ribot and Agrawal 
(1999 in Ribot: 2002b) called the ‘actors, powers and accountability framework’. The 
basic elements of this framework for analysis are the local actors involved, the 
powers they hold and the accountability relations in which they are embedded (Ribot 
2002b: 16). This will be elaborated on in chapter 4, where the project case SLAMU 
and its underlying CBNRM-programme with co-operating organisations will be 
analysed using the framework and the other theoretical contributions mentioned 
above. This will be done to see if these institutional arrangements can really be 
considered a decentralisation venture from a theoretical point of view, and to 
categorise this to be able to discern how extensive the decentralisation is.  
According to Crook and Sverrisson (1999: 6) one can measure the responsiveness 
of a decentralised institution by assessing the levels and quality of participation when 
participation is a goal of decentralisation. It is important from a democratic point of 
view that the responsiveness is considered, to be able to say something about the 
projects’ contribution towards empowering of local people. This is also important 
because increased participation is a goal, both for SLAMU and for NORAD. The 
participation can be either 1) representative government, 2) direct participation at the 
community or project level or 3) mobilisation from above. These three forms can be 
combined in various ways (ibid: 7). In practice it is difficult to completely separate 
the forms of decentralisation, because they affect one another. One illustrative 
example from Cohen and Peterson (1999: 23-24) is that while administrative 
decentralisation is not the same as political decentralisation, it can under enlightened 
central leadership lead to democratisation and greater political participation.  
The Community-based Natural Resource Management approach, which is the 
ideological basis of LIRDP/SLAMU, can be seen as a practically oriented and 
specialised sub-type of decentralisation. The principles are listed in the box below.  
 
                                              
41 Olowu 2001, Crook and Sverrisson 2001, Crook and Manor 1999, World Bank 2000, Balogun 2000, Conyers 1984, 
1990, 1999, 2000, Cohen  and Peterson 1997. For more examples see Ribot 2002a. 
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Community-based Natural Resource Management Principles 
 
1) Producer community – The unit of production should be the unit of management 
and benefit. 
2) Scale – Producer communities should be small enough that all households can 
participate face-to-face.  
3) Accountability – Community corporate bodies should be accountable to their 
constituency. 
4) Decentralisation – Functions should be conducted at the lowest appropriate level. 
5) Production responsiveness – The link between production and benefit should be 
transparent and immediate.  
6) The right of choice – Communities must have full choice in the use of wildlife 
revenues, including household cash 
7) Commercial devolution – All marketing should be open and competitive and 
should be done by the wildlife producers themselves. 
8) Differential taxation – The rates of taxation of wildlife should be similar to that 
of other resources. 
9) Sustained capacity – Activities or investment should not be undertaken unless 
they can be managed and sustained locally. 
10) Government’s responsibility – Government is ultimately responsible for 
wildlife but can best achieve societies’ goals by devolving authority, operational 
management and benefit within an enabling framework while maintaining direction 
with the minimum essential regulation. 
11) Process – Devolving authority and developing community management capacity 
is a process. 
12) Co-management – Co-management is necessary, especially in the shift from 
central to community management systems.  
                                                                                   (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000: 102). 
 
 
I will not use these principles to evaluate SLAMU because that has already been 
done by Munyenyembe et. al. The principles will be touched upon in relation to the 
more general contributions of decentralisation theory mentioned above, when 
analysing SLAMU and the CBOs. Is SLAMU an administrative (deconcentration) or 
political (devolution) type of decentralisation? What about the CBOs SLAMU co-
operates with? As mentioned, I wish to look closer at this in the analysis. 
3.1.2 Implementation theory - Decision oriented and process oriented approaches 
Implementation as a concept is characterised by a basic duality (Kjellberg & 
Reitan 1995: 132).  To implement is both to carry through and to make real.  To carry 
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through a policy does not necessarily mean realisation/fulfilment of its (original) goal 
(Lane 1992:91 in ibid.). The starting point for all implementation researchers is that 
implementation of a policy or the realisation of a plan, neither follows automatically, 
nor is guaranteed in any way (ibid: 137) There are two main methodologies within 
implementation theory; Decision-oriented and Process-oriented approaches. To get an 
overview, the main difference between them can be set up in a simple figure: 
 Decision-oriented Process-oriented 
Main focus on Central control, hierarchy, formality,  Local action, equality, learning, 
political processes 
Definition of implementation 
 
narrow: the Phase between central 
resolution and local 
operationalisation 
Wide: in theory the whole 
political and administrative 
process 
Arenas for implementation Administrative processes Political processes 
Empirical basis Authoritative resolution (law or 
equivalent) about public ventures. 
The processes in connection 
with specific target 
groups/problem areas; the 
resolution as part of its 
surroundings. 
Organisational frame Stabile structures, formal authority 
relations 
Non-formal structures, special 
networks between equal actors. 
Understanding of governance 
elements 
Control, direct influence of 
underlying units 
No clear governance elements; 
adaptation through negotiation 
and compromise. 
Evaluation criteria for 
‘successfulness’ 
Degree of correlation between the 
goal of the undertaking and the local 
efforts/ arrangements. 
Degree of correlation between 
wanted change in a social 
situation and actual results of 
the venture. 
 
Overarching goal Try to understand what contributes to 
efficient public governance. 
Try to understand what 
modifies/conditions practically 
adapted results of public 
ventures. 
Proponents Pressman & Wildavsky 1973,1984  
Van Meter & Van Horn 1975  
Mazmanian & Sabatier 1980,1986    
Elmore 1980  
Hjern  1979,1981-82  
Barrett 1984 
 
     
Table 3.2 Differences between main methodologies in implementation theory. ( based on 
Kjelberg og Reitan 1995: 162). 
 
For proponents of the decision oriented approach, it is important that 
implementation has a starting point and an end and their view is that it can’t succeed 
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or fail unless there is a goal to measure it by (bid.). Others have insisted that 
implementation is to be seen as an uninterrupted process with no beginning and no 
end. As a representative for the process oriented approach, Elmore (1980 in Kjellberg 
& Reitan 1995: 155) states that the implementation should be a learning process 
where the shaping of a policy continuously changes and adapts to the problems it is 
supposed to solve. This means that it is not important if the original goal is carried 
through or not, it is the experiences in implementing a goal which are important, and 
the most imperative is the carrying on of these experiences to new ventures 
(Kjellberg & Reitan 1995:155).    
Another important issue is resources: 
Without resources in finance and personnel, implementation will have little 
chance in succeeding no matter how good ambitions people have for the 
venture (Kjellberg and Reitan 1995: 144). 
So if people lack good ambitions for the venture, does it make a significant 
difference if they have sufficient resources for the implementation of it? When one 
tries to analyse the implementation of a venture, it can be difficult to know were to 
start. Looking at the early phases before the implementation process can give some 
clues to why it has been successful or not. Was there a clearly articulated plan, which 
only needs to be fulfilled or, which is an unambiguous assumption for everything that 
is going to happen later? Or does the phase before the implementation in reality 
consists of unclear signals, insecure intentions, and awaiting actors (ibid: 136)? 
Strategies that are supposed to cover a whole agency’s activity are often an example 
of the last. These strategies are worded in an ambiguous way to avoid political 
disagreements. When there are possibilities to interpret a strategy in different ways, it 
is easier to get the strategy accepted. The strategy on environmental development co-
operation provides a good example of how difficult it can be to agree and get a 
strategy on paper, it was discussed for 10 years (Andersen 2001: [personal 
comment]).  
3.1.3 Institutional theory. 
The concentration on formal aspects within ‘old’ institutionalism has been 
criticised by ‘modern’ scholars for several reasons. First, the strong focus on the 
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formal aspects of political systems has concealed important informal features from 
researchers (Peters 1999: 8). Second, with these formalistic assumptions political 
science could not function well in less developed countries, or countries that lacked 
the structures common in Western countries (Almond & Coleman 1960 in ibid.) 
Therefore, Peters continues: 
“..to embrace a larger world, political science would have to learn to cope 
with other forms of analysis that were sufficiently general to apply to almost 
any political system” (Peters 1999: 8). 
The ‘New Institutionalism’ should then be more capable of analysing informal 
structures and thereby also better suited for analysing institutional conditions in 
developing countries.  The character of the different institutions which influence 
SLAMU can hopefully give explanations to why SLAMU is considered a success. In 
this case the main influencing institutions are the SLAMU organisation itself, 
ZAWA, GRZ and NORAD. The focus here will be mainly on the first and the last, 
since those two are the most important in this study and because there were problems 
in getting data from the other two institutions (See 3.2.3: 44) There are many 
different directions within institutional theory, but according to Scott, most can agree 
to this definition of institutions:  
“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are 
transported by various carriers – cultures, structures and routines – and they 
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott 1995: 33). 
Or in the words of March & Olsen: 
“..an institution can be seen as a relatively stable collection of practices and 
rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific 
situations (March & Olsen 1998: 948). 
According to Peters (Peters 1999: 17), there are at least six different versions 
within ‘New Institutionalism’, and instead of going through all of them in detail, an 
eclectic approach with elements from the different directions will be used in 
analysing the role of the institutions on SLAMU. I will mainly focus on the different 
versions’ contributions to explaining the role of individuals, and the change of 
organisations. The core of institutionalism which binds the different version together 
can be summarised in four points:  
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The core of Institutionalism: 
1. The most important element of an institution is that it is a structural feature  
of the society and /or polity,  
 formal (legislature, agency in public bureaucracy, legal framework)  
or 
 informal (network of interacting organisations, set of shared norms). 
2. Existence of some stability over time 
3. Must affect individual behaviour. An institution should in some way  
constrain the behaviour of its members 
4. Must be some shared value and meaning among the members. 
                                                                                               (Based on Peters 1999).          
 
Both NORAD and SLAMU are formal institutions, which have existed with some 
stability over time. Further, the behaviour of the members of an institution is 
constrained by a certain ‘logic of appropriateness’ and codes of conduct, which 
means that institutionalised rules, duties and rights, define acts as appropriate or 
inappropriate ( Peters 1999: 18, March & Olsen 1998: 948). At the same time as 
institutions constrain individual behaviour, they also provide them with resources and 
therefore capabilities. Institutions are concentrations of resources, which make 
collective behaviour possible and efficient (Olsen 1992: 253).  The different carriers 
mentioned in Scott’s definition of institutions will be given unequal weight by 
different directions within the theoretic field, which is connected to the views on the 
role of individuals. The different views on change are also connected to the unequal 
weight given to culture, structure and routine. The differences and similarities 
between the approaches within institutionalism can be summarised as follows (based 
on Peters 1999): 
SIMILARITIES:  
• All stress the same fundamental analytic points.  
• Most fundamental point - scholars can achieve greater analytical leverage 
by beginning with institutions rather than with individuals.  
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• All point to the role structure plays in determining behaviour, as well as 
determining the outcomes of political processes. 
• All argue that institutions create greater regularities in human behaviour 
than would otherwise be found. 
• Institutions are seen as the result of purposive human action, the 
fundamental paradox of institutions is being formed by human agents yet 
constraining those same actors. (In all versions of new institutionalism). 
DIFFERENCES: 
• The instrument through which constraint on the individual is exercised. In some it 
is through values and norms, in others through rules (intra- or inter-institutional). 
• Degree of institutions’ fixity/or capacity for change (planned or unplanned).  
• Extent to which institutions are conceptualised as concrete objects, as opposed to 
more intangible collections of norms and values that have their influence primarily 
through the perceptions of the members of the institutions. 
 
3.2 Research methods – introduction 
Since political science students usually don’t go on fieldwork, maybe especially 
not to developing countries, I need to use some literature on research methods from 
other disciplines. I find it necessary to have some reflections of a more human 
geographical or anthropological character as part of this thesis. Instead of repeating a 
lot of general contemplations from researchers and textbooks, I will try to relate the 
research methods directly to my research field. 
 
3.2.1 Choice of research methods 
When choosing research methods one has to think of what will be the best ways to 
reach the aim of the research, and within this consider the time, personnel and 
financial means which are available.  
My starting point was Norwegian development co-operation and how it contributes 
to sustainable development in developing countries. I decided that I wanted to start 
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with one aspect of NORAD’s work, namely the integration of environmental 
considerations in development co-operation, since that is an important aspect of 
Sustainable Development , and because I got the impression that it was problematic 
for NORAD. Since I also wanted to see what implications a development co-
operation project could have for poor people in a rural area, I thought that a case 
study of a concrete development project would be a suitable choice. Yin (1994:2-3), 
argues that as a research endeavour, the case study contributes uniquely to our 
knowledge of individual, organisational, social and political phenomena, and the need 
for such a research method arises from the desire to understand these complex 
phenomena – to retain holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events – 
which was exactly what I wished to do. After having spoken to some NORAD 
employees, I chose a project in Zambia which was considered successful by NORAD. 
Since the focus on development aid is often negative, I wanted to contribute with 
research on a successful development project with three things in mind;  
1) The hope that it can give possibilities of succeeding elsewhere, in that similar 
efforts can be made42.  
2) That it can contribute to a more positive view on development aid, as a 
counterweight to the negative focus often presented in most public media.  
3) To gain scientific knowledge about an important area of environment and 
development, and hopefully to be able to share it with other interested parties. 
 
3.2.2 Qualitative, quantitative or both? 
According to many scholars it is ideal to combine qualitative and quantitative 
research methods (e.g. Andersen 1990, Hesselberg 1998). If it is not possible to get 
reliable quantitative data that are utilisable, however, it is obvious that one has to use 
other and more qualitative methods (Andersen 1990: 16)  With my relatively short 
stay, I didn’t have time to conduct my own quantitative research, and there is not 
                                              
42 In that at least other areas of Zambia can try some of the successful efforts from SLAMU, or maybe other 
African countries with similar natural resources. 
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much available from others either. I was told that some British MSc students had 
some questionnaires which where filled out by local people, but the doctor of wildlife 
economy who worked on the project earlier said that it was a waste of time (Child: 
2002 [personal comment]). The reasons for this were that the people don’t have the 
possibilities to understand the questionnaires properly because of lack of education, 
and they are also not used to that kind of thing. One could easily see from the 
questionnaires that they had misunderstood a lot of the questions (ibid.). To be able to 
get people’s opinions, one has to talk to them, Child said, and I followed his advice as 
far as I could43.  
Another aspect that favours the approach I selected is that the context of data 
collection can be as important in explaining the data as the data themselves 
(Devereux & Hoddinott 1992: 4). They argue that;  
“Unless and until this contextual dimension of data collection is fully 
recognised – and accepted as integral to the process – fieldwork results risk 
being reported in a way which is misleadingly ‘precise’ and 
‘objective’(ibid.).   
By this they mean that it has to be considered how one is perceived by the 
respondents, and within this to consider how ones gender, age and nationality may 
affect them. They give examples of how respondents gave systematically different 
answers to the same question on their age, depending on who was asked and who 
asked (ibid.) Both the experiences of Child and my own experiences show that it is 
important to consider the context and be aware of that the answers given can depend 
much on people’s understanding and perception of the interviewer, the questions and 
what they think is the ‘right’ answer.  
 
                                              
43 Some of the people working at the project didn’t have time to sit down with me while I was there, mainly 
because of the annual review meeting preparations. I left some questions for them to answer and send to me by 
post. Some answered others didn’t, but the ones who answered had clearly misunderstood some of my 
questions. This observation also speaks in favour of the approach I selected, since even these people who were 
educated had problems with the written questions.  
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3.2.3 Fieldwork with Qualitative Interviews.  
Fieldwork was a must. I went to Zambia to get to know the project properly, to get 
my own impressions by observing, and especially to find out which views local 
Zambians have. There was a possibility of reaching central authorities and possibly 
the management at SLAMU through post and partly through the Norwegian Embassy 
in Lusaka, but there are very clear weaknesses in such a research method, which has 
been touched upon above and will be elaborated on in the following. Also, getting to 
know the people who work in junior positions as well as senior, and seeing the 
community projects which had been started and finished, gave me a good 
understanding of how things function, which I would not have grasped had I not gone 
there. By being there I got a feel for the project and how it affected local people’s 
lives, and since reaching the poorest is NORAD’s main goal, I found it important to 
see if these people were actually reached, especially since the project was 
characterised as successful.  
Conducting interviews and getting documents from NORAD in Oslo was no 
problem, but as mentioned, my wish was to go all the way down to a concrete project 
to be able to say something about the results in a developing country, not just the 
Norwegian politics, strategies and views. I managed to get a scholarship from the 
Norwegian Research Council through the Faculty of Social Science and the Institute 
of Political Science, which gave me the possibility to go to Zambia for 6 weeks. It 
would have been an advantage to stay longer, but the time and financial constraints 
made that impossible, and knowing that I had a limited period there, made me work 
hard to get as much out of it as possible. I carried out quite many interviews44 of 
people that I and others found relevant for this study. Most have been done directly, 
but some follow-up questions have been sent by e-mail, fax or post. If one wants to 
know people’s opinions on certain issues, depth is needed, and qualitative 
interviewing is a suitable research method (Hesselberg: 1998, Andersen: 1990).  
The degree of structure can vary and one has to adopt different types of interviews 
as the process moves on. Patton (1990:288-89) has made a list of variations in 
                                              
44 See interviews list in appendix 2. 
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interview instrumentation, which was useful as an overview when I started to work 
on the structure of the interviews (in Mikkelsen 1995: 102-103). I started with some 
semi-structured interviews45, to get to know NORAD better and thereafter the project 
in Zambia. These interviews were of type 1 and 2 in Patton’s figure, that is ‘informal 
conversational interview’46 and ‘interview guide approach’47. These were matched to 
the individuals who were interviewed, used to form hypotheses and increase the 
relevance of later questions. Through some semi-standardised48 and standardised 
open-ended interviews49 later on, where the interviewees answered the same 
questions, the comparability of responses were increased (Mikkelsen 1995: 103).  
By combining the different types of interviews, the weaknesses of them are 
lessened, as they supplement each other (ibid.). I have tried to formulate the questions 
as objectively as possible, following advice on good and bad questions and reading a 
lot about interviewing from several researchers within different disciplines 
(Mikkelsen 1995, Hesselberg 1998, Andersen 1990, Kvale 1996, Rubin & Rubin 
1995, Berg 1989). Since being totally objective is impossible, asking a lot of different 
people the same questions and supplementing with some different questions, in 
addition to using different forms of interviewing at different stages, will help me in 
getting a wide variety of views. It will also be a method for checking the reliability in 
the responses.  
As mentioned above, doing interviews face to face has some clear advantages, 
especially in the beginning when one doesn’t know the study field well and maybe 
doesn’t have a clear idea of what is most important to reach the aim of the research. 
In sitting face to face doing a semi-structural interview, one can let the interviewee 
                                              
45 semi-structural interview= only some of the questions and topics are pre-determined. Many questions will be 
formulated during the interview and irrelevant questions can be dropped. Questions are asked according to a 
flexible checklist or guide and not from a formal questionnaire (Mikkelsen 1995: 102). 
46 Informal conversational interview= questions emerge from the immediate context and are asked in the 
natural course of things; there is no predetermination of question topics or wording. This method was only used 
in Zambia, to find out what kind of positions people had, about their attitudes and so on. 
47 Topics and issues to be covered are specified in advance, in outline form; interviewer decides sequence and 
wording of questions in the course of the interview. 
48 Semi-standardised interviews= A number of predetermined questions and/or special topics, asked in a 
systematic and consistent order, but permitting the respondent to digress and go far beyond the answers to 
the question (Berg 1989: chapter 2). 
49 Exact wording of questions and sequence of them are predetermined. All interviewees are asked the same 
basic questions in the same order. Questions are worded in a completely open-ended format. 
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elaborate on things they find important and thereby be able to find out things one 
would not have, if the interviewee had answered to some strict questionnaire by post 
or e-mail. When they touch upon something that seems important, impulsive follow-
up questions might bring important information. My experience is that questions are 
more easily misunderstood when in writing without the interviewer present, probably 
even more so in cases where English is used and the language is not the mother 
tongue of the interviewer or the interviewees. I tried to get the interviews which were 
impossible to conduct for various reasons when on fieldwork, done through post and 
fax. Unfortunately, some never answered. Because of this the main focus will have to 
be changed a little. Since I don’t have the views of the local council and the ministry, 
it will be more fruitful to focus on the development possibilities in SLAMU and how 
it has affected peoples’ lives, in addition to NORAD employees points of view.  
I could see that some of the questions that were answered through post had been 
misunderstood; something that did not happen to the same degree when done directly, 
and then the possibility of clarifying directly was there. I let the interviewee finish 
before I tried to formulate a ‘new’ question to get an answer to what I wanted to 
know if they had misunderstood, so that no one would feel uncomfortable for not 
understanding.  
When done by post, it is much more difficult to send new questions if one can see 
that they have misunderstood. This is particularly because the postal system is slow, 
unpredictable and relatively unreliable in the recipient country. Sending letters to 
make questions clear and getting new answers would take months. Luckily though, I 
got very good contact with some both current and former SLAMU employees, that I 
still have contact with through e-mail and fax. I have been able to send extra 
questions to and through them, which has been very helpful throughout the whole 
process.  If I had not gotten to know these people so well during my fieldwork, this 
would have been impossible.  
Another disadvantage by not going on fieldwork is that it can be difficult to know 
if the interviewees have understood the questions in the same way as you do yourself. 
When you don’t see people it is more difficult to know how they have interpreted the 
questions.  Some of the interviews I had planned were not conducted. One important 
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person, the former manager of LIRDP/SLAMU for ten years, Mr. F. Munyenyembe 
unfortunately passed away before I got to interview him. I also struggled with 
transportation problems when in the Mfuwe area, since the SLAMU vehicles were 
much occupied, there is no public transportation and the distances were too wide to 
walk. Therefore, my plan was to talk to the Mambwe District Council representative, 
the District Administrator (DA) and a chief at the Annual Review Meeting for the 
local case, SLAMU, when back in Lusaka. Because of some misunderstandings50, I 
was only able to have a brief talk with the District Administrator, and the other two 
were not willing to speak to me.  
Some representatives for the central authorities were hard to reach, some promised 
to send me answers through fax and post, but I never received anything although I 
tried to call several times. These were the only ones who were not very co-operative 
during the fieldwork, and they were also the ones I didn’t get to know – which shows 
that it is easier to get positive responses and understanding when meeting and getting 
to know people. All others on all levels were friendly, interested and helpful. The 
incident with the chief and the District Council representative was probably an 
example of differences in understanding, and maybe they felt that I wasn’t showing 
them enough respect, which is related to the next sub-section on research in a 
different culture. 
 
3.2.4 Research in a different culture - considerations on how to behave. 
I think it is important to reflect on the subject of doing research in a country which 
is very different from my own. Being aware of cultural differences, consider how it 
will be appropriate to dress and behave among other things. Hesselberg (1998) has 
written a guide to questionnaires and interviewing in developing countries for 
postgraduate students of Human Geography. This is relevant for me because most 
                                              
50 The district council representative had heard that I had been in the Mfuwe area some weeks before the 
meeting and was obviously insulted that I had not taken the time to come and see him in his office. I tried to 
explain that it had proven too difficult with the transportation, and because of the distance between SLAMU 
HQ and the Mambwe District Council offices, I had not felt that it would be right to occupy a SLAMU vehicle 
for several hours to go there– especially since I knew I would see him in Lusaka. He had a different opinion. 
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Human Geography students go on fieldwork for some months like I did, and 
generally not as long as students of Anthropology. I found his advice clear and it lead 
me into a process of increasing awareness. Several researchers with fieldwork 
experience recommends living in the area, not just come to do interviews and then 
leave (Hesselberg: 1998, Devereux & Hoddinott: 1992, Mikkelsen: 1995). 
Involvement – to be able not just to observe but to participate in community life – 
adds a dimension to understanding which living apart can never provide (Devereux & 
Hoddinott 1992: 12).   
The disadvantages mentioned are that if one lives with a family, the relationship 
with them usually means that one has to exclude them from any random sample, and 
the association with them inevitably influences how the people in their network 
perceive and respond to the fieldworker, for better or worse (ibid.) Some people may 
refuse to be interviewed because they have a strained relationship to the family the 
fieldworker lives with. I didn’t experience any problems in this respect, probably 
because I wasn’t really associated with any family. I lived in the house of a former 
employee, because no one new had been employed and thereby the house was empty. 
This way I lived very close to the SLAMU offices and many of the people in the area, 
without being directly associated to any family. I also saved a lot of time by living 
there, because it was only 5 minutes to walk to the offices, and I found out very early 
that it was a meeting place for people in the area. That way, by sitting at the 
community programme/CBNRM office with my work, I was able to observe what 
was going on, help with practical things when they had workshops, listen in and 
participate, and last but not least, talk to and interview a lot of people when they had 
the time. The employees at the community programme also shared their PC with me 
and explained a lot about their work through informal conversations. The contacts 
with them were invaluable, in that they also included me in workshops, both at the 
office and in villages, and later took me out to do interviews.  
Hesselberg (Hesselberg 1998) also says that it is important to behave correctly, if 
one does something wrong it will spread quickly and can make future interviewees 
                                                                                                                                           
The chief also meant that I should have seen him in the Valley, and said that he “didn’t like to be taken by 
surprise” (communicated to extension officer Muzengesa at meeting 04.07.02). 
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more hostile. I spoke to a fellow student who had been in Zambia on fieldwork some 
months earlier, and also to some Zambians living in Norway before I went, to get 
some tips on how to behave. When in Zambia I spent a few days in the capital talking 
to the second secretary at the Norwegian Embassy, who also put me in contact with 
Dr.Child, who became one of my key informants. Both of them also gave me 
information about the Zambian culture and the project area in particular. No matter 
how well prepared one is, there will always be some dilemmas which will come up 
when living among the people one is interviewing, one example Hesselberg (ibid.) 
gives is beer drinking. I avoided this problem partly because they were too shy to ask 
me to join them in the beginning, and some also said that I seemed so busy with my 
work that they didn’t want to disturb. There was a party on my last evening in the 
bush, which the young employees invited me to, and I could join without worrying 
about what people might think about it, since the interviews were over. It was a nice 
occasion to have informal conversations with a lot of people which gave me a last 
look into their life situation. It was also giving to get affirmative feed-back. 
Hesselberg (1998:39) also argues that although one should generally not give 
presents, it is okay to give something to the persons one works the most with, and to 
give away material things when leaving, that were bought for the stay. I knew that 
they would need the mosquito net, mosquito repellent, torch, some clothes and shoes 
much more than me, so it felt good to give it to them, especially the net and repellent 
since malaria is such a big threat and poor people don’t have the possibility to 
prioritise such things. 
Another thing Hesselberg mentions that several students have experienced, is that  
an informant can accuse students of “imperialism”– that they are “stealing 
knowledge” without giving anything back (Hesselberg 1998). I also experienced this 
to a certain degree, although it was not unfriendly. I was not directly accused of 
stealing knowledge, but some village people asked me if my work would make any 
difference in their lives, if they would gain anything from it in any way. The only 
thing I could say was that it was not up to me, but some NORAD employees and 
SLAMU people might read it, and that they might take some of my observations and 
possible advice into consideration. Even if they would not, at least I would know 
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more about their situation and be very grateful if they would help me to understand 
better. I said that they would be helping me in understanding and getting educated, 
which would never be wasted – they agreed to that.  
 
3.2.5 Anonymity versus reliability 
It is very difficult to know what is best, but one has to consider how sensitive the 
information is and if people wish to be anonymous that has to be respected. I agree 
with Hesselberg (1998:42) that it is important to let ethical considerations come 
before reliability. This goes for both letting informants be anonymous and letting the 
ones who don’t want to be interviewed in peace (1998:41-42). In this case it is not 
necessary to give the place and project false names. There was a general acceptance 
of my research, and it is not the first time someone from the outside has come to do 
research in the area. I consider it to be enough to let some of the people I interviewed 
be anonymous. As long as I only say that they are, or have been employed in 
LIRDP/SLAMU, it will be very hard to find out who have said what. I am the only 
one who knows who I have interviewed; no one else has seen the list.  
In Norway, some of my informants have asked not to be quoted on some of their 
statements, and some have asked to be anonymous. If the statements they have asked 
not to be quoted on are important for my findings they will still be used, but without 
saying who said it. Hesselberg (1998:43) also recommends that only parts of the 
thesis is translated and sent back to the studied area. Since all the people who have an 
interest in reading this thesis can read English, I don’t need to have it translated, but I 
will certainly reflect on which parts I will send, to make sure that no one gets into any 
trouble and that no one are offended or hurt by what I write in any way. Since I 
understood that one of my informants in Zambia had been fired because of things he 
had said earlier – although something else was given as the reason– it is vital to make 
sure that I don’t contribute to anything similar. The same goes for the Norwegian 
informants – the ones who trust me by letting me know things they would not have 
said publicly, will be given anonymity on certain statements. 
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3.3 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have gone through the theoretical approaches that will be used in 
the analysis, and hopefully, the necessary methodological reflections have been 
made. As mentioned, the analysis will be on several levels, in 2 different countries, 
involving a lot of different people, and importantly, on concepts that are 
interdisciplinary in nature, which makes the ‘support’ of several approaches from 
different disciplines needed. Fortunately this is not new to me, since I have been 
studying many different disciplines, although the main contributions used are taken 
from political science, the other contributions will clearly be helpful in this study51. 
 The model in sub-section 1.2 above shows more specifically which relations will 
be examined in chapter 4. As partly mentioned in 1.2 and 2.5.4, the data collection 
both in Zambia and in Norway will be used to answer the following questions, 
starting with the general questions about NORAD and the international conventions, 
and going down to project level to analyse SLAMU and its community programme. 
All these questions will help determine Norwegian development co-operation’s 
contribution towards Sustainable Development:  
• How can the problems of integrating environmental considerations in all 
development work be better understood? 
• To what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, CBD and 
CITES influenced NORAD’s strategies? 
• Which institutional features in NORAD play a positive role in realising the 
project goals?  
• And which function as barriers? 
• Is the decentralisation to SLAMU/the Community-programme having any 
effect on local government? 
• How is the placement of the project under ZAWA instead of NPWS affecting 
the decentralisation/the autonomy of SLAMU/the Community-programme? 
• How has the community-programme affected local people? 
Or more specifically for the last question, 
                                              
51 I am talking about contributions from Human Geography, Anthropology and Wildlife Economics, the first 
two mainly on research methods and the last as a support in the analysis. 
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In accordance with what I have written in the previous chapters, I will begin the 
analysis ‘at home’, with NORAD’s integration of environmental factors in the 
development work and how this is connected to Sustainable Development. Lafferty’s 
& Meadowcroft’s understanding of Sustainable Development will be used as an 
analytical tool. As mentioned in section 2.2, it involves seeing economic 
development, social development and environmental protection as interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing components53.  I will also look at the role of the two chosen 
international conventions for NORAD - CBD and CITES. Some reflections on the 
conventions influence on SLAMU directly will be made.  
My second main chore is to analyse the institutional relationship between NORAD 
and SLAMU with the help of institutional theory, to be able to see what hinders and 
what promotes the daily work and further development of the project. The 
institutional features which influence the relationship between these two 
organisations, and which will be analysed further in this chapter are: institutional 
culture, competence on different issues and organisational form. Part of this will be to 
see if what happens in NORAD – with the integration of environmental factors and 
the role of the conventions – has any, or what kind of influence it has on SLAMU.  
Thirdly, SLAMU’s Community Programme will be analysed to see how well it is 
able to fulfil some of NORAD’s and SLAMU’s primary goals – poverty reduction 
and empowerment. I will try to see how much the decentralisation of management 
responsibility for wildlife means in this work, how it is implemented and how the 
project can be defined with the help of implementation theory and decentralisation 
theory. 
 
                                              
53 For further explanation of Sustainable Development, see 2.2, especially pages 15-16. 
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4.2 The Integration of Environmental Factors in NORAD 
    The Norwegian government decided to integrate Sustainable Development 
(SD) in all sectors of Norway’s foreign policy already in 1988 (Langhelle:2000). 
White Paper 46 (1988-89) outlined the Norwegian follow-up to the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), including the relations with 
developing countries. Two parts of SD are already integrated in the development 
work – social and economic development – so environmental issues was the weakest 
aspect, see model under 4.4.3. If SD is the means and/or the goal, equal weight has to 
be given to the three aspects within the concept; economic development, social 
development and environmental protection.  
Efforts have been made to strengthen the environmental aspect within NORAD by, 
among other things, increasing the competence on environment. From 1996-1999 
NORAD made a massive effort through an environment project (EP), with relatively 
limited results. When this project was ended, the project approach was left in favour 
of having visiting experts on environmental issues integrated in the technical 
department and region offices54 instead (Strand 2003 [interview]). Strand (ibid.) 
maintained that the project “lived outside the organisation” and that integration has to 
happen on that level as well as on other levels. It seemed that this can be part of the 
explanation of why the results of the EP were limited, that is, the lack of integration is 
a reason for lack of learning in the organisation. This would also be corresponding to 
another explanation; both to the delay in the creation of the Environment project and 
its narrow results, that big organisations like NORAD need time to adopt a ‘new’ 
policy and plan how to integrate it with the already existing policies (Olsen 1992).  
The ambitious main goal of the EP group was “to reach sustainable development 
which takes natural resources, biological diversity, cultural heritage protection and 
pollution problems into consideration (Jordfald in N&M bulletin 05/97). One can 
maintain that the integration with the other aspects within SD, and within the already 
existing focal areas should have been mentioned in the main goal. The environment 
project was supposed to increase the competence on environment both in NORAD 
                                              
54 See organisational chart of NORAD in appendix 1. 
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and in the recipient countries. However, it would have been beneficial to focus also 
here, on increased competence on the interdependency in addition to environment in 
itself. One of the means they used was to go through the routines in NORAD to 
improve them to secure that environmental factors are considered (ibid.). In addition, 
other Norwegian institutions with competence on environmental management were 
included in the development co-operation as support. The co-operation with these 
institutions has later been formalised as “Norwegian environmental assistance”55. The 
head of the environment project said in an interview in 1997, that the aim was to 
make sure that the consideration of environmental factors would be fully integrated in 
the core of all departments in NORAD by the end of the environment project 
(Jordfald in N&M bulletin 05/97). To be able to implement/integrate a new criterion, 
some aspects play an important role. Besides resources – which include financial 
means, personnel and sufficient time – strategies which point out responsibility and 
way of implementing, and good ambitions/agreement on the issue, can be decisive. 
Kjellberg & Reitan argue that; 
Without resources in finance and personnel, implementation will have little 
chance in succeeding no matter how good ambitions people have for the 
venture (1995: 144). 
In addition to these resources pointed out by Kjellberg & Reitan (1995), as 
mentioned above, the time spent on implementation can be vital. The environment 
project with its vast assignments lasted only three years, which makes it natural to 
question if that was sufficient time, especially considering that they spent a year on 
establishing the project, had one year of normal operation, and at the beginning of the 
last year the reduction of staff started (Hansson Jan. 2003 [e-mail]).The leader for the 
Environment Program found that the financial resources to environmental projects 
increased a lot during the existence of the EP and that the general consciousness on 
environmental issues increased (Jordfald Febr. 2003 [e-mail]). However, he writes:  
                                              
55 The formalised co-operation has its own internet page (http://environment.norad.no). 
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“The beginning was difficult. We spent about a year on establishing the 
project, because most of the environmental advisors had quit and it took time 
to recruit both those who were to be hired in permanent positions and those 
who were going to work in temporary positions in the EP. In addition, we 
had substantial lag on ordinary environmentally related work which had to 
be done as well….I saw it as important to get acceptance in the organisation, 
that we rendered the expected service internally and not only ran 
development work. This occupied a good deal of our capacity (ibid. (my 
translation).  
 Jordfald’s comments show that the resources set aside were not properly defined for 
the project, but also made them feel responsible for ordinary environmental work in 
addition to the recruiting of both temporary and permanent employment. The 
responsibility for recruitment of people to the permanent positions should have been 
given to someone outside the EP. If there were almost none left of the environmental 
advisers, it seems logical that someone in the leadership should have taken that 
responsibility. 
When it is considered that environmental considerations are not properly 
institutionalised in NORAD, the building of the new SLAMU headquarters in Mfuwe 
makes a good illustrating example of lack of institutionalisation both there and in the 
local SLAMU. Even in the local project where environmental consideration is such 
an important aspect, they managed to start building without doing an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) which is a demand not only in all Norwegian development 
work but also according to Zambian laws (Grøva: Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). None of the 
actors involved – NORAD, ZAWA, SLAMU’s leadership, the Zambian building 
authority, tender board, architects and technical advisers – reacted to the lacking EIA. 
It was someone from the tourist industry who asked about the placement of all these 
buildings and a plan for it, which made people realise that they were actually 
supposed by law, to have had both an EIA and a Land Use Plan from the beginning 
(ibid.).  
When it was discovered that there was a lot of unplanned and unfavourable 
building going on in other parts of the area as well, The Environmental Council of 
Zambia stopped all building activity in the whole area. Nothing will be finished or 
started until a Land Use Plan has been made, which is currently being developed with 
the help of WWF, and NORAD is supporting it through funding. The building of the 
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headquarters has not had any severe environmental consequences, but in this case 
were no precautions were taken, it was pure luck (ibid.). After the mistake became 
known, all parties have done their best to co-operate on the Land Use Plan, and the 
work seems to be going well (own observations including workshop, Grøva: Nov. 
2002 [e-mail]). 
 Even if there are still some initiatives for further integration of environment in 
NORAD, the main effort was the environment project, and evaluations of the 
integration56 have pointed out that it is still not satisfactory. So what can help explain 
the lack of full integration? To be able to make some contributions towards 
understanding the problems with integration, the strategies (4.3) and some of 
NORAD’s institutional features (4.4) will be analysed below.  
 
4.2.1 The Strategies - Report no.19 to the Storting (1995-96), NORAD invests in 
the future 2000-2005, & SEDC57. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, all the strategies touch upon environmental factors in 
the development work, but they neither focus on the connection between the aspects, 
nor the connection between SD and poverty reduction to a sufficient degree. The 
different aspects within SD are all touched upon separately in connection with 
poverty reduction, but are not seen together, which would show the interdependency. 
The further one goes in time from the WCED-report and the UNCED in Rio, the less 
Sustainable Development is mentioned in the strategies. The first and best when seen 
with ‘Sustainable Development glasses’, is Report no. 19 to the Storting from 1995-
96. It maintains that  
“The overriding goal of Norwegian south policy is to contribute towards 
improving economic, social and political conditions in the developing 
countries within the limits of sustainable development (Report no. 19 1995-
96: 2 and 11) 
It is further argued that the different main areas of the South-politics must be seen in 
connection to each other, so that they can strengthen each other (ibid: 11) and that the 
                                              
56 As earlier mentioned, the external evaluations after the environment project was ended were the ProSus-
report from 2000 and the Office of the Auditor General of Norway from 2002. 
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government wants to strengthen the work on integrating environment in the 
development co-operation in general. When it comes to the position of women it is 
said that the achievement of greater gender equality is a matter of economic 
development, human rights, and social justice, and is one of the premises for 
Sustainable Development (ibid: 6, 34-35). Among other things, the connection 
between women and management of natural resources is highlighted and there are 
many more good examples of how the connection between the different areas within 
the development work is seen: trade development within the frames of Sustainable 
Development, education in relation to population development, health, nutrition, 
environmental consciousness and resource conservation. Unfortunately, there are few 
examples of this in the other strategies.  
The next is the Strategy on Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC) 
from 1997, which barely mentions Sustainable Development and superficially refers 
to the connections within the concept. It seems that most of SEDC is concentrated on 
special environmental development projects, although the principle of integration of 
environmental consideration in all regular development work is mentioned, with a 
reservation in saying “where it is relevant” (SEDC: 1). This last part has a 
symbolically negative effect. It makes it much easier to disregard environmental 
factors when working with a project or programme which is not directly 
environmentally targeted, especially for those who don’t have much competence on 
environment. It can also be used as an excuse for not having regarded the 
environment because it ‘didn’t seem relevant’ no matter if there are environmental 
consequences of a venture or not.  
Later, in the appendix from NORAD it is maintained that the integration of 
environment in all development co-operation shall be upheld and strengthened, 
without mentioning ‘where it is relevant’ (SEDC: 18). But then two examples of 
areas were the integration of environment is easiest reached from a Norwegian view 
is given, the primary industries and sectors were Norway have special competence. 
This can clearly be seen as self-contradictory. In the same sub-chapter integration in 
all development work is emphasised and thereafter special focus is given to two very 
                                                                                                                                           
57 See section 2.3 for background information on the strategies. 
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limited areas within development work. When it comes to the question of how to 
integrate environmental factors, there are no concrete suggestions in the appendix 
which is supposed to show ‘guiding lines for operationalisation and visualisation of 
the strategy for the primary users’, NORAD employees.  
The third strategy in time is the current overarching, main strategy “NORAD 
invests in the future, 2000-2005”. It says:  
The overriding goal of development co-operation is to contribute towards 
lasting improvements in the economic, social and political conditions of the 
population of developing countries, with the particular emphasis on ensuring 
that aid benefits the poorest people (NORAD invests in the future: 9). 
Sustainable Development is not mentioned, nor is environmental factors in 
connection with the overriding goal. This shows how the integration of environment 
has been ‘forgotten’ on the highest strategic level. However, environment and natural 
resource management is one of the points in the list of focal areas on the same page, 
after that it is barely mentioned until the last part of the strategy, “Areas in which 
NORAD invests”. Does this show someone from the outside that environment is well 
integrated and prioritised in the development work like some people maintain? Where 
is the Sustainable Development approach from the report to the Storting in 1995-96? 
When Lomøy (2002: [interview]) maintains that Sustainable Development is 
integrated and therefore political fronting is not needed anymore, does that mean that 
it needn’t even be mentioned? All the other prioritised aspects within the 
development work are mentioned often, like social development, human rights, the 
principle of recipient responsibility, democratic development, economic development 
and so on – does this mean that these aspects are not integrated? That is obviously not 
the case, but they are naturally still part of the main strategy, which shows that 
Sustainable Development has clearly lost political momentum (Langhelle 2000). This 
is one of the reasons why it is not mentioned, not that is has been integrated. The 
General Director of NORAD also mentioned that Sustainable Development and 
environment has not been outspokenly politically prioritised as long as she has been 
in NORAD (Since 1996) (Strand 2003 [interview]). She continued: 
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That does not mean that we are not working with these issues. We try all the 
time, to make systems which are so secure that we don’t put aside things that 
are important when new things come up... We have four sustainability 
elements in everything that we do, but not everything comes out in writing, 
its just routine… Our challenge is to keep a good level on those things that 
are important on the whole all the time.  
It is easy to see the changing trends in the different strategies. As mentioned 
above, Sustainable Development was strong in 1995-96 but in 199958 when the main 
strategy was formulated, different social development aspects had taken over again. 
Although the recipient responsibility was emphasised in the strategy from 95-96, it is 
much more dominating in the main strategy together with Human Rights.   
When Opsal said that the strategies are not the problem but the practical 
implementation of the environmental aspects (2002: [interview]), this was at first 
seen as unproblematic. However, after having read the strategies again, I realised that 
a clarification and operationalisation of (the problems with) the strategies can also 
help ease the practical work. At the same time, I have understanding for the fact that 
it is seen as more important to use the resources on practical integration. 
Nevertheless, since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has the main 
responsibility for the development of strategies, most of the resources to improve the 
strategies would be engaged in MFA and not NORAD, so that NORAD could still 
work on the implementation. It has been pointed out that NORAD is not much 
involved in, or doesn’t contribute much to strategies and other policy work (NORAD 
employee 2002 [interview], former NORAD employee 2002 [interview]). The current 
division of responsibility can be a reason for lack of ‘ownership’ of the strategies, 
that the strategies are not properly related to NORAD employees’ daily work. My 
impression from all the documents in the archive is that NORAD is often given a 
short time-limit by the Ministry to contribute to policies and strategy work, which can 
make it an extra burden. However, Moen pointed out that this has been improved 
(2003: [interview]). 
Some preliminary concluding remarks on the integration of environment can be 
made so far. It seems apparent that the focus on the connections between the aspects 
                                              
58 Espen sees the same tendency in her thesis “Pasvik, management of a transnational watercourse” 
(forthcoming 2003) 
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within Sustainable Development and the prioritised areas within the development co-
operation, which overlap, needs to be more clearly and more profoundly dealt with in 
the strategies. This will make it easier for NORAD staff to work holistically, consider 
all areas and see the interdependency. It will probably also help them in integrating 
environmental factors and other ‘new’ aspects which will come in the future. In 
trying to simplify by dividing up a whole into different areas, it seems that things 
have become more complicated and less surveyable for NORAD employees.  
 
4.2.2 Institutional features of NORAD 
Both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ – the origins and the paths by which an institution has 
arrived where it is – are important (Berman 1983: v in Olsen 1988: 252). In the case 
of NORAD it seems that the roots are strong, while the routes have been going in 
different directions according to trends in society, and parliament’s influence. 
However, as different trends wear off, or it is decided that a part-goal has been 
reached, the tendency seems to be a return to the original main focus – social 
development. This assumption is based on the fact that NORAD’s main strategy59 
puts a lot of emphasis on issues which can be placed under social development as an 
overarching aspect, and this has a strong symbolic effect. In addition there are several 
sub-strategies on social issues60 and my own impressions from observations and 
interviews also indicate emphasis on social development, which will be further 
analysed below. If we first allow a little speculation61 on why the social development 
aspect is so strong, there are at least two possible factors. First, different types of 
people are drawn to different types of institutions (Olsen 1992: 253). It should be fair 
to assume that most NORAD employees are more idealistic and involved in solidarity 
than the average person. Their main reason for seeking a job at NORAD is probably 
                                              
59 “NORAD invests in the future - NORAD’s strategy for 2000- 2005” 
60 "HIV/AIDS and development - Norway’s views", "NORAD's Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Action 
Plan",  "Action plan for human rights", NORAD's "Handbook in Human Rights Assessment", and "Strategy for 
female- and equal rights oriented development co-operation". 
61 Olsen calls one of the sections in his article “Analyzing Institutional dynamics”, “Speculating about 
institutional dynamics”. This is mentioned to show that known researchers speculate, as a justification of the 
speculation here. It is also to show recognition of a little speculation which can bring innovation together with 
empirical findings. Hopefully this kind of ‘brainstorming’ can bring new ideas and help to solve problems. 
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that they wish to contribute to a more just world, which is also deeply entrenched in 
the history of, and the foundation of NORAD62. In this connection it is natural to see 
a wide definition of social development (including economic development) as the 
most important issue since it can be easily seen as a means in poverty reduction.  
Second, when ‘new’ aspects are added to the list of criteria for assessing projects 
or programmes without removing any, it makes the job more complicated. Some 
employees point to the fact that they have a lot of strategies and criteria to relate to, 
and one maintained that several employees stationed at different embassies had not 
even read the strategy for environmental development co-operation63. When asking 
about environmental considerations, some constantly reminded me of all the other 
aspects they also had to consider. Even if it is not an excuse, it can be hard to focus 
on several complicated concerns at once, especially under time pressure, and one may 
well end up putting most focus on what one personally finds the most important, and 
partly neglect other factors.  
Just like democracies live with conflict between institutionalised rule-sets (Olsen 
1992: 253), so do institutions64. When institutions in addition have some ‘rule-sets’ 
which are not properly institutionalised that they have to work on integrating because 
parliament or others on the outside demands it, it makes it even more complicated. 
Even though there is no outspoken direct conflict between economic- and social 
factors against environmental factors within NORAD, the lack of focus on the 
interdependency between them makes it harder to remember the consideration of 
environmental factors in relation to projects and programmes, since environment has 
a weaker position. It is not only environment that needs to be better integrated, but 
also the focus on the interdependency between it and social and economic 
development65 in the organisation and work descriptions, just like in the strategies as 
                                              
62 In Report no. 19 to the Storting (1995-96) it says: A wish to realise international solidarity is a cornerstone in 
the Norwegian involvement in the developing countries (p.11)  
63 When a high degree of trust is reached and controversial issues are touched upon, it is important to give the 
informant anonymity on those statements. I have been trying to minimise anonymous statements, but when 
considered important in trying to explain something, they have been included in the study. For further 
contemplations on anonymity versus reliability, see section 3.2.5. 
64 As mentioned, there is disagreement on how institutionalised environment is, but even if environmental 
factors is not an institutionalised rule-set, there is no doubt about the possibility of conflict. 
65 See for instance http://www.forskningsradet.no/nyheter/notiser/melding.html/12991 
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mentioned in section 4.3. Sustainable Development is a relatively complicated 
concept, and many in NORAD have more education and competence on economic 
and social issues than on environmental ones,66 which can also make it more difficult 
to make sure that environmental factors are considered. Maybe SD is more of a 
problem for the employees than most are consciously aware of or willing to admit?  
 
4.2.3 The organisation of NORAD – role of the leadership and internal dynamics 
When asked about the role of Sustainable Development, several employees answer 
that it is what NORAD is working towards (e.g. Lomøy:2002, Grøva:2002 
[interviews]). With this in mind, one would expect that it would be visible both in 
strategies and the way the offices are organised. In the organisation of the offices 
however, environment is not given as much place and resources as the other two 
aspects within SD. It is placed in the Technical Department in the Unit for 
Environment and Energy, the employees in the unit have no implementation 
responsibility for programmes or projects, and the executive officers in the regional 
offices are not obliged to consult them (Ås: 2002 [interview], Skjønsberg: 2000).  
This doesn’t harmonise with the goal of integrating environmental factors in all 
development co-operation, like Skjønsberg (2000) has pointed out before. The head 
of the Unit for Environment and Energy, stated that he thought Skjønsberg’s research 
report had really opened the eyes of many NORAD employees (Opsal: 2002 
[interview]).  
 The idea behind the current organisation is that the expert advisers on 
environmental issues (and on human rights, health, education and son on) are situated 
in a separate department without implementation responsibility to be able to make 
impartial judgements on programmes or projects. If they are more closely involved in 
(implementation of) programmes or projects, it would be like evaluating themselves 
when considering the possible environmental impacts. After the environment project 
was ended in 1999, the number of employees in the environment field was reduced 
                                              
66 See also the explanation connected to the ‘competency trap’ under 4.3.2 p.56 
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from thirteen to three (Jordfald: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). If the consideration of 
environmental factors had been as integrated in all departments as Jordfald hoped for, 
the reduction might not have been a problem, but many have stated that 
environmental factors are not well enough integrated (Skjønsberg 2000, Andersen 
Jan. 2003 [e-mail], Larsen 2002 [interview], Ås 2002 [interview], and the Auditor 
General 2002). It seems that environmental factors have been tolerably integrated in 
strategies, but not well enough in the organisation and thereby not in the daily work. 
Another important aspect, as partly mentioned above, is the role of the leadership. 
My assumption is that the leadership has to have a genuine interest in, and will to see 
implementation through, to get an aspect integrated in an institution. That means that 
it is at least partly up to the leadership to get environment fully integrated in all 
development-co-operation. The leader(ship) of an institution, especially a small and 
hierarchical one, can make evident changes in the behaviour of the institution (Peters 
1999: 36). But, Peters (ibid.) continues: 
Even then, however, the compliance may be only for aggregative, 
instrumental reasons rather than a reflection of any real changes in the values 
that undergird behaviour. If that is so, then in institutionalist terms there may 
not have been any meaningful change. 
It is possible that this can be part of the explanation to the weaker role of 
environment compared to other aspects in NORAD, because the organisation is big 
with a flat organisational structure, it must be more difficult for the leadership to 
initiate changes. It seemed that the Director had interest in implementing environment 
and clearly she saw it as an important part of NORAD’s work (Strand 2003 
[interview]), but maybe this is not clear to the employees? And maybe having three 
visiting environmental experts from other institutions at all times is not sufficient? 
According to Kjellberg & Reitan, if the leadership doesn’t secure sufficient attention 
on, and resources for the integration of a ‘new’ aspect, there will be little chance of 
success (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995). Environment is not a new aspect anymore, but it 
needs attention to become institutionalised as long as this has still not happened.  
The employees stand very free – it becomes more difficult to control that 
everybody make the necessary considerations both environmentally and otherwise. It 
can also make it difficult to follow up strategic changes, and thereby critique comes 
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from parliament and others, when it has been decided that NORAD should change its 
focus and it is not happening to a sufficient degree. The flat structure and the freedom 
the employees have, also gives the institution less continuity and the institutional 
memory is weakened compared to other more formal institutions (like MoE) 
(NORAD employees [interviews]).  
On the other hand, the flat organisational structure can be motivating in that the 
employees feel that they are given much responsibility. They also travel very much, 
and move around within the institution to a great extent (Moen: 2003 [interview]), 
which should give good possibilities for learning and seeing things from different 
sides. Besides the way NORAD is organised, we might find parts of an explanation in 
other areas like the institutional culture.  
 
4.2.4 Institutional culture and values in NORAD 
Within historical institutionalism, ‘path dependency’ is seen as a tendency in 
governments (Peters 1999: 64), but it is just as relevant for a big institution like 
NORAD. ‘Path dependency’ means that once the initial policies and institutional 
choices in a policy area are made the patterns created will persist, unless there is 
some force sufficient to overcome the inertia created at the inception of a programme 
(ibid.). If ‘path dependency’ is one reason why environment has not been integrated 
in NORAD, it must be because the various attempts to integrate it over time, have not 
been a strong enough force to change the initial policies.  
Another ‘version’ of ‘path dependency’ is what Olsen & March calls the 
‘competency trap’ (1992: 964). It is defined as a tendency for a system to become 
firmly locked into a particular rule-based structure by virtue of developing familiarity 
with the rules and capabilities for using them (ibid.). Even though NORAD is seen as 
a flexible organisation, especially by its own employees, the ‘path dependency’ or 
‘competency trap’ can be a logical part of an explanation for at least two reasons. 
 First, even though this might be a weaker trend now than before, many have been 
working at NORAD most or even their whole career. These people don’t really know 
any other organisational system, and the exploitation and refinement of known 
 73
practices and rules tend to drive out the exploration of possible new ones (Olsen & 
March 1992: 965) The longer one works in an organisation and thereby increases 
ones competence, the larger becomes the disadvantage of new rules and practices 
(ibid.) 
 Second, even though NORAD employees shift positions very often within the 
organisation, which should indicate high flexibility, the rules and practices are mainly 
the same. They might have a feeling of change and being flexible because of the 
moving around, which can make them feel less stuck in patterns than they really are 
Both at the headquarters in Oslo and at the embassy, people seemed to have a very 
clear picture of what the main goal of NORAD is and that everything has to be 
clearly related to that. If a project changes and it becomes hard to see the direct 
connection to economic or social development which leads to poverty reduction, a 
problem arises. When the main focus of the SLAMU project in Zambia was partly 
changed to wildlife management, the community programme within it became more 
important to NORAD, because it entails empowerment of local villagers, and thereby 
the connection to social development was secured. 
 One of the NORAD employees said that there must be resistance in the system 
since integration of environment has been a goal for such a long time without getting 
properly integrated (NORAD employee 2002 [interview]). If the integration of 
environment is seen as a reorganisation from an institutional theoretic point of view, 
it implies that strong organisational capabilities are needed to stabilise attention, 
mobilise resources and, last but not least, cope with resistance (Olsen 1992: 256) If 
both the institutional culture is traditional and strong, and the resources spent on the 
integration of new aspects is not sufficient, the integration of environment in the 
development co-operation will be very hard. Several former employees – both  
people who were at NORAD as permanent employees for a substantial period of 
time, and those who were there temporarily as environmental experts from other 
institutions – have indicated that they didn’t feel that they ‘fitted’ within the 
organisational culture (former NORAD employees 2002/2003 [interviews]). It must 
be mentioned that some of them think that things have improved after Tove Strand 
took over as General Director (ibid.). 
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It also makes it hard to integrate environment since it is supposed to be in all 
development work. If it had been something which was new to only one programme, 
which involves a smaller group of people, it would be easier to integrate. In addition, 
if it was an aspect which was easier to integrate as part of the already institutionalised 
aspects, or an aspect which was already there but was given new attention, like 
education has been lifted lately, it would also be easier. In other words, the responses 
of an institution to external events and proposed reforms, will be influenced by the 
matching of the events/reforms and the identity, history and internal dynamic of that 
institution (Olsen 1992: 257). Limitations in time and attention, reluctance against 
creating or re-opening conflicts, and ambiguity when it comes to the effects of 
institutional changes, contributes to a protection of action-programmes close to the 
institutional core against large and quick changes (Olsen 1988: 24).  
When related to NORAD, the focus on Sustainable Development including 
environment in society in general, and the demands of integration in the development 
work from parliament, is dependent on how well it is seen to match with the already 
existing focus, practices, competence and so on. An alternative is to see the 
integration of environment as a still ongoing process, and some have this very 
process-oriented view (see Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: chapter 5). Because of 
institutional inertia, especially in big organisations like NORAD, it takes a long time 
before ‘new’ approaches get integrated. The fact that the environment project in 
NORAD was initiated almost ten years after the WCED-report was published and 
after the general societal interest in Sustainable Development had fallen, shows that it 
takes time to make changes in large institutions. As mentioned in chapter 2, the 
Strategy on Environmental Development Co-operation (SEDC) was also finalised 
late, it took ten years from it was initiated until it was printed (Andersen 2001 
[interview]). 
Environmental factors have been incrementally and partly integrated and as time 
moves on and the staffs are changed, environment might get a more natural role and 
be fully integrated. When interviewing the employees in the Unit for Environment 
and Energy, one hypothesis that was mentioned was that younger people are more 
interested in environmental questions than older people. The follow up of this was 
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that there might be a bigger chance of integrating environment in NORAD’s work 
when the amount of new and young employees becomes higher. My general 
impression is that this is normally the case, but even if environmental issues –and the 
importance of these – has been more focused on during the last two decades, and also 
partly in kindergartens and schools, it does not mean that the majority of young 
people will have a stronger interest than older people. This can also be used as an 
excuse for the lack of integration, indicating that ‘old’ people can’t change and 
therefore ‘new and young’ people are required to reach the goal of integration.  
There are always exceptions to any rule, which was confirmed by the group 
interview with the Zambia-Malawi team.  The oldest person in the group was the one 
who seemed most inclined to consult the technical department, and who viewed it as 
a security net rather than a strait jacket. She also believed that if environmental 
considerations were not taken by the recipient country, NORAD had to make sure 
that this was done. The youngest on the other hand meant that if the recipient country 
wished to disregard environmental consequences because they viewed economic 
development as more important, then they should be allowed to do so. This statement 
is directly in opposition to the criticism that came from the Office of the Auditor 
General’s report recently. It states that NORAD’s degree of involvement and follow 
up has to be considered in relation to the recipient country’s capacity and context, but 
the Norwegian responsibility to control that environmental considerations are made 
cannot be disregarded (Document no. 3: 4 2002-2003: 38).  
This example shows that personal understanding, knowledge, interests and 
background can be part of the integration problems. It can also be seen as lack of 
training. Pressman & Wildavsky’s statement that an implementation process must 
have a beginning and an end (see chapter 3.1.1), can be part of an explanation to the 
disagreement on the level of integration of environmental considerations in the 
development co-operation. Many people need to ‘finish’ things, which mean that they 
need a beginning and an end to the implementation of for instance a project. The 
strategies are however in many instances not clear enough on aims and goals and 
doesn’t specify measures that should be taken, which results in different 
interpretations and disagreements on whether something has been implemented and if 
 76 
original goals have been reached or not. In addition, (political) measures can be 
ambiguous when it comes to means, and who is to have the responsibility (for 
implementation (Sørvang 1984 in Kjellberg & Reitan 1995: 136). 
NORAD’s main goal has always been poverty reduction, but not always 
considering possible environmental consequences. There have been cases where 
social consequences have not been well considered either, but in those cases it has 
been because someone made the wrong judgements on the social impacts of a project, 
not because it was not considered at all like the case has been with environment. 
Considering the social impacts is much more integrated in the way NORAD 
employees work than the consideration of environmental impacts. Lafferty & 
Meadowcroft (2000) illustrate well that there are physical environmental constraints 
as well at ethical constraints on developmental activity67, which is especially relevant 
for development agencies like NORAD. This is because the failure of not considering 
these constraints will undermine their own activity. If a resource is depleted, it can be 
very difficult or even impossible to get it back to a normal level, which several 
examples can show.68 This will be further discussed under 4.5 since it is related to the 
international environmental conventions.  
 
4.2.5 Any solutions? 
In my opinion, since the two aspects social - and economic development still stand 
much stronger in NORAD than environmental protection, and actually entail two of 
the six main areas69, a reorganisation of strategic goals a part of a possible solution 
might be a reorganisation of strategic goals. The leadership would have to play an 
important role and take responsibility for it. Since there is no single, easy and ‘right’ 
answer to how environment can be strengthened and integrated better, and different 
minds will have different views, what we can do is to make some more suggestions of 
                                              
67 See also page 14 in chapter 2. 
68  A known example is the Victoria Lake fisheries, video can be watched at 
http://www.intermedia.uio.no/publikasjoner/streaming/big-fish/stream.html or the internet pages 
http://www.sum.uio.no   
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possibilities. First, to put the SD-triangle as the main focus on strategic level, because 
disregarding any of the three aspects would mean undermining NORAD’s own 
activity.  That is not to say that all three aspects are, or have to be, part of all 
programmes or projects. But they have to be regarded in the planning-, execution- 
and completion phases to make sure that no unforeseen social, environmental or 
economic effects will appear.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Sustainable Development Triangle 
Second, on a practical level of how to organise the offices, there are two options. 
One is to make the consulting of the experts in the Unit for Environment (and 
Energy) in the Technical Department obligatory. It would mean that the capacity has 
to be increased, for them to be able to handle all programmes or projects. Another 
option is to integrate the experts on environment in the regional offices instead of 
keeping them on the sideline in the Technical Department. This would probably be 
seen as problematic by some because of the idea behind the present organisation, see 
4.4.1 p.60. On the other hand, in has been indicated that the present situation is not 
                                                                                                                                           
69 The areas referred to here are the ones listen in NORAD’s main Strategy, taken from Proposition no. 1 (1998-99) to the 
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working very well with the Technical department as an “internal consulting 
company”, and that there is a high level of frustration among the employees in the 
Technical Department (Jordfald Jan. 2003: [e-mail]), Moen 2003: [interview]).  
The opposite of the idea behind the present organisation would be that integration 
of the environmental experts in the region offices could give them a feeling of 
‘ownership’. Being more closely included and having responsibility in assessment 
and follow up of projects, could just as well function as a motivation to make sure 
that no harmful environmental consequences come from ‘their’ projects. To be able 
to integrate environment better, to reach a twenty year old goal, to get closer to 
Sustainable Development, and in the future be able to avoid criticism like that of 
Skjønsberg (2000) and the Office of the Auditor General of Norway (2002), this is a 
possibility that should be assessed. As for the option above, it would also necessitate 
increasing the capacity on environment, since there are now only three employees 
working directly with environment in the technical department. Since there are four 
regional offices70, at least one more person would be needed to cover the region 
offices.  
It might be that some NORAD employees in general are more focused on the 
direct developmental parts of their work and see the environmental factors as 
problems getting in the way of the development work. Those who have this focus will 
clearly get problems when demanded to consider environmental factors. Integrating 
the environmental experts in the regional departments could also contribute to dealing 
with this, and fulfilling the plan of more teamwork like the Director General has 
emphasised. So far there are more ‘nice words’ about teamwork than real action in 
some departments (anonymous 2003: [interview]). 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Storting. 
70 The regional offices are: department for Southern Africa, department for Eastern Africa, department for Asia 
and department for Latin America, the middle East and Eastern Europe.  
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4.3 The roles of Conventions in NORAD’s work and for SLAMU. 
International environmental conventions in general play a small role in NORAD’s 
work, they are handled by the Ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of 
the environment (MoE). One could expect a connection between development work 
and the international conventions on biodiversity, since there is a general 
acknowledgement of the threat that loss in biodiversity represents to basic human 
needs, especially in food and medicine, and particularly for rural poor people (SEDC 
1997, Swanson 1997, Rosendal 1999, Paavola 2002). As mentioned earlier, the 
greatest variety of biodiversity and the greatest loss of it are in developing countries. 
This is another reason why one could expect a conscious connection between 
international conservation work and development co-operation on biodiversity issues. 
In addition, it is specifically mentioned in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) that the overriding priority of the developing countries is poverty reduction, 
see section 2.2.1. For these reasons, the roles of CBD and The Convention on Trade 
in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) will be analysed below.  
One of the provisions of the Zambia Wildlife Act (ZWA) from 1998 is 
implementation of these two conventions. What kind of role do these conventions 
play in development work? Have they had any influence on NORAD’s work 
generally and on SLAMU specifically?  
 
4.3.1 The convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
Of all the people I interviewed in the first round, no one said that CBD is important 
for their work or for the project in Zambia71. One who holds a doctorate in wildlife 
economics said that CBD was irrelevant for SLAMU (Child:2002 [interview]), and 
one of the senior wildlife police officers said that he had not heard anything about 
CBD having any influence on the project (Skabala 2002 [interview]). Most of the 
Zambians hadn’t even heard of CBD, while the NORAD employees in the Unit for 
Environment and Energy in Oslo said that they use it for what it is worth when 
                                              
71 Direct interviews and e-mails with Biseth, Child, Chimba, Gulnes, Lubilo, Nesvåg, Opsal, Sauvik, Ås, all 2002/2003.  
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evaluating applications (Opsal and Ås 2002 [interviews]). The Head of the Unit for 
Environment and Energy said that the connection between CBD and the concrete 
projects or programmes is too weak. He wanted to strengthen it in the work of the 
Unit by systematically making it more visible (Opsal 2002 [interview and e-mail]. In 
addition, he thinks that they might have to put more emphasis on specific projects 
which can contribute towards implementation of the conventions. This is a future 
goal (ibid.).  
In general the employees in the Unit for Environment and Energy had a more 
conscious relationship to the convention than the others, which is not very surprising 
or unnatural. In the second round of interviews, which was after the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, I was told that some of the 
embassies have started to use the international conventions more actively, which was 
seen as a very positive development (Ås: 2002 [Interview B]) This was also 
mentioned and thereby confirmed by the Zambia-Malawi team at NORAD. Several 
developing countries have shown interest in CBD and especially the Cartagena 
protocol72. This interest has lead to co-operation between some developing partner 
countries and NORAD on preparation to fulfil the requirements, which makes the co-
operation a fulfilment of CBD for Norway (Ås and Opsal [interview B]). 
In the Norwegian national report on implementation of the CBD (1997), there’s a 
chapter on Development Co-operation and other international work. On the bilateral 
development co-operation it says:  
“Norway has for many years used development assistance to support 
measures that have a positive effect on nature management and biological 
diversity in recipient countries [..]” (1997: 62).  
The problem, however, is that all programmes have not been evaluated by 
environment advisers or at least checked by the executive officer responsible for a 
                                              
72 The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted a supplementary agreement 
to the Convention known as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on 29 January 2000. The Protocol seeks to 
protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology. It establishes an advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure for ensuring that countries are 
provided with the information necessary to make informed decisions before agreeing to the import of such 
organisms into their territory. The Protocol contains reference to a precautionary approach and reaffirms the 
precaution language in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The Protocol 
also establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange of information on living modified 
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project. Since not all executive officers check for possible environmental impacts or 
have an environment adviser look at it before it is approved, there have also been 
programmes or projects which have had severe negative consequences73. Sometimes 
negative impacts on the environment have been unforeseen and were actually 
considered in the preparatory phase of a project, but lack of control or follow up in 
the execution and completion phases gives possibilities for negative impacts as a 
project develops –which is exactly what the Office of the Auditor general is pointing 
out in their report (2002). When even projects that are categorised as environmentally 
targeted projects don’t check for, or report on, environmental effects of for instance 
buildings, it must mean that the awareness is not high enough and not incorporated 
well enough into work descriptions and introduction courses for new employees.  
4.3.2 The convention on trade in endangered species of flora and fauna (CITES). 
CITES is not even mentioned on NORAD’s home pages, nor in the Strategy on 
Environmental Development Co-operation or anywhere else in NORAD’s guiding 
documents for that matter. The advisers in the Unit for Environment and Energy said 
that CITES is not an important convention for NORAD (Opsal and Ås:2002 
[interview B]). One explanation might be that there are not many projects like 
SLAMU among the NORAD supported projects, which means that as long as 
NORAD is not supporting many projects where CITES can play a part, it is not 
considered important. For many other developing countries besides Zambia, CITES 
can be very important to; Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Sri Lanka and 
others74. If the emerging interest in biodiversity shown by some developing countries 
in relation with the WSSD – among them Zambia – is genuine and continues, it might 
be necessary for NORAD to put more resources in, and get more competence on 
biodiversity and the conventions on the theme.  
                                                                                                                                           
organisms and to assist countries in the implementation of the Protocol 
(http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/background.asp)  
73 Examples from Africa are schrimp farming in Uganda , Victoria Lake fishing project, and more.   
74 Some of these countries are currently not co-operating with NORAD, but it is an issue which is always 
considered as the times and political leadership changes. Kenya will be considered after the democratic election 
in December 2002, since Daniel Arap Moi gave up power. 
 82 
Two of the employees in NORAD’s Zambia-Malawi team said that they had been 
working with CITES before when they were stationed at embassies in South-Africa 
and Zimbabwe. The reasons given were that CITES was (is) important to these 
countries, and therefore the embassies focused on CITES to help the recipient 
countries in their work with it (Biseth and Gulnes 2002 [group interview]). However, 
now when they are back in Norway, CITES is not part of their work. The newest 
employee in the team had touched upon CITES when working with research on trade 
in traditional medicines in South Africa before he started working at NORAD. The 
conclusion was that the most important thing for the team was to know a little about 
everything, to know who to consult, where to get more information or knowledge 
when that is needed.  
CITES was known to a higher degree than CBD among the Zambians. Although 
known, this was due to only one aspect – the ban on elephant hunting. In Zambia 
generally, and the Luangwa Valley specifically, the CITES global ban on elephant 
hunting has caused severe problems. It has reduced the revenue with something 
between 25-50 per cent (Child: 2002 [interview]). Dr. Child argued that one could 
sustainably have hunted ten elephants a year for $ 10.000 each, which would have 
given the local people a lot more to live from, since the revenue from safari hunting 
goes directly to the villagers. It would also have given incentives to the villagers to 
take care of the elephants and not poach, since they are the ones who have to live 
with the problems that the elephants cause. If local people know that they can earn 
money on the elephant legally by taking care of them instead of poaching, it will be 
easier for them to accept the presence of the elephants.  
But, since Zambia is a party to CITES and the elephant is endangered on a global 
basis, there is no possibility of hunting elephants anywhere. The CITES system does 
not give room for diversifying different countries or areas, which means that no 
matter how much the number of elephants grows in one area, even if it becomes a 
problem of too many, they can’t be hunted. Some have argued that this functions as a 
punishment instead of a reward for those who manage to make the conservation 
efforts so successful that the number of elephants grows (http://www.iucn.org). 
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 However, there have been some changes during the last years; a one-off sale of 
confiscated ivory was allowed by CITES in 1999. The effects of this is discussed, and 
there are very different opinions about how it affects the level of poaching among 
other things, but the IUCN reports from the CITES COP 1275, that no relationship has 
been established between the one-off sale and illegal activity in killing and trade 
(http://www.iucn.org/info_and_news/press/afelephant.pdf). Since the amount of 
elephants has become so large that it has become a problem in several areas, four 
countries – South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe – proposed to lift the 
ban on trade in ivory at the COP meeting in 2000. In addition, at the last COP 
meeting in 2002, Zambia also proposed a lift of the ban (ens-news.com 2002)76. 
South-Africa, Botswana and Namibia were given permission; Zambia and Zimbabwe 
were turned down.  
The situation is thereby the same in Zambia, since a down-listing of the elephant 
from appendix 1, under which trade is prohibited, to appendix 2 under which trade 
could be allowed, was not approved (ibid.) The secretary-general of CITES, Willem 
Wijnstekers, stated that while richer countries can often afford to promote 
conservation through strict protection, many poorer nations need to do it in ways 
which benefit local communities and bring in much-needed cash for conservation 
(http://ens-news.com/ens/nov2002/2002-11-12-01.asp). Wijnstekers continued to say 
that in Africa, a conservation strategy based on sustainable use may offer the best 
solution (ibid.). He thus supported the Community-based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) strategy that SLAMU is based on, but the CITES COP-
meeting still decided not to let Zambia trade in ivory. One reason for this is probably 
that the administrative system on national level is not trusted (Child: Jan. 2003 [e-
mail]). Zambia also has relatively low elephant populations and a long history of 
poaching (ibid.) If ZAWA manages to establish a stable system of management –
which includes that the other Managements Units in time reach the level of SLAMU, 
                                              
75 COP = Conference of the Parties (to the convention) number 12. 
76 The Environment News Service (ENS) is a daily international wire service of the environment. Established in 
1990 by Editor-in-Chief Sunny Lewis and Managing Editor Jim Crabtree, it is independently owned and 
operated. It exists to present late-breaking environmental news in a fair and balanced manner. ENS is indexed 
by Reuters Business Briefing, Dow Jones Factiva, and the London Financial Times.  
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and that CBNRM programmes are legally established in all Units – there is great 
potential for the number of elephants to stabilise and for Zambia to develop on profits 
from tourism77. 
 
4.4  The importance of surrounding conditions for SLAMU. 
As mentioned in 2.5.4, it is necessary to look at the surrounding conditions when 
trying to understand SLAMU. Zambia’s overall decentralisation strategy, the national 
political situation, and international conventions that Zambia is a party to, are all 
influencing, to different extents, the way SLAMU is functioning. In addition, the 
funding from NORAD and its influence has been very important. The roles of the 
conventions have already been dealt with above, and other aspects will be analysed in 
the sub-sections of this chapter. For general economic conditions, see section 2.1.1. 
 
4.4.1 Zambian national political situation and the decentralisation strategy  
The different central authorities which have been governing Zambia, both colonial 
and after independence, have all had ‘policies of decentralisation’ (Ribot 2002, 
Braathen 2002). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) also involves 
decentralisation (Crook & Manor 2001: 2). This would have been positive for 
LIRDP/SLAMU if the policies had been followed up properly. However, central 
authorities have earlier on departed from the decentralisation policy by centralising 
government functions, and the current government has so far failed to deliver a 
national decentralisation policy, which has been due since the ‘final draft’ appeared 
in March 1997 (Braathen 2002:38). NORAD (2001: 8) writes that “the 
decentralisation has proceeded at an unsatisfactory pace”. In addition to the lacking 
decentralisation strategy, reasons for the pace of decentralisation can include the 
central governments lack of political commitment in two other ways; 
                                              
77 See also Sele (2002) Zambia. Yearbook 2002-2003, The Norwegian Council for Africa. 
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- Through their failure to deliver full counterpart funding to all relevant (mainly 
donor-funded) development programmes, like SLAMU, and 
- Failure to develop an integrated and legally based system of local government, 
including sub-district structures (ibid.). 
These features of the governance system affect SLAMU in several ways; first, 
because the Unit receives very little in financial support from the GRZ (Child Dec. 
2002 [e-mail]). Second, the local government bodies are so weak that they are not 
able to fulfil their obligations (Braathen 2002, Crook & Manor 2001, and FODEP 99-
00). These obligations are therefore ‘transferred’ to SLAMU, in that local people 
complain to them and expect them to relieve the situation, although it is outside their 
mandate at present. Local Councils have been weakened financially, administratively 
and politically. This has happened through: 1) drainage of their revenue base, 2) 
penetration of central government on local levels and 3) reduction in formal authority 
(Crook & Manor 2001: 13, Braathen 2002: 36). All of this has weakened the council 
to such a degree that they have lost legitimacy and are barely able to perform at all. 
 Because of this, SLAMU is spending resources on filling the gap by providing 
services that the local/provincial government bodies are supposed to carry out. Road 
maintenance is a good example, and it is something that SLAMU sees as very 
necessary to do, since they are so dependent on the roads. This makes it harder for 
them to become financially self-sustainable, which NORAD is requiring. The 
SLAMU vehicles also function partly as free ‘public transportation’ for the local 
people when they are out driving, since such a service doesn’t exist in the area, and 
the distances are vast.   
ZAWA is also penetrated by the president, and ZAWA centrally does the same to 
SLAMU locally, so the intervention is repeated through all levels of the system. The 
central authorities seem very afraid of loosing power and control over resources of 
any kind, and some of my informants even said that officials in central government 
bodies have been trying to destroy the project behind the scenes78. One can question 
if the decentralisation strategy is genuine – maybe it has been formulated to increase 
                                              
78 The sources will not be listed because they were interviewed under confidentiality.  
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state legitimacy and/or because donors value it? The decentralisation policy has been 
initiated from above, and it has been stated that a partial explanation for lack of real 
decentralisation is that the motivation has not been to empower local self-
government. Many central government agents fear, and therefore block 
decentralisation, because it could undermine their own state power and central control 
(Ribot: 2002, Eriksen et. al in Braathen 2002: 23).  
NORAD has expressed support to the decentralisation policy of Zambian central 
authorities, so it seems that they are interpreting the ‘final draft’ as a proper policy, or 
they are showing support to decentralisation to influence GRZ, and hope that it will 
lead to an enactment of the policy. NORAD is expecting that the issue of 
decentralised versus centralised management models will be the most difficult 
question in the dialogue on possible future support to the Zambian Wildlife Authority 
(ZAWA) (Grøva: 2002 Yearly Review Meeting and [e-mail]). Child also considers 
this a very important question, and the centralisation tendency in ZAWA is seen as 
problematic by both of them (Grøva and Child 2002 [interviews], Child 2002, Grøva 
and Child [e-mails]). The community programme79 is crucial for the general 
development in the project area80, and it would benefit from a continued and 
improved decentralisation policy, not a more centralised management model for 
wildlife.  
Siame has written a paper on how to strengthen local government in Zambia 
(Siame 2000). He argues that a decentralisation policy is needed, to provide direction 
and a framework for development of local governance. However, I find his 
argumentation a bit ambiguous. First, local councils are seen as the only 
representative body in the district (ibid: 2). He writes: 
It is the local council, alone, which has the people’s mandate to run the 
affairs of their communities in the district on their behalf (ibid.).  
Later on he argues that the traditional rulers, the chiefs, should be included when 
considering the role of institutional structures in local government development (ibid: 
                                              
79 See  section 1.3 and footnote 18. 
80 The revenue which is used by the CBOs in community project have brought school buildings, teachers’ houses, toilet 
buildings, water wells and more. These organisations have received training from the community programme under 
SLAMU 
 87
5). The reasons given are that these institutions have a longer history, and that local 
people tend to be more loyal to them. He maintains that the State has undermined the 
chiefs after Zambia’s independence in 1964, but that “the new MMD government is 
finally giving them back some of the dignity that they deserve” (ibid.). Siame doesn’t 
say anything about why chiefs deserve dignity, or why people are loyal to them. The 
last mentioned can be just as much out of fear as out of respect, and the reasons why 
chiefs are in their positions, and therefore their legitimacy, vary a lot. 
The opposite view concerning the chiefs is argued by Ribot (Ribot 2002). He 
maintains that colonial powers, the state after independence and donors, have all 
contributed to a strengthening of the chiefs’ positions (ibid: 73). The reasons why 
they are in these positions can date back to pre- colonial or colonial time, where 
chiefs came to their positions through rights of conquest, descent from ruling 
ancestors, membership in a ruling family, or because they were appointed by colonial 
powers from positions like soldiers or cooks (ibid: 73-74). Some were even appointed 
in areas they didn’t belong to81. Ribot has several reasons for caution when it comes 
to empowerment of chiefs; the fact that chiefs are not necessarily representative or 
even liked, and that working with them may not serve the efficiency, equity or 
development aims so often forwarded by decentralisation advocates (ibid: 77). In 
addition he points out some facts which are even mentioned by Siame (Siame 2000); 
that the chiefs are not democratically elected, that they are not obligated (legally or 
morally) to consider the people’s expressed wishes when making decisions, and that 
they often govern by decree (ibid: 5). Siame only suggests one solution to this 
problem, to make the chiefs aware of human rights issues, without specifying who 
should have the responsibility for the raising of this awareness (ibid.). Some chiefs 
deserve respect for doing a good job as local leaders, but there are also many who are 
despots (see Ribot 2002: 76). Therefore, from a democratic point of view, it will not 
be a strengthening of local government or local democracy to include chiefs in local 
governance with their current ambiguous legitimacy. If they had been democratically 
elected however, it would have been an entirely different matter.  
                                              
81 For further arguments see Ribot 2000:pp73-77, where he also refers to several other sources. 
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The experiences from South Luangwa show that some of the chiefs embezzled, 
and that some didn’t consider the general well-being of the people, but only tried to 
get as much as possible out of the co-operation with LIRDP for themselves. As 
mentioned in section 2.5.3, this was the main reason why the main contact point was 
changed from the chiefs to the lowest level of CBOs, the VAGs (NORAD ZAM 044 
archive documents, Larsen 2002 [interview]). This has contributed to greater 
transparency, the members of the CBOs are democratically elected, everybody in the 
villages can be part of the decisions on how to spend the money, and awareness of 
rights among people have increased (Chimba 2002 [interview], workshop 
observations 2002).   
Siame doesn’t mention the possible role of CBOs or NGOs at all, but this is 
done by the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)82. In a Resource Manual 
for District Councillors (1999-2000: 25), it is written: 
The Organisation of the government administration at district level will 
involve the following: 
1) The District Administrators office 
2) Government line departments 
3) Semi-autonomous Institutions 
4) Local Authority 
5) NGOs, co-operating partners and CBOs 
6) District Development Co-ordinating Committee (DDCC). 
 
 This indicates that donors, NGOs and CBOs are seen as part of the formal 
governance system! There is also an appendix with an organisational chart showing 
this feature. However, the role of the 5th group on the list of government 
administration is not specified further, which makes it very difficult to understand 
how the system is understood by FODEP and how it (is supposed to) work. Maybe 
this can be partly explained by the important role played by donors, NGOs (and 
CBOs) in general development ventures83? In a country were the state’s budget is 
                                              
82 FODEP is a voluntary NGO working for the promotion and protection of the democratisation process in Zambia, 
registered under the Societies’ Act of Zambia in 1992. It is the successor of the Zambia Elections Monitoring and Co-
ordinating Committee (ZEMCC) which was a conglomerate of civil society organisations an interest groups formed to  
monitor Zambia’s first round of Multi-Party elections in 1991. 
83 See section 4.4.2, especially citation on p.85 
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fifty per cent donor financed, it can be understandable that (the role of) donors is not 
properly separated from the Zambian governance system, although this must be seen 
as a misunderstanding. 
After the problem with chiefs’ embezzlement was solved, the most severe 
problems for SLAMU have been due to different kinds of interference, directly and 
indirectly, mainly from central authorities. The most extreme indirect example was 
when the former president, F. Chiluba banned all hunting (Grøva: 2002 [interview], 
Child:2002 [interview], several SLAMU employees:2002 [interviews]). This 
seriously affected SLAMU and the local people who gained revenue from the safari 
hunting, people became more negative towards the project and the community 
programme especially, since the most important financial source had been taken away 
by the ban (e.g. Chimba: 2002 [interview], Kamwendo 2002 [interview]). This is a 
good example of how central authorities can rip away the foundation for local 
development work. Even if the local project functions, it is often dependent on central 
politics and a certain degree of good-will, and is thereby vulnerable. Many SLAMU 
employees indicated that they need NORAD’s protection. As long as NORAD is 
partially funding SLAMU, central authorities will not have the possibility to 
undermine the project or take resources from it. This will be further discussed in the 
next sub-section, 4.6.2. There are also examples of direct central interference. 
Whenever the regional manager of SLAMU makes a decision which is not popular 
with the director of ZAWA, or the president, they intervene (Yearly Review Meeting 
and several interviews 2002). This undermines the authority of the regional manager, 
it makes it difficult for him to make decisions and stand for them, the local people 
question how much their so-called management responsibility for the natural 
resources really counts, and it makes them sceptical and pessimistic (observations 
from fieldwork and Yearly Review Meeting, Grøva:2002, [interview], Chimba:2002 
[interview]). Another example which illustrates the interfering of central authorities 
was a complaint put forward by a chief at the Yearly Review Meeting. When there 
are problem animals destroying local farmers’ crop fields, instead of being able to 
send someone to deal with it straight away (like LIRDP apparently were able to do 
before),  the SLAMU management has to contact ZAWA centrally to ask what they 
 90 
can to do with it. From what the chief said as a spokesman for all the others, it could 
take weeks before anything happened. It is a matter of dividing responsibilities and 
decentralising what is functionally done better and quicker locally than centrally. This 
is a question of deconcentration of power, which as mentioned above, is something 
ZAWA has a problem with. 
The national political situation has fluctuated during the 16 years84 history of 
LIRDP/SLAMU. It is argued that a decentralisation system must have been in 
operation for at least ten to fifteen years in a financially and politically stable 
situation, before one is able to fairly evaluate its success or failure (Crook and 
Sverrisson 1999: 5). Most projects are evaluated and criticised before they have had a 
real chance to get the wheels rolling properly, and it is impossible to measure the 
performance before it has been tried properly (Crook and Sverrisson 1999: 5, Ribot 
2002: 2). Crook & Sverrisson also say that in cases of changing or abandoning 
decentralisation projects after only a few years or one electoral cycle, the projects 
won’t be able to show results which can be fairly judged (ibid.)  
If this is extended, one can look at the effect change of central government has on 
a decentralisation project even if it is not abandoned or changed officially. After the 
elections in Zambia in 1991, LIRDP was not changed, but NORAD experienced that 
the new government had a hidden agenda (NORAD ZAM 044 archive). They saw the 
project as the former president Kaunda’s ‘baby’, since he had been personally 
engaged from the beginning, and had overruled the Ministry in cases were LIRDP 
came into trouble with it. In addition, several have mentioned in interviews that many 
were envious of the development that happened in South Luangwa. These people also 
considered the project as highly favoured by Kaunda and NORAD, and tried to 
sabotage it. In this period, there were substantial problems between NORAD and the 
central authorities. The Zambian authorities said in meetings that they were happy for 
NORAD’s support to LIRDP and that they were positive to the continuing 
development of the project (NORAD ZAM 044 archive). A short time after, and in 
total contradiction to what they had said, NORAD received messages from LIRDP 
staff that the licence of the safari company of the project had not been renewed 
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(ibid.). This and other incidences obviously created considerable problems for 
LIRDP, and also indicates that the assumption made by Eriksen et. al. on central 
authorities’ motivation for decentralisation is highly convincing in this case. But, 
with the personal engagement of several of the employees and NORAD’s support, the 
project endured. 
Later on, both LIRDP staff and NORAD realised that LIRDP had become a mini-
government which was hard to manage. Reaching financial self-sustainability which 
was a goal from the beginning was impossible (Grøva 2002 [interview], Child 2002 
[interview]). The budgeting and other things went out of hand, which ultimately lead 
to reorganisation in 1996. This is a clear case of crisis-lead reorganisation, which 
made it possible to make substantial changes in a short period of time, whilst in other 
cases were there is no crisis; reorganisation will normally be more incremental 
(Kjellberg & Reitan: 1995). NORAD had previously warned against too much focus 
on the wildlife management, which was the most successful part of the project. 
However, they showed ability to learn and in this case adopted a process oriented 
approach to the implementation, which meant that the sub-goals were partially 
changed. Child has supported this approach (2002 [interview]), which also seems to 
be corresponding to the way things are usually done in NORAD. When deciding 
which projects to support and on the main goals, they are clear and decision oriented, 
but the sub-goals are subject to learning processes and adjustments according to the 
situations in the countries NORAD work in (NORAD  employee 2003 [interview]).  
The fact that one is dealing with official institutions with different degrees of 
inertia means that patience is important. In addition, ZAWA is a new institution, and 
it is parastatal, which gives them special challenges in that many of the employees 
used to work in the NPWS, ZAWA’s predecessor. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
84 See 2.5.2 
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4.4.2 The significance of NORAD for SLAMU 
NORAD’s presence and partial financing of SLAMU have always been important. 
Absolutely all interviews in Zambia indicate that without NORAD’s patience, it 
would never have worked out so well, or maybe not at all. The second secretary at the 
Norwegian embassy also confirmed that the project has always been looked upon as 
very interesting and important by the employees at the embassy, including the former 
second secretaries and ambassadors (Grøva 2002 [interviews]). A former adviser at 
SLAMU and currently freelance consultant to NORAD, was also impressed by the 
involvement and commitment showed, he stated:  
“NORAD was flexible, small, and handled the programme nimbly, and with 
knowledge. I don’t have to tell you how rare this is with donors. LIRDP was 
lucky that they got a series of exceptional desk officers and ambassadors, but 
this was more luck than built into NORAD’s make-up” (Child: Nov. 2002 
[e-mail]). 
This feature of commitment has had a very positive effect on SLAMU. It shows 
how important individuals can be, and that institutional theory which disregards 
human agency, will loose a very important aspect. Within ‘New Institutionalism’ 
different approaches emphasise the influence of individuals differently. The 
normative institutionalism approach emphasises what they call ‘the logic of 
appropriateness’, which defines what behaviour is appropriate for members of an 
institution (Peters 1999:35, March & Olsen 1998: 948). For the logic of 
appropriateness to be effective, there must be some form of enforcement (Peters 
1999: 35), and from the normative institutionalism point of view, socialisation 
functions as a sanction and enforcement process.  
It seems, from the interviews and impressions of NORAD, that the socialisation is 
stronger at the head office than at the embassy. It is natural that individuals play a 
larger role in small institutions than in large ones, or in smaller (relatively 
autonomous) offices than in larger ones, also because there are bigger changes in 
personnel and more often changes. An example is to what degree the recipient 
responsibility is emphasised; it seems that it is stronger at the head office in Oslo than 
at the embassy. This is interesting when considering that the embassy relates more 
directly and more often with the representatives of the recipient than the head office 
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in Oslo. It indicates that it is easier to hold on to a principle when further away from 
the realities of the recipient countries. In addition, the emphasis on recipient 
responsibility is seen by some as shovelling the responsibility over to the developing 
country, which is expressed to a further extent by people who have experience from 
an embassy than those who don’t.  
The focus of the recipient responsibility principle seems to be more on ‘recipient’ 
than ‘responsibility’ (Munyenyembe et. al: 113-114). It is important to remember that 
NORAD needs to be responsible too, which should include demands of 
accountability. According to Munyenyembe et. al. (2000) and Child & Bergstrøm 
(2001), clearer borders and demands for accountability from NORAD were part of 
what made the project more successful. It seems that many in NORAD think that it 
would undermine the recipient if NORAD is more involved, but it is important to 
remember the opposite view - that it can be rewarding to be held accountable, as it is 
inspiring to work in an environment were people care about whether the work is done 
well or not85.  
Another thing which was mentioned, was that NORAD in comparison with the 
EU, is much quicker in dealing with emergencies and the transfer of funds to projects 
(Mwamba: 2002 [interview]). Mr. Mwamba had experience from working on 
different donor funded projects in Zambia, and therefore had the possibility to 
compare. This is another positive feature of NORAD, which I could see was 
important during my fieldwork. The transfer of funding from NORAD had never 
been a problem. Both former and current NORAD employees at the head office in 
Oslo have also stated that there is emphasis on a low degree of bureaucratisation and 
quick transfers of funds, and this seems to function well. However, it must be part of 
the ‘evaluation’ that the comparison is made mainly to the EU, which is a larger 
institution and is in general considered highly bureaucratic. 
The transfer of wages from ZAWA to SLAMU however, had been a problem for 
some months when I was there. It was naturally a heavy drain on SLAMU 
                                              
85 This view is supported by what Munyenyembe et. al 2000 writes, by Child 2002 [interview]. 
 
 94 
employees’ personal funds as well as their patience and work energy. This problem 
was one of the main reasons for the negativity towards ZAWA. NORAD could help 
ease this problem by funding and other assistance to ZAWA head office, something 
which is being considered. Child (2002) is recommending that NORAD support 
ZAWA in his assessment of the sector, although with certain conditions like 
emphasis on capacity-building86. 
NORAD is seen as a protector by many SLAMU employees, which is not hard to 
understand. A good example came forward at the Yearly Review Meeting, where it 
was questioned why some NORAD funded SLAMU vehicles - which had been taken 
to the ZAWA head office in Lusaka a long time ago- had not been returned. It was 
explained that a British donor NGO had decided to fund the overhaul of the vehicles 
and that as soon as this was finished, they would be returned. As long as NORAD is a 
partner and the agreement between the governments of Norway and Zambia is on 
direct funding of SLAMU, ZAWA can’t legitimately transfer resources from 
SLAMU to the head office or other management units. With the difficulties in the 
history of the project, it is understandable that the SLAMU staff become sceptical. 
From NORAD’s point of view it is also understandable that they are seen as 
protectors, but in addition they find it problematic. What will happen when NORAD 
pulls out? It has been clear from the beginning that they are not going to be there 
forever, even though the partnership has lasted longer than planned. Several of the 
employees have misunderstood NORAD’s role. It seems that NORAD is juxtaposed 
with ZAWA in that NORAD is seen as, and wanted as main ‘supervisor’ instead of 
ZAWA. They are not considering the fact that NORAD is not part of the Zambian 
governance system. The understanding of the role of donors is a problem also outside 
SLAMU, among others in FODEP, where donors are seen as part of the governance 
system in Zambia87. I got a strong impression that this phenomenon is due to the long 
time presence of donors and their extensive significance and influence. One good 
example from SLAMU:  
                                              
86 See Child (2002) Background Assessment of the Wildlife Sector, Draft Report, sept.2002 
87 See previous section 4.4.1 pp81-82. 
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“With the transformation to ZAWA, nothing is operating the way it was 
before. ZAWA is also diverting resources like vehicles and money, which is 
a breach of the NORAD/GRZ agreement. They should stop violating the 
agreement and leave the resources in the project area, - if only an 
independent management employed by NORAD could run the project, not 
those employed by ZAWA” (SLAMU employee 2002 [interview]). 
This statement shows how NORAD is seen as the ‘good protector’ against the ‘bad 
violator’ ZAWA. As an outsider considering viewpoints from SLAMU, NORAD and 
ZAWA, I am more optimistic. There are grounds for a good co-operation between 
NORAD and ZAWA, but the relationship between these two institutions is 
ambivalent. They communicate well, but have some fundamental disagreements on 
ownership of natural resources, especially the hunting, and as mentioned above, the 
centralisation issue (Grøva Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). Grøva is also unsure of how much 
ZAWA appreciates NORAD’s views, but believes that they are seen as a better donor 
partner than many of the other ones. Reasons for this are like Child and Mwamba 
have mentioned in interviews – that they are less bureaucratic, quick with transfers of 
funds and dealing with emergencies, are knowledgeable and show genuine interest 
and commitment (Child 2002 [interview and e-mail], Mwamba 2002 [interview], 
Grøva 2002 [interview and e-mail]).  
ZAWA staff off course say that they have a good relationship with NORAD 
(Mushinge 2002 [interview]), and the disagreement on some issues were not 
mentioned. Mr. Mushinge highlighted that ZAWA has a warm and fruitful 
relationship with NORAD, he said: 
They supported us when no other donors would touch us, and have 
contributed to transparency in that all money has to be accounted for” (ibid.). 
It is fortunate for SLAMU that NORAD has decided to fund another phase. First, it 
gives SLAMU another chance to become financially self-sustainable. Second, 
NORAD can still support if any problems should arise with ZAWA, which is not 
unlikely. NORAD has understanding for the problems SLAMU has had with ZAWA 
lately, and thinks it is due to the re-centralisation and increasingly detailed control by 
ZAWA (Grøva Nov. 2002 [e-mail]). They are however going to consider the funding 
of ZAWA, but have together with other donors decided that some criteria on the 
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disputed issues88 have to be set up before funding is possible. To make sure that the 
decentralisation of management responsibility and the ownership of natural resources 
is not withdrawn by central authorities, it would be recommendable for NORAD to 
stay in the partnership with SLAMU until these features of the wildlife management 
are unquestionably legally secured. Currently, legal status of the CBOs is not secured, 
because the ADCs in the area have not been replaced with CRBs, which will have a 
legal status as corporate bodies in the Wildlife Act of 1998. 
If the CRBs are established and this system is spread to the other Management 
Units under ZAWA, NORAD will undoubtedly have contributed to a far-reaching 
democratising change of the wildlife management in the whole of Zambia. Local 
corporate bodies will be able to manage ‘their own’ wildlife, and the democratic 
features of the system can contribute to a change in attitudes and a strengthening of 
the people’s participation in the government system in general.  
Crook and Manor (2001: 1) have a list of larger purposes that democratic 
decentralisation usually serves, which can show the effects a spread of this system 
can have. I will mention the ones which can already be seen in South Luangwa;  
1) more sustainable development projects 2) greater participation and associational 
activity, 3) greater accountability, 4) greater transparency, 5) break down of citizens’ 
apathy about government and development, and 6) easing of the burden on donors 
and central government. The other aspects on the list89 are more directly connected to 
formal governance bodies in general, e.g. District - or City Council, or Province 
government. The improvement of these bodies can be an indirect effect of the 
improvement in the wildlife management sector, as mentioned, if the SLAMU model 




                                              
88 Mainly the centralisation vs. decentralisation issue on ownership of natural resources. 
89 See Crook and Manor 2001. 
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4.5 Is SLAMU a decentralisation venture? 
 
The lack of a ‘theory’ to explain when, how, and why to decentralise has 
been important…(in explaining why decentralisation efforts are) generalised, 
superficial, and, not surprisingly, largely ineffective.  
(Wunsch 1991: 15, sited in Cohen & Peterson 1999: 19). 
 
There are many different theoretical definitions and types of decentralisation. 
Some scholars use the same words but ascribe different meanings to them, and what 
is called decentralisation and not, also vary. The approaches used in this study are 
described in section 3.1.1. 
It is important to describe and define a system in order to know what we are 
dealing with. Characterising decentralisations illustrates the degree to which 
decentralisations are actually taking place, exploring the difference between discourse 
and practice (Ribot 2002a: iv). In addition, it will be easier for outsiders to 
understand, be able to learn from, and use the experiences made. That way a system, 
or parts of it, can be tested further in other areas. It is also important to remember that 
decentralisation is essentially about distribution of power and resources. Therefore, 
such schemes cannot be treated as technically neutral devices which can be 
‘implemented’ without constraint, as if there were no pre-existing social context 
(Crook & Sverrisson 2002: 2). Many see it as a question of loosing or gaining power 
and resources, and not as a strengthening of all levels like the advocates of 
decentralisation maintain (Crook & Manor 2001, Ribot 2002, Johnson 2001).  
The actors which are currently involved in the management of natural resources to 
different degrees are; ZAWA/SLAMU, local communities via VAGs and ADCs 
(future CRBs), and the local council. I will go through these actors’ roles, but let us 
first have a quick look at the period before some of these actors were established. 
The formal governance system in Zambia is still weak (Siame: 2000, Crook & 
Manor 2001, Braathen 2002), and the eastern province is no exception. LIRDP, 
SLAMU’s predecessor, did not contribute much to its improvement since it was an 
autonomous project outside the local governance system. If anything, LIRDP 
contributed to a further weakening of the legitimacy of the District Council and Line 
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Ministries, in that it took over service provision from them which they were unable to 
handle with so little resources. LIRDP provided public services better than the 
government bodies, but can hardly be called a decentralisation venture in a formal or 
strict theoretical sense. From the overview in 3.1.1, the definitions which are wide 
enough to include LIRDP are Rondinelli’s general decentralisation definition and 
Ribot’s devolution, the last being considered too wide by Ribot himself (2002: v). I 
share his view, and think that for any scheme to be called democratic 
decentralisation, it cannot entail any form of privatisation. This is because 
privatisation of public services will not transfer power and resources to a 
democratically elected entity and it does not necessarily improve the local 
(administrative) governance system90.  
Decentralisation within a governance system – in a strict formal or a wider but still 
public sense – is supposed to strengthen both the central and local governance. As 
shown with the example of LIRDP, although that was not formally a full 
privatisation, local governance will not be strengthened by such measures outside the 
formal system. Decentralisation is supposed to make the system able to perform with 
appropriate roles at multiple levels, and support the objectives of national unification, 
democratisation, and greater efficiency and equity in the use of public resources and 
service delivery (Ribot 2002: iv). It is not hard to understand that this didn’t happen 
when the roles were so unclear; there were no efforts to include LIRDP in the 
existing system, or to strengthen the existing local government units. 
The change of the project into SLAMU has lead to an inclusion in the new formal 
governance system for natural resources. The former National Parks and Wildlife 
Service (NPWS) was reorganised into the parastatal Zambia Wildlife Authority 
(ZAWA) and SLAMU was placed under it as a territorial sub-unit. The SLAMU 
                                              
90 Privatisation can strengthen the governance systems by lessening the burden on them, but it is far from guaranteed - 
neither is equity. The main reason for privatising is usually a response to donors in fulfilling structural adjustment 
plans which involves building down the state administration. The idea is that competition will bring cheaper and more 
efficient service delivery. 
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employees are now ZAWA employees and get their salaries from ZAWA, instead of 
through funding from NORAD91.  
In trying to define ZAWA, the problem is that the role of this entity is unclear. 
Even though it is said to be a parastatal, it seems to function just like a regular state 
agency in relation to the central government. An example is that the president of the 
Republic intervenes in the decisions made by the Director General of ZAWA 
(anonymous 2002 [interview]). ZAWA is having problems with establishing its 
organisation properly, which is partly because it is hit hard by political interference, 
something which also happens with parastatals in Zimbabwe (National Report: 
20.03.03). It seems that the only reason why the central government has made ZAWA 
and other entities parastatal is to please donors, although this does not necessarily 
involve NORAD (See footnote 88).  
When trying to analyse actors in defining to what degree a decentralisation is 
actually taking place, it is important to have this aspect of national policies in mind. 
Zambian central authorities are trying to satisfy international donors by having a 
policy which is the basis for implementing structural adjustment measures92. 
Privatisation and decentralisation are parts of this. However, it might very well be 
that they are trying to make the efforts look like privatisation and decentralisation 
without that really being the case, or that they are making it difficult for the local 
units to use the powers they are supposed to have been given. The half-privatisation 
of ZAWA and the powers it is supposed to have been given – including the powers 
and autonomy of the territorial management units – is an example of this. Currently 
ZAWA has its head office just outside the capital Lusaka, and can as such only be 
seen as a non-territorial deconcentration. This will be the situation until the territorial 
sub-units are strengthened, since SLAMU is the only management unit which 
functions relatively well. According to the commercial director at ZAWA, Mr. 
                                              
91 See further discussion of NORAD’s role in sub-section 4.4.2 above and section 4.6 below. 
92 Cohen & Peterson (1999:28) write: “In the early 1980s it was not uncommon for a given government to have established 
and delegated authority to hundreds of such semi-autonomous organisations. Since then, fully privatising such organisations 
has been a major objective of aid agency structural adjustment conditions”. 
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Mushinge, “SLAMU is miles ahead of the other management units” (2002: 
[interview])93. 
The decentralisation definition that fits best for SLAMU, is Rondinelli’s version of 
administrative decentralisation, which he calls delegation. Delegation is defined as a 
more extensive form of decentralisation, where central government transfers 
responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-
autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government but 
ultimately accountable to it (1999: 3). At least this was the case when LIRDP 
changed name to SLAMU and was incorporated in the system under ZAWA. As 
mentioned above, there has been a centralisation tendency lately, and more detailed 
control by ZAWA HQ is undermining the authority of SLAMU. Hopefully this 
tendency will be reversed again so that SLAMU can continue fulfilling its established 
role in the CBNRM efforts. The way it used to be from the reorganisation in 19996 to 
the incorporation in ZAWA in 2000, the powers they had been given and the 
accountability made the Unit function well.  
The community-based organisations (CBOs) in South Luangwa – Village Action 
Groups (VAGs), and Area Development Committees (ADCs) – are difficult to define. 
There has definitely been a transfer of decision-making power in the form of 
management responsibility and resources in the shape of revenue from hunting, but 
the members of the CBOs are not civil servants, like Eriksen et. al demands in their 
definition of deconcentration94. The CBOs degree of autonomy can be discussed, 
since they have to report to ZAWA through SLAMU on the use of wildlife revenue, 
but are not formal sub-units under SLAMU or ZAWA so far. They get the revenue 
from the hunting in the GMA through the accountants at SLAMU. On the release of 
new funds, reports and accounts of previously released funds are given to SLAMU 
(Grøva: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). Besides the reporting on use of revenue, they are not 
upwards accountable. The downwards accountability is well established and will be 
discussed below. 
                                              
93 As mentioned in sub-section 4.4.2 NORAD is considering funding ZAWA more extensively than just SLAMU. This will 
be an important part of making sure that what has been accomplished by SLAMU is sustained over time and that resources 
are not taken from SLAMU and distributed to the other sub-units in the name of equalisation and redistribution. This will be 
summed up in chapter 5. 
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The CBOs also co-operate with the staff at the CBNRM section under SLAMU, 
but there is no hierarchy, the CBNRM-section has no superior or responsible position 
in relation to the CBOs.  The section provides civic education and holds workshops 
on governance, land use, accounting, and related issues. This means that the role of 
SLAMU beyond the demand for reporting on use of funds is advisory and related to 
capacity training (e.g. accounting skills) (ibid, Boje 2000: 4).  
What makes the CBOs a very interesting case, is the characteristics which are so 
important in political/democratic decentralisation, namely representability of - and 
downwards accountability to local people, and public participation in local decision-
making. These are all covered by the function of the CBOs, as opposed to the 
customary authorities, the chiefs.  It can therefore be argued that the decentralisation 
to the CBOs is of political type, that is, in accordance with  the definitions of political 
or democratic decentralisation by Ribot (Ribot 2002) and Braathen/Eriksen et. al. 
(Braathen 2002). But, there is one important aspect which is missing – the legal basis 
of the CBOs. Without a legal basis the decentralised rights can be taken away by 
central authorities at a whim95 (Ribot 2002a: 41 & 2002b: 1). This has been a 
problem in other African countries where local people have felt so insecure about 
their rights that it has lead to over-exploitation of natural resources in order to use as 
much as possible because they expected the right to be taken away from them (Ribot 
2002b). Even if this has not happened in South Luangwa, the example shows that the 
means of transfer must be secured. 
This issue is however being dealt with, as the ADCs will be replaced with or made 
into Community Resources Boards (CRBs), to strengthen the legal status of these 
CBOs as wildlife managers. The CRBs are based in the Zambia Wildlife Act (ZWA) 
from 1998 as local communities with common interest in the wildlife and natural 
resources in the area. They are to be comprised of; seven to ten representatives of the 
local community, one representative of the chief  in whose area the board is, and one 
representative of the local authority in the area (ZWA 1998: 17-18). This indicates a 
formalisation and inclusion of the local formal authority and the customary authority, 
                                                                                                                                           
94 In Braathen 2002:22. 
95 Although this will not happen as long as NORAD is a party and functions as a watchdog, See subsection 4.4.2. 
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which is positive, especially since the chiefs themselves are to be patrons. This means 
that they are not regular members like the democratically, direct and indirect, elected 
representatives of the local community, but function more as advisers. Integration 
between the different entities and levels can contribute to less hostility and better co-
operation towards the mutual goal of development.  
The wildlife act, like any other law, is open for interpretation. This means that it 
can be problematic that the Minister (of Tourism, environment and Natural 
Resources) and the Authority (ZAWA) is given so much power. An example of this 
can be found in part III subsection (2) where it says:  
The Authority shall register as a board [….] and shall in consultation with 
that board, develop management plans for the Game Management Area or 
open area or any part thereof which is under its jurisdiction” (ZWA 1998: 
17).  
This can easily be interpreted as if the Authority has the main responsibility for the 
management plans and will only consult with the CRBs. It should however be the 
other way around, which would be in accordance with CBNRM principles no. 1), 4), 
6) and 10)96.  
Another problem is that the VAGs are not specifically mentioned in the Act. From 
what Munyenyembe et. al. writes (2000) it seems that their interpretation of the ZWA 
is that the legal basis of VAGs is included in the legal basis of CRBs. It is excellent if 
it is included, but as long as it is not specifically stated it is unclear. Since the VAGs 
are the most important organisations because they function better than the ADCs as 
the main manager of wildlife97, it is important to make sure that their legal basis is 
just as secure as that of the CRBs.  
ADCs and VAGs currently have their own constitutions which function well 
although they have an unclear legal status (Chimba 2002 [interview], Munyenyembe 
et. al. 2000). People refer to the constitution and their rights and it has given the local 
people’s institutions a real foundation (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000: 75). This can be 
compared with a case from Mali on forest management. Elected rural councillors lost 
patience in waiting for the government to transfer powers to them like they had 
                                              
96 See textbox in sub-section 3.1.1 above. 
97 See figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
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promised, and started protecting forests on their own (Ribot 2002b: 9). These two 
positive examples from Mali and Zambia show that much can happen without 
transferred powers and a secure legal basis. Although a legal basis is important in the 
long term, it might not be necessary to wait for it before starting developing a 
management plan and protecting natural resources. This shows that Ribot’s view – 
“Transferring power without accountable representation is dangerous. Establishing 
accountable representation without powers is empty” (Ribot 2002: 2) – is too 
simplistic98. Waiting for national authorities to comply and bring about an enabling 
framework when people are eager to contribute to a positive change, could be the 
same as giving up in certain cases. LIRDP was established in difficult circumstances 
with extensive poverty and as a consequence of this, extensive poaching. But, the 
progress has been achieved by the project on its own, despite lack of national level 
support like clear supporting policies and laws (Child & Bergstrøm 2001: 37). 
Braathen and Ribot both define decentralisation as transfer of power and resources 
within an organisation (Braathen 2002, Ribot 2002a & b), but can it also be called 
decentralisation when it happens between organisations? The transfer of management 
responsibility for wildlife and the revenue from safari hunting – first from LIRDP to 
the chiefs and thereafter from the chiefs to the CBOs – is an example of such a 
transfer. In the first case where the chiefs got the responsibility for the allocation of 
money from the hunting, it can not be seen as decentralisation within a democratic 
approach, because the chiefs are not elected by the local people. When it was realised 
that the chiefs also embezzled, the organisation was changed99. Instead of the top-
down approach a bottom-up approach was chosen, and amazingly they managed to 
convince the chiefs that the largest part of the money should be given to the VAGs 
instead of them.  
Since the members of the CBOs are democratically elected by the local people, 
this feature of the CBOs distinguishes them from NGOs, where the members are not 
elected (Ribot 2002: 13). There is a higher probability that CBOs in general will be 
more transparent and generate a higher degree of participation by local people than 
                                              
98 Although he admits that even partial decentralisations have borne some positive social and environmental outcomes. 
99 See figure 2.2 in appendix 1. 
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NGOs. In addition, a CBO will have greater possibilities of creating long lasting 
sustainable development since it is so well integrated in the local community. An 
NGO on the other hand, can also be well established in a community, but can more 
easily withdraw from development projects and start with something else in a 
different area if there are any disagreements. The control with CBOs is necessarily 
higher, since they are based in a particular community and will not be able to 
withdraw to the extent an NGO can, especially if it is an NGO from the outside. For 
these reasons, decentralisation to CBOs, in any form, is seen as generally more 
advantageous than decentralisation to NGOs. CBOs should be categorised in a group 
of its own, not as a sub-group of NGOs like many authors seem to do. It is although 
not fully clear if it is CBOs they are writing about since they don’t use that term. 
Community groups and community organisations are the terms used, which can just 
as well be interest groups which are not representative for the whole community 
These CBOs at the lowest level of organisation are now responsible for 
administering the money, and meetings are held were all the villagers can participate 
and give their votes on how to allocate the money (Chimba 2002 [interview], 
Munyenyembe et al. 2000). The constitutions of the VAGs are strong on 
accountability and transparency and because they function so well, I will maintain 
that the transfer of responsibility and powers to these institutions can be formally 
defined as political decentralisation, as soon as the legal basis is secured. 
Even if the role of the CBOs is the most important, the best will in most cases be 
collaboration. If the CBOs have the main responsibility, receive the revenue from and 
report to the authorities, in this case SLAMU/ZAWA, NGOs can bring specialised 
knowledge to the partnership. A good example is the current work on a Land Use 
Plan in the area, which is a co-operation between representatives of the CBOs, the 
CBNRM-section of SLAMU and WWF. NORAD is supporting it through partial 
funding, since it is a very important condition for the continued building of SLAMU 
housing for employees, and to get a holistic and long-term plan for the development 
in the whole area. The Land Use Plan is also a scheme to prevent building too close 
to the National Park, which could create conflicts. 
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4.6 The role of SLAMU and its CBNRM-programme for sustainable 
development and empowerment.  
The questions I wished to answer in relation with the effects of SLAMU and its 
CBNRM-section was; 
• First, will people be able to see that the prioritisation of natural resource 
conservation can lead to economic and social improvement in the long run? 
•  Second, to what extent and in which ways have Sustainable Development, 
CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU project? How do they promote or 
hamper the project? 
• Third is the decentralisation to SLAMU having any effect on local 
government?  
• Fourth, how is the placement of SLAMU under ZAWA instead of NPWS 
affecting the decentralisation or the autonomy of SLAMU? 
• Lastly, how has SLAMU in general and the community-programme more 
specifically affected local people?  
We have already touched upon answers to all these questions above, but they will 
be elaborated on here, starting with an answer to the first, second and last question  in 
combination, then the third and the fourth. The parts about the international 
conventions in question two have been answered above in section 4.3 and will not be 
elaborated on here. 
It has taken time and a lot of effort, especially from the community programme 
employees, but most of the people in the project area have realised the benefits of 
conserving the wildlife (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000, Child & Bergstrøm 2001, WWF 
workshop 2002, SLAMU interviews 2002, village interviews 2002). The 
Community-based Natural Resource Management principles are the foundation of the 
education and knowledge the people have received through training from the 
community programme. The principles and thereby the training are in line with and 
can be seen as a part of the overarching concept Sustainable Development. As 
mentioned above, all the interviewees in Zambia expressed gratitude towards 
NORAD and said that without LIRDP and later SLAMU, there would not have been 
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much going on in the area. The current tourism was made possible due to the 
establishment of LIRDP which saved the animals people are coming to see in South 
Luangwa National Park. One said: “Without NORAD and LIRDP, no animals, 
without animals, no tourism, and without tourism, no revenue and no development” 
(local villager 2002 [interview]). This statement is illustrative, although simplifying. 
What LIRDP/SLAMU has managed to do, is to save a very important basis for 
tourism and thereby for income. Besides SLAMU, the tourism industry through the 
lodges is the biggest employer, and most of the people who have a permanent job 
work either for the lodges or for SLAMU. Still, many people are without permanent 
employment, which makes their future very insecure. They live from day to day, 
hoping to get ‘piece works’ as they call it - which is short term employment like 
painting, carpentry, cleaning and so on. There is still a long way to go to reach the 
majority of the poor people in South Luangwa. The new cash distribution system – 
Tyolela100 - is helping, but it is not enough to sustain large families, and it is seen by 
villagers as a disadvantage that it is only given out once a year (village group 
interview 2002).  
At a planning workshop I attended, current problems were listed. Most of them 
were related to health and education, like lack of clinics and medicine, lack of 
teachers and teaching material, lack of secure water access, and lack of enough and 
quality housing to attract teachers and doctors. These problems are being dealt with 
indirectly by SLAMU through the revenue the villagers receive, and through the 
capacity building of the CBNRM-section. The revenue is used for community 
projects e.g. wells and housing, and the knowledge provided by the CBNRM-section 
is used by the villagers to organise themselves and demand their rights from chiefs 
and ZAWA. The knowledge is provided through workshops on organisation, 
financial and technical issues e.g. accounting and quota-setting. 
The third question was about the autonomy of SLAMU now in relation to earlier. 
LIRDP had a pilot project status for a long time, with strong direct support from 
Kaunda as long as he was President of the Republic (until 1991). It was placed under 
                                              
100 Tyolela is a local expression for the money received directly by persons or households. It refers to folded bank notes 
placed in the pocket (Chimba 2002 [interview] , Child & Dalal-Clayton 2001:21) 
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NPWS, but had a very autonomous position, partly because of the characteristics 
mentioned above, and because of a high level of NORAD funding. The Zambian 
central authorities were often asking questions about how long this so-called pilot 
project was supposed to last, and when it would be incorporated in the formal 
governance system. NORAD tried to drag out the ‘pilot project’ period because of 
distrust in the central bureaucracy, but could not express this distrust (anonymous 
2002 [interview]). With change to SLAMU and the integration under ZAWA, some 
of the autonomy seems to have been lost, in that ZAWA’s control is clearer and more 
detail-oriented101 After the reorganisation in 1996, however, the major problems have 
been handled; SLAMU has a clearer mandate, the institutional set-up has been 
strengthened and the participation has been widened. There is as far as I can see only 
one problem in relation to the mandate. As long as the Line Ministries are still not 
able to deliver basic services, there is constant pressure on SLAMU to provide some 
of them like it used to as LIRDP102. 
The most exciting effects of SLAMU from a political science point of view are the 
democratising so-called side-effects. These mechanisms were acknowledged as 
possible, positive side-effects of the project from the beginning, but were not among 
the main objectives. However, the wider institutional implications of SLAMU are 
several, as we have referred to briefly in the previous section, 4.5. First, the local 
authorities within other areas than wildlife, like water and education, have adopted 
the SLAMU model of organisation (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000). Second, it has been 
maintained that the current CBNRM policy of ZAWA would not have been possible 
without SLAMU (Regional Manager, Mr. Matokwani May 2002: CBNRM meeting). 
Matokwani also maintained that NORAD’s financing and assistance in building the 
institution of SLAMU has been the basis for the establishment of ZAWA (ibid.). 
Third, the Forestry Department is working on legislation to empower community-
based management of forest products and has visited the Project to learn from their 
guidelines and experience. Fourth, the European Union have expressed that they wish 
to try the SLAMU model in another part of Zambia, the Lower Zambezi (Mushinge 
                                              
101 For more on this issue,  see above in sub-section 4.4.2 and section 4.5. 
102 This view is supported by the findings of Munyenyembe et. al 2000. 
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2002 [interview]). Last but not least, Mambwe District Council has expressed wishes 
to integrate the CBOs as Sub-Units of the Council, which can develop the local 
democracy.  
According to Crook & Manor (2001: 33-34) a major weakness in the current 
governance system is the lack of legally constituted sub-district structures in the 
whole of Zambia. There are however unofficial ‘village development committees’ in 
some provinces 103(ibid.), but the Eastern province is not mentioned as one of them. 
Since Crook & Manor don’t write anything about the function of these ‘village 
development committees’ it is difficult to compare them with the CBOs in South 
Luangwa (Crook & Manor 2001). From the name they can have similar functions as 
the ADCs and VAGs, but probably on a different basis than wildlife revenue. It is 
odd that the CBOs in the eastern province are not mentioned by Crook & Manor, 
since SLAMU is widely known. However, they write:  
We do not recommend that Zambia follow the example of other countries 
which have experimented with direct representation of interest groups on 
councils by giving reserved seats to associations and NGOs. Apart from the 
problem of the ‘democratic credentials’ of such interest group 
representatives, this is a device which avoids rather than deals with the 
original problem: how to make the selection and election of councillors who 
should be representing whole communities and areas more effectively 
democratic and representative (Crook & Manor 2001: 32). 
When it comes to the question of SLAMU’s effect on local governance, we have 
already mentioned in the section above, that LIRDP took over service provision in the 
early phases and that way did not contribute towards making the local government 
better able to fulfil their ‘duties’. When it was decided to scale down LIRDP, the 
responsibility for many functions was given back to Line Ministries without 
supporting them properly or doing it gradually. In the mean time, the Line Ministries 
had not become stronger or better fitted to deal with these assignments, and the result 
was that most of what had been built up by LIRDP with funding from NORAD 
collapsed (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000). Mr. Klem at NORAD saw the possibility of 
this happening and wrote about his concerns to NORAD Lusaka in comments to 
“Fourth revised project submission for phase III” (NORAD note 16.10.94). He wrote 
that the period set aside for transfer of responsibility to the Line Ministries was too 
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short, and that substantial support would be needed – his advise was not followed up 
properly. Many of the sheds built for food storage for better food security were not 
maintained and the Women’s Clubs which were seen as the only viable institutions in 
the community at the time, collapsed (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000: 69).  
In spite of failure on some areas by LIRDP in the first phases, at least they were 
trying to take responsibility for service provision that the Line Ministries were not 
able to deal with (ibid: 62-63). The most important reasons for the failures were; the 
lack of a clear mandate, serious weaknesses in the institutional set-up and lack of real 
local participation through involvement (ibid: 68-69, Chimba 2002: [interview], 
Larsen 2002: [interview], LIRDP project document # 14). The most important reason 
for the scaling down of the project was however the expenses – it was impossible to 
create enough revenue to sustain all the activities. Financial self sustainability is 
especially important to NORAD, and it was a goal from the beginning.  
My interpretation is that what they call interest groups, including associations and 
NGOs, does not include CBOs, because CBOs are democratically elected by the 
people of the communities they represent104. When seen this way, I agree with Crook 
& Manor that interest groups should not have seats in councils. CBOs can however 
contribute to a strengthening of the effectiveness of democratic local government by 
becoming formal sub-structures105.  
When former and current employees of SLAMU ([interviews]) were asked if they 
thought it would be a good idea to share the hunting revenue with the council to 
strengthen it, nobody thought so. They were highly sceptical and not willing to give 
the council another chance, since they had disappointed them earlier by not showing 
up for meetings and so on. This is an example which shows how little trust there is in 
formal government systems, like Crook & Manor (2001) and Siame (1998) also 
maintain. However, if the CBOs are integrated in the formal governance system as 
sub-units, this will mean that revenue will go automatically to the local government 
as CBOs turn into a part of it. The legal system for local government is however 
                                                                                                                                           
103 Crook & Manor 2001:34 ”for example Southern, Western, Northern”. 
104 For full description of  VAGs and ADCs, see Munyenyembe et. al. (2000) or Child & Dalal-Clayton (2001/2003). 
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intricate, which will make it difficult for Mambwe District Council to implement its 
plan. Both Crook and Manor (2001: 28) and Siame (1998: 6-7) indicate that changes 
of the legal basis of local government is needed. 
To sum up, we can safely maintain that the current mandate of SLAMU functions 
well. It covers wildlife management in the National Park and contribution to 
empowerment of the people around the park. It has lead to a higher degree of 
participation, people are demanding their rights, and slowly the development is 
improving in the shape of better infrastructure, social services delivery, and small 
business ventures. In working by the principle “we bring only knowledge” the 
CBNRM-section contributes to a lessening of the former dependency and 
subservience culture (Munyenyembe et. al. 2000). NORAD’s investments in this 
project over time has definitely brought better conditions for people and more 
sustainable use of natural resources, mainly wildlife. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
105 Crook & Manor have a list which shows how sub-district structures would help strengthen local government which 
includes; community participation, linkage for up- and downwards communication, resource channel, conflict mitigation 
between the multiplicity of levels. For full description see Crook & Manor 2001:33-37. 
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5. Conclusions and tentative recommendations 
 
The main objective of this thesis has been to find out to what degree Norwegian 
Development Co-operation is in accordance with the concept of Sustainable 
Development. There were two main reasons for wanting to do research on this theme; 
first that Development Co-operation which disregards environmental issues can be 
undermining its own activities because development is often based on natural 
resources. Second, that Sustainable Development seemed to have lost political 
momentum. Therefore, I wished to find out if it was less important in NORAD now 
than it had been when the concept had a stronger position in society in general, that is 
at the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s. 
It was also important for me to look at the actual impacts of NORAD’s work on 
project level, not just to examine the strategies and guidelines. Therefore, I went to 
Zambia to study a NORAD supported project called South Luangwa Area 
Management Unit (SLAMU) to see what they were doing, what it meant for the 
development in the area and if they were working within a sustainable development 
approach. 
What I have actually done is first to look at the importance of the mentioned 
concept for NORAD, by using Lafferty & Meadowcroft’s definition of Sustainable 
Development to see how Sustainable Development is used and if the three 
dimensions106 within the concept are equally emphasised in NORAD.  
Second, the importance of the conventions for NORAD has been analysed through 
how they are mentioned in strategies, and how they are used by NORAD employees. 
The main question in relation to the conventions was: To what extent and in which 
ways have CBD and CITES influenced NORAD’s strategies and how are they 
used in the daily work?  
Third, the importance of the concept and conventions was considered at project 
level in a developing country, namely Zambia. A ‘successful’ development project 
                                              
106 The three dimensions are social development, economic development and environmental protection, and 
they are seen as interdependent and mutually reinforcing components of SD. See 2.1 for elaboration. 
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with basis in sustainable use of natural resources was chosen as study object, 
SLAMU. The main question was: To what extent and in which ways have 
Sustainable Development, CBD and CITES influenced the SLAMU project? 
How do they promote or hamper the project?  
Fourth, I examined the institutional relationship between NORAD and SLAMU in 
light of institutional theory and implementation theory. I also wanted to see how the 
institutional relationship and their co-operation affected SLAMU’s community-
programme. Since Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is 
promoted through the community-programme, and this is considered by NORAD as 
one of two areas within SLAMU where their main goals can be reached, namely 
empowerment and poverty reduction, it was important to see how NORAD affected 
the community-programme. 
After summing up the findings and explanations, some contemplations will be 
made on the difficulties I encountered during the work with this thesis, what I have 
learned and how this knowledge can be used in the future.  
 
5.1 On the integration of environment in NORAD 
The use of the concept of Sustainable Development in NORAD is very closely 
linked to the problems they have had with the integration of environment. It is 
important to point out that I see social and economic development as just as important 
as the environment, but since they are fully integrated, that means institutionalised, in 
NORAD, the environment is ‘the problem’. This only confirms what some have 
realised a long time ago, and therefore have been trying to integrate environment to 
get closer to sustainable development work. 
Two questions were asked in section 1.2. When it comes to the question of right 
competence or will to integrate environment, there are clear indications from several 
interviewees that the competence wasn’t, and still isn’t sufficient, although it has 
been clearly improved over the twenty years since environment became part of 
NORAD’s work. The second question was about the Minister of Development, Hilde 
Frafjord Johnson’s expressed thoughts on the need to focus more thoroughly on the 
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connection between poverty and sustainable development. She expressed that this 
was needed when she took over the position as Minister, but, it has not resulted in any 
clear emphasis on this issue as far as I can see, which makes it an expressed ‘strategy’ 
which has not led to action. 
I have read the relevant strategies of NORAD and interviewed NORAD employees 
on different levels to find out what kind of position the concept has today. As shown 
in chapter 4, the strategies have become weaker and weaker on this issue as time has 
passed from the report Our Common Future was published in 1987. With so much 
focus on social development and recipient responsibility in the main strategy107, and 
nothing on the meaning of Sustainable Development or the connection between the 
three aspects, it is partially understandable that environmental factors are not properly 
integrated. There are of course other sources which contain references to Sustainable 
Development, but it can be overlooked when referring to the main strategy, since it is 
not properly integrated in it. In addition, the part of the internet pages which says 
what NORAD’s main goal is, does not even mention Sustainable Development and 
environment. If one looks further into the more specific areas of NORAD’s work 
listed on the internet pages, and also has a look on the specified strategies and work 
guidelines, it makes the situation somewhat better. The Director General was happy 
to be made aware of this, since it is important both that employees and ‘outsiders’ get 
the right impression of what is important to NORAD (Strand 2003 [interview]). 
The understanding of concepts, in this case Sustainable Development, is important. 
It seems that it is not concrete enough for the employees, which means that it needs to 
be operationalised better. This is a common problem although it could be understood 
in a quite simple manner from Our Common Future, namely that all development 
should be within the borders of nature’s carrying capacity. If the understanding and 
use of the concept is the same, or at least very similar among the employees, and 
according to the strategies, there will be less criticism from the outside, and the 
development work will be more holistic.  
                                              
107 NORAD invests in the future – NORAD’s Strategy for 2000-2005. 
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There have been several evaluations of NORAD’s performance on environment, I 
have looked at two of them; The Office of the Auditor General’s investigation108 of 
environmentally targeted development aid109 from 2002 and the ProSus report by 
Skjønsberg from 2000. The main findings of the Auditor General are that NORAD’s 
follow-up and documentation of how environmental factors are integrated into 
development co-operation projects, has some serious deficiencies (Document no. 3:4 
2002-2003) The audit revealed that environmental factors were touched upon in the 
preparatory phase, but otherwise in most of the projects which were investigated, 
there was little trace of environmental considerations in the documentation of the 
execution - and completion phases (Office of the Auditor General, press release 
08.11.2002). It is clear in guideline documents on all levels that all NORAD financed 
projects shall be evaluated in relation to environmental consequences (Auditor 
General Document no. 3: 4 2002-2003: 38). The degree of involvement and follow-
up has to be considered in relation to the recipient country’s capacity and context, but 
there is no doubt about the Norwegian responsibility to control that environmental 
considerations have been attended to (ibid.). 
Skjønsberg’s conclusions in the Prosus report from 2000 can be seen as part of an 
explanation to the findings of the Auditor General’s audit. This is because Skjønsberg 
found that environmental considerations were not properly integrated in NORAD, 
and the way the offices were organised, didn’t harmonise with the goal of integration 
(Skjønsberg 2000). The re-organisation in 2001 didn’t make any changes related to 
this issue, and the findings of the Auditor General can thereby be partly explained by 
the findings of Skjønsberg (ibid.) In other words, as long as there is no change in the 
focus on Sustainable Development including environment, it is not surprising that the 
institutionalisation of environmental considerations has still not occurred. 
It might be part of an explanation that the interest in environmental issues and 
Sustainable Development was at its highest in 1989 and had fallen dramatically by 
1993 (Langhelle 2000: 175). Langhelle argues that it is evident that Sustainable 
                                              
108 Submitted to parliament in November 2002. 
109 Environmentally targeted development aid= both development aid projects whose primary aim is to improve 
the environment, and activities that aim to integrate environmental factors into all types of development aid 
projects, in order to avoid damage to the environment as a result of the project. 
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Development has lost some of its political momentum (ibid.), and I think that shifting 
trends can have an influence on institutions as well as individuals. When Parliament 
adjusts its priorities according to shifts in opinion (ibid.), it is natural that institutions 
placed under it are affected too. The size of NORAD as an institution and thereby the 
level of bureaucratisation plus the possible ‘path dependency’110, will although lead 
back to old patterns when the different trends wear off. It will have to be a very 
strong demand from the authorities over a long period of time for something to lead 
to a real change in such an institution as NORAD, unless it is something that is 
already there just getting renewed focus, or is easily integrated into the traditional 
aspects111.  
Since my findings have led to the conclusion that the consideration of 
environmental factors has not been properly implemented, further exploration is 
needed to find reasons for this. First, it seems that the pressure from the authorities 
hasn’t been strong enough or focused enough. There have been other demands on 
NORAD that have taken over the main focus, which results in less pressure to 
integrate environmental factors and thereby no real change. Second, when various of 
the employees in NORAD are focused on the traditional developmental issues, and 
maybe not able or willing to see the importance of integrating environmental factors 
in the development work, “business as usual” will probably be the result. One reason 
for the disagreement on whether environmental factors have been integrated or not, is 
due to different interpretations by different people. Some find that it has been 
integrated, that they work according to the strategies and that environmental factors 
are always considered. Others, especially former and current employees with a strong 
interest in environmental factors, find that it has not been fully integrated. This view 
is supported by the reports by Skjønsberg and the office of the Auditor general and 
my own findings and observations112.  
                                              
110 For further contemplations on ‘path dependency’ see sub-section 4.2 4 above. 
111 By traditional aspects I am referring to social- and economic development which have been the main focus 
areas for NORAD since the beginning in the 50s. Something that is already a part of these aspects, like for 
example education and good governance, will not constitute a problem when getting renewed focus, because 
they are already institutionalised in NORAD. 
112 For references to the two mentioned evaluations, see above or in the bibliography. 
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This does not mean that environmental factors are not considered, in many cases 
environmental issues are considered to full extent. The problem is that environmental 
considerations have not been institutionalised, which means that it is not properly 
secured that environmental factors are always considered, or considered well enough. 
The stability and continuity of NORAD in environmental issues is thereby not 
secured. It is likely that the competence on social and economic development is 
higher than the competence on environment, since the first two have been an 
important part of NORAD during the entire history of the institution. One can 
maintain that the employees with knowledge, education and a special interest in 
environmental factors will make sure that necessary considerations are made, whilst 
employees who don’t see the importance of environmental factors might not make or 
have the necessary considerations made by environmental experts. Logically enough, 
it seems that the danger of not having environmental consequences secured is most 
likely to happen in projects which are not directly environmentally targeted. Even if 
the environmental consciousness is high in SLAMU, a major mistake was made when 
the building of the new headquarters started. This will be elaborated on below, in 
section 5.2. 
It seems that there is very little change of personnel in NORAD, which might be 
part of an explanation to the difficulties in changing/adapting to ‘new’ policies. The 
employees very often work for NORAD an entire lifetime, only broken off now and 
then by leaves for other temporary employment. After some time almost all of them 
come back, and two employees said that it is because it is so great to work there 
(Biseth 2002 [interview], Moen 2003 [interview]). Two others who worked there for 
a shorter period of time, and one of them who tried to implement new policies, are 
very critical towards the ‘way of work’ or the institutional culture. Even some current 
employees think that there is a resistance in the NORAD system at some level, 
against integration of environmental considerations in development co-operation. 
Smaller institutions like embassies change more often because of changes in 
personnel, especially changes in leadership can lead to very profound alterations, 
which many employees and people collaborating with embassies have experienced.  
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My assumptions are that the leadership has to have a genuine interest in, and will 
to see it through, to get environment fully integrated in all development-co-operation. 
These assumptions are supported by the OECD (2002: 36) list of ‘Elements of a 
national sustainable development strategy’. It seemed that the director general of 
NORAD was not fully aware of that it isn’t very visible that environment is an 
important aspect in NORAD (Strand 2003 [interview]). She said that it was 
something they had to sit down and have a look at, because she thinks it is a problem 
if this aspect is not visible to outsiders (on the internet and in strategies) (ibid.). It 
might also be an idea to put more emphasis on environmental factors in the 
introductory course all new employees go through. If it is stated that the integration 
of environmental factors is something that NORAD has difficulties with, it might 
motivate new employees to work towards rectifying the problem. Another possibility 
might be that the leadership put a stronger focus on the connection between the 
components within Sustainable Development; economic development, social 
development and environmental protection, and also the connection between these 
and poverty reduction.  
The integration of environment in the development work is also a part of the more 
overarching national goal that all sectors should work within Sustainable 
Development. The last can thereby not be reached before the first is finalised.  
 
5.2 On the Role of NORAD, Zambian Authorities, Sustainable 
Development and International Conventions in SLAMU 
It is difficult to divide up the effects of the different aspects in the surroundings 
like I have done in the analysis, because there are so many issues that are intertwined 
in each other. Therefore, in this section I will sum up the interrelated effects of these 
institutions, conventions and concept, for SLAMU.  
The picture that has emerged on the roles of NORAD, Zambian authorities, the 
concept of Sustainable Development and the International conventions is rather 
unambiguous. We can start with the last first since it is has turned out to be the least 
important.  
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As mentioned in section 4.3, the CBD is hardly known to the Zambians. The ones 
who had heard of it meant that it had no significance for SLAMU. Since it is not 
considered important by NORAD either, there was no flow of information on this 
convention from NORAD to SLAMU. 
CITES was better known in Zambia, and one aspect of this convention was 
considered important, namely the ban on elephant hunting. The interviewees who 
knew about this thought it had a negative effect on SLAMU, except Sauvik who 
thought it had helped in controlling the poaching in early stages (Sauvik: Jan. 2003 
[e-mail]). Child said that if sustainable hunting had been allowed SLAMU could have 
earned a lot more money, which would also have given people an even higher 
incentive not to poach on the elephants (Child 2002/2003 [interview and e-mails]). 
When Zambia among other countries applied to CITES to lift the ban on trade in 
ivory at the last conference of the parties in 2002 and it was not granted, Child argues 
that it is probably because the government is not trusted and because the number of 
elephants in Zambia still isn’t very high (Child: Jan. 2003 [e-mail]). 
When it comes to the role of NORAD’s co-operation with SLAMU to create 
Sustainable Development in the project area, almost all the informants both in 
Zambia and Norway indicate that individuals definitely have played and still play an 
important role. It is the commitment of individuals which is highlighted, something I 
saw the importance of myself during my fieldwork. Again, Child had some important 
observations, in that he has highlighted the endurance of individuals both at the 
Norwegian embassy (NORAD) and at SLAMU (Child 2002 [interview and e-mail]). 
He believes that it is extremely important to have highly qualified personnel and that 
it is more luck for SLAMU that the desk officers at NORAD have been so dedicated, 
than it being a part of NORAD’s make-up (ibid.). This is also an indication towards 
the fact that environmental considerations are not institutionalised in NORAD. As 
mentioned above, no one, neither in NORAD nor in SLAMU, came to think of the 
necessity of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) when the building of the 
new headquarters began. To their defence, it is important to mention that this was a 
one time incident and that it is being rectified in a proper manner. There is currently a 
massive study going on to make a Land Use Plan for the whole area, to secure that 
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people don’t build houses too close to the national park and to make sure that 
everything that is built is put in a suitable place. 
Many of the SLAMU employees are dedicated, but as mentioned in chapter 4, 
there have been problems related to the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) lately, 
which drain their energy and personal economies. The placement of SLAMU under 
ZAWA happened before ZAWA had established properly, and the economy and 
power relations of the authority are still not ‘settled’. This means that SLAMU 
employees don’t get their salaries on time, that ZAWA interferes in their decision-
making and they are at the moment less autonomous than they were under ZAWA’s 
predecessor, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS). With the possibilities 
that lie in the Zambia Wildlife Act and with NORAD’s continued presence, I believe 
that the problematic issues will be resolved. NORAD realises that SLAMU has come 
a long way and that their continued support is needed to make sure that what SLAMU 
has achieved will not collapse when NORAD eventually draws out. 
There is one important aspect related to the recipient responsibility principle of 
NORAD which has been touched upon in sub-section 4.4.2 above, and needs to be 
briefly elaborated on in these concluding remarks. The reason for this is that it is vital 
in trying to bring development forward, something which requires a focus on 
responsibility more than on recipient. To emphasise what Munyenyembe et. al. 
(2000: 114) states, empowerment can also be strengthened by holding people 
accountable, this way NORAD is co-responsible, and are not putting the full 
responsibility on a recipient which doesn’t have sufficient capacity. This is supported 
by Mushinge’s statement (see sub-section 4.4.2: 94), and by the audit of the Auditor 
General of Norway (see sub-sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 5.1 above). 
If integration, co-operation and eradication of differences between management 
areas in the whole of Zambia happened as a follow up and widening of the 
developments in South Luangwa, the result could be extensive development and more 
equality for all, because collaboration between public agencies and local resource 
users can produce ‘synergistic’ outcomes (Johnson 2001: 526). Even scholars who 
are sceptical towards decentralisation and what it is supposed to bring in development 
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and poverty reduction, end up recommending it113. The scholars have different 
approaches and work within different fields, but the conclusions are more or less the 
same – to lessen the expectations a bit and be aware of that decentralisation might not 
bring all the benefits that can possibly be obtained, but in most cases, some or many 
benefits evolve. There is not even one who maintains that decentralisation of 
management responsibility for natural resources is not recommendable.  
I agree with and will emphasise the advice already given to NORAD by Child and 
Braathen, when it comes to the development co-operation with Zambia. I would 
therefore advise the ones in NORAD who have not read their studies to do so. First, it 
means that NORAD should support the other management units under ZAWA to 
make sure that they can develop to the same level as SLAMU. It might be possible 
that they can do this together with other donors in a harmonised way, which could 
make the development of the other units quicker, with more funding and with all the 
experience gained in SLAMU. This is important because the current big differences 
among the territorial units create envy and efforts by ‘outsiders’ to draw SLAMU 
down. It must be avoided that ZAWA centrally can use fair distribution as a reason 
for deriving resources from SLAMU. With enduring efforts they have achieved a 
great deal over time, and the worst thing that could happen would be if what they 
have achieved was taken away by ‘outsiders’. It is also important that the people in 
the other Management Units and areas get the same opportunities to develop their 
local societies from below – that way the probability that it will be sustainable and 
lasting is higher. 
So, on NORAD’s role we can conclude with the same observation as Braathen 
(2002: 172) made in the Northern Province of Zambia, namely that NORAD’s 
presence and intervention has created space for emerging social and political forces 
that challenge the political-administrative order from below. In my view, better ways 
of democratising and making the local structures sustainable can not be found.  
 
                                              
113 Child, Crook and Manor, Crook and Sverisson, Johnson, Conyers, Munyenyembe, Cohen & Peterson, Ribot. In addition 
there are many that these scholars refer to who also recommends decentralisation. 
 121
5.3 Final concluding remarks 
As I said in chapter 3, there were three things I wished to contribute to by writing 
the part of the thesis which involved the case study project in Zambia: 
1) The hope that it can give possibilities of succeeding elsewhere, in that similar 
efforts can be made,  
2) that it can contribute to a more positive view on development aid, as a 
counterweight to the negative focus often presented in most public media,  
and  
3) to gain scientific knowledge about an important area of environment and 
development, and hopefully to be able to share it with other interested parties. 
 
By distributing this study to stakeholders in development projects, there will be 
possibilities of reaching the first aim on the list. Reaching the second aim is 
dependent on who reads this and what views they have, because I have both been 
critical and positive. All in all, I still hope I have communicated that development aid 
definitely works well in the project I have studied. As noted earlier, the problem lies 
in institutional aspects of NORAD in Oslo. It should however, be fully possible to 
rectify these by strengthening the environmental capacity and stronger will to see 
through the institutionalisation of environmental considerations.  
On the third point, I have gained a lot of knowledge on the sustainable use of 
natural resources as a means in empowerment of poor people, although there is 
always a lot left to learn. The issues of natural resource management, poverty 
reduction in a wide sense and power issues are in reality so interrelated that it is 
impossible to do a study of one of them, without having to relate it to the others.  
SLAMU is a good example which shows us that it is possible to combine 
development and environmental protection through sustainable use. It is, however, 
difficult to reach real decentralisation of management responsibility and financial 
gains, because of the difficult issue of power relations. Real decentralisation has not 
been fully and securely reached in SLAMU, although they have come a long way. It 
is therefore important to consider the circumstances when trying to reach 
decentralisation, and not forget what Crook and Sverrisson have highlighted; that 
decentralisation measures are not technically neutral devices which can be 
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‘implemented’ without constraint, as if there were no pre-existing social context 
(Crook & Sverrisson 2002: 2).  
The empirical findings from Zambia have shown that the decentralisation theories 
used are too narrow to capture the role of the CBOs. If the CBOs are considered to be 
a sub-group of NGOs, their positions in the local communities are undermined 
because they have a much wider basis than NGOs normally have. They represent the 
whole communities, not special interest groups. Even so, the theoretical contributions 
especially from Braathen (2002) and Ribot (2002 a & b) have provided me with a 
fruitful basis for the case study project. These contributions have also helped in 
putting focus on the difference between political and administrative decentralisation 
and to see how important it is to have a clear view of what we are talking about when 
it comes to decentralisation. 
The institutional theoretical contributions I have used in this study have made it 
possible to focus on some of the institutional phenomena of NORAD and the 
probable effects of these on the practical development work. In other words, I have 
been able to capture parts of the ‘infrastructure’ of the organisation, which gives 
better understanding of how NORAD works and what could be done differently to 
get closer to sustainable development work. The empirical findings of this study 
don’t provide clear support to one or the other of the two different main approaches 
within implementation theory. Some parts of the work of NORAD and SLAMU are 
decision-oriented and other parts are more process-oriented, but in general there are 
aspects of both in most of the work. There are problematical features of both – 
decision-oriented implementation can lead to few possibilities for local people to 
influence development work which affects them, and process-oriented can undermine 
democratically made decisions if the goals are totally changed. 
There are some aspects that I wish I could have looked more closely into; the role 
of central authorities, the neopatrimonialism that characterises the Zambian State, 
The function and role of parastatal units in development and how national structural 
adjustment promotes or hinders local development. The main reason why I have not 
gone further into this is because I didn’t get to interview the representatives of central 
authorities in Zambia like I had planned. My stay was too short to manage that, 
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although I tried to reach the relevant people several times. It can therefore be seen as 
a weakness of this study that their views have not been presented. However, there 
have been several studies which have done this more thoroughly that I have been able 
to use, and they correspond well with what my informants have said and my own 
impressions from the fieldwork and the Yearly Review Meeting of SLAMU in 2002. 
Issues that I have not touched upon which would have been very interesting to 
study include: the role of women in local development, the impact of malaria and 
HIV/Aids on continuity in development efforts, the role of NGOs in democratisation 
and development and the future role of former CBO members in democratisation and 
development. These are all issues that have surfaced during my fieldwork and work 
with this thesis that could be the basis for further studies in the area. 
On the possibilities of generalisation from this study, at least I can see similarities 
between this and the studies of Braathen (2002), Crook & Manor (2001) and Ribot 
2002a & b). On a more practical level, I am waiting with excitement to see what the 
future can bring of similar projects elsewhere, both in Zambia and in other countries 
with comparable natural resources. I hope that I get possibilities to contribute with 
both information and practical implementation of future projects. Both Grøva at the 
Norwegian embassy (NORAD) in Zambia and Child who has a lot of experience with 
projects of this kind, share the excitement with me and think that a spread of similar 
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Appendix 1 Figures 
 
Figure 2.3 How the money is shared in the new organisation model. (From Boje 2000:12) 
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Figure an example of how communities are organised (from Boje 2000). 
The about 4000 adult members in Chief Kakumbi’s area are organised in 5 different 
Village Action Groups (VAGs). At general meetings the members of each VAG elect a 
committee. Senior representatives from all the VAG committees constitute the Area 
Development Committee – the co-ordinating body of the whole chiefdom. The ADC will 
be transformed into a Community Resource Board under Zambia Wildlife Authority. 
 
 
Figure Organisation model – NORAD head office (from www.NORAD.no) 
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Appendix 2 List of interviews 
 
NORAD (in alphabetical order): 
Helle Biseth, Senior consultant, Dept for Southern Africa , Zambia-Malawi team 
interview Nov. 2002 and e-mail Dec. 2002 
Wenche Gulnes, Adviser, country co-ordinator for Zambia, Dept for Southern 
Africa, Zambia-Malawi team, interview Nov. 2002 and e-mails Oct., Nov. and 
Dec. 2002. 
Jon Lomøy, Head of Dept for Southern Africa, NORAD, Interview April 2002  
Eli Moen, former country co-ordinator for Zambia, formerly in the Technical Dept. 
and Dept. for Civil Society and Private Sector Development. Currently on research 
leave. Interview Jan. 2003. 
Stein Inge Nesvåg, Consultant, Dept for Southern Africa, Zambia-Malawi team. 
Interview Nov. 2002. 
Inger Næss, Adviser, NORAD Interview December 2001 + e-mails. 
Knut Opsal, Head of Unit for energy and environment, NORAD. Interviews 11.01 
and 28.11.2002 + e-mails) 
Leif Sauvik, former employee at the embassy in Lusaka, currently at the embassy 
in Dar es Salaam, e-mail January 2003. 
Tove Strand, General Director. Interview 03.03.2003. 
Jon Heikki Ås, Adviser, Unit for energy and environment, NORAD Interviews 
11.01 and 28.11. 2002 + e-mails. 
Paul Sverre Tharaldsen, NORAD. Interview and e-mail 
 
Former NORAD employees: 
Regine Andersen, former NORAD employee, now researcher at Fritjof Nansens 
Institute. Conversations, telephone and e-mail. 
Rasmus Hansson, Director WWF Norway, former environmental adviser, NORAD 
Interview Apr. 2002 and e-mails Oct 2002, Jan. 2003. 
Gunnar Jordfald, Director SNT, former head of environment project, NORAD e-
mail Jan. 2003. 
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Thor S. Larsen, former second secretary Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia and 
adviser at NORAD HQ, and Director of Noragric, International Centre at the 
Norwegian Agricultural College. Interviews Apr. 2002, and Dec. 2002, e-mails 
Jan, Oct, and Dec. 2002.   
 
In ZAMBIA: 
-Magne Grøva, Second Secretary Norwegian Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia (interview 
June 2002 and e-mails Aug, Oct. Nov. and Dec. 2002, Jan. 2003. 
- Brian Child, former technical Advisor, SLAMU, currently Consultant at 
Development Services and Initiatives, Southern Africa. Interview June 2002, e-
mails Oct, Nov. Dec. 2002, Jan. 2003. 
 - Thomas Mushinge, Commercial Director ZAWA HQ, former Commercial 
Director SLAMU. Interview June 2002. 
 
-SLAMU interviews, all in May and June 2002: 
Edwin Matokwani, Regional Manager Eastern Province, ZAWA 
Lewis Mwamba, Head of personnel 
Charles Skabala, Senior wildlife police officer 
Patrick Sakanga, Wildlife Police officer 
Mrs. Matokwani, Personnel clerk  
Moses Mukumbi, Park Ranger 
Enok Kamwendo, driver (employed from the very beginning in 1987) 
Tindi Chimba, Data entry clerk, SLAMU, and member of core team in Land Use 
Planning project, WWF. 
 
WWF (Zambia and Norway): 
Rodgers Lubilo, former manager of CBNRM programme and Extension officer 
SLAMU, ZAWA, now land use planning coordinator WWF. Interview June 2002, 
e-mails Aug, Oct, Nov, 2002.  
Leif Jon Fosse, Adviser, WWF Norway. Interview Apr. 2002. 
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Norwegian Ministry of the Environment (MoE), interviews and e-mails: 
Kjell Glomnes, Dept for International co-operation. section for global co-operation. 
Interview Apr. 2002. 
Gunnbjørg Nåvik Dept for International co-operation, section for global co-operation. 
Interview Apr. 2002, e-mail Jan. 2003.  
Andre Thomas Eid, Dept for International co-operation, former environment adviser 
in NORAD on leave from MoE (sept.2001-sept 2002). Interview Jan. 2003. 
 
